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Privileges or Immunities
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
On June 8, 1866, as the Senate prepared to take its final vote on the pro-
posed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Senator Reverdy Johnson of
Maryland moved to delete the first part of the second sentence, the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. He made the motion "simply because [he did] not
understand what would be the effect of that."2 The motion was rejected without
a recorded vote, and the Amendment passed with the clause intact.3
As usual, however, Reverdy Johnson had a point.4 The clause mystifies
us no less than it did him.5 Judging by the Supreme Court's case law, one
would think that Johnson's motion had passed. No important line of decision
rests on the clause; every student of constitutional law quickly learns that it was
virtually read out of the document by the Slaughter-House Cases.6 The disap-
pearance of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, of course, has not kept Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming the principal font of constitu-
tional law through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. But this
result seems upside down to those students of the Fourteenth Amendment who
believe that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was thought by its framers to
be one of the central elements of Section 1.7 It is almost as strange as if the
Supreme Court had developed its ramified system of federal jurisdiction
doctrine solely in cases under the Multistate Land Grants Clause.!
This Article is one more attempt to end this embarrassment. My main thesis
rests on a distinction, central during Reconstruction and still familiar today,
between substantive and equality-based constitutional limitations. A substantive
protection either prescribes or forbids a certain content of state law. An equali-
ty-based protection, by contrast, says nothing about the substance of the state's
I. U.S. CONST. amend. xiV, § 1.
2. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (1866).
3. Id.
4. Johnson was Attorney General of the United States from 1849-1850 and was twice elected Senator
from Maryland, first as a Whig and then as a Democrat. From the 1820's until his death in 1876, he was
a leading practitioner before the Supreme Court. See 92 U.S. v-xvi (1876) (tributes of Supreme Court Bar
upon Johnson's death).
5. The standard view regarding the effect intended by the drafters of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause seems to be that it "has been a mystery since its adoption." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMIERICA 166 (1989).
6. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
7. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152, 163 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); JOHN H. ELY, DEiOcRAcy AND DISTRUST 22 (1980).
8. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies
"between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States").
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law; it instead requires that the law, whatever it is, be the same for all citizens.
I argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is, with respect to everyday
rights of state law, the latter kind of protection. The main point of the clause
is to require that every state give the same privileges and immunities of state
citizenship-the same positive law rights of property, contract, and so forth-to
all of its citizens.
This equality-based reading becomes the natural one once we understand
that in 1866, when people discussed abridgments of the privileges or immunities
of citizens, they mainly were talking about laws that deprived certain classes
of citizens of the civil rights accorded to everyone else. Such abridgments were
called Black Codes. The Codes, which the ex-Confederate states enacted in
1865 and 1866 before the onset of Radical Reconstruction, restricted freed
slaves' rights to make and enforce private contracts, to own and convey real
and personal property, to hold certain jobs, to seek relief in court, and to
participate in common life as ordinary citizens. Some included vagrancy laws
that effected a virtual return to slavery for those unfortunate enough to be
caught up in them.9
This equality-based reading provides a solution to the larger riddle of the
Fourteenth Amendment, namely discovering how the text of Section 1 accom-
plishes its primary purpose. That purpose was to mandate certain rules of racial
equality, especially those contained in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. The Act guaranteed that black and white citizens would be equal with
respect to a list of vitally important rights.
My argument begins by demonstrating that such a riddle exists. With the
problem identified, the discussion turns to a brief history of the Amendment's
drafting. The principal lesson to be drawn is the centrality of the Civil Rights
Act. With that history in mind, I take up the concept of equality as it was
understood during Reconstruction, suggesting that the Republicans phrased their
opposition to race discrimination in terms of the more general principle that
all citizens were entitled to the same basic rights of citizenship.
In the terminology of Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment, a law
abridged a state law right when it took that right away from only one group
of persons. Black Codes served as the quintessential example of an abridgment
of state law rights. A law changing the content of a right equally for everyone
was not an abridgment. The privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States include the very rights deriving from state law that were restricted by
Black Codes.10 Thus, an amendment that forbade the states from abridging
9. The enactment and content of the Black Codes are described in 6 CHARLES FAIRAN, RECONSTRUC-
TION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 110-17 (1971). See also S. EXEc. Doc. No. 6,39th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867)
(collecting Black Codes); EDWARD McPHERsoN, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 29-44 (Washington, D.C., Philp & Solomons, 1871)
(summarizing Black Codes). I discuss a number of examples in more detail below.
10. This is true despite Slaughter-House's assertions to the contrary. See infra notes 108-16 and
accompanying text.
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privileges or immunities would ban caste legislation with respect to citizens'
rights and place the principle of the Civil Rights Act in the Constitution.
The natural objection is that I have misplaced the Fourteenth Amendment's
requirement of equality. Orthodox teachings maintain that the Equal Protection
Clause constitutionalizes the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This orthodoxy, howev-
er, is belied by the way in which the concept of the "protection of the laws"
was used in 1866.11 I argue that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
more likely understood the "protection of the laws" to be a narrower body of
rights than either "the privileges and immunities of citizens" or those given
attention by the Civil Rights Act. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause is not best
understood as accomplishing the principal purpose of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
After presenting this interpretation of the two clauses, I consider the real
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in more detail and discuss its
application to various Fourteenth Amendment questions. I do not suggest that
there are easy answers to the questions thus formulated, but they have the virtue
of being the Constitution's questions rather than our own.
I. THE RIDDLE OF THE TEXT
A. Posing The Riddle
This Article suggests an unorthodox reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 That reading is part of an attempt to
do something surprisingly difficult: to explain how the language of the Amend-
ment can have the meaning that it is supposed to have. Virtually everyone
agrees that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended at least to
empower Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866.13 Most students of
history would go a bit further and say that the Amendment actually writes the
11. See infra notes 199-225 and accompanying text.
12. The Constitution contains both the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to reduce confusion, I usually will
refer to the Article IV provision as the Comity Clause, although I will call it the Privileges and Immunities
Clause in contexts that raise the question whether the clause is about interstate comity only.
13. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. As Nelson explains, "section one was added to the
amendment at least in part to remove doubts about the constitutionality of the 1866 act." NELSON, supra
note f, at 104. Those Republicans who thought that the Act was constitutional without the amendment have
relied mainly on Congress' power to eliminate badges of slavery under the 13th Amendment. This was the
theory espoused by the Act's author, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois. See infra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
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substance of the 1866 Act into the Constitution. 14 Any theory of the Four-
teenth Amendment must therefore explain how it validates the Civil Rights Act.
1. The Inadequacy of the Equal Protection Clause
The answer is not immediately obvious. The Civil Rights Act first makes
certain people citizens of the United States. It then in effect forbids the states
from discriminating among citizens on the basis of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude with respect to a number of matters. If we turn to the
Amendment, things get off to a good start. It too begins by defining American
citizenship so that native-born former slaves will be citizens. The analysis
breaks down, however, when we try to match the Act with the second sentence
of Section 1.
The orthodox derivation of the Act from the words of the Amendment
holds that the Equal Protection Clause does the job. The clause does have the
word "equal" in it, but its suitability for this task ends there. First, unlike both
the Civil Rights Act and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause extends to all persons, not simply citizens. This difference, which
is striking to begin with, becomes more suspicious when we realize that
nineteenth-century American law frequently distinguished between the rights
of citizens and the rights of noncitizens, principally aliens.
15
Second, the Equal Protection Clause's function as the basis of the Act rests
on a piece of textual sleight of hand familiar from Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
16
which asserts that "the equal protection of the laws" means "the protection of
equal laws."'7 If that seems obvious to us, it is because custom has run a
groove in our minds. By shifting the focus from "protection" to "laws," the Yick
Wo maneuver draws our attention away from the embarrassing fact that the
subject of the Equal Protection Clause is protection. That word suggests either
the administration of the laws or, if it is about their content, laws that protect
as opposed to laws that do other things. In order for the clause to be a require-
ment of equality in everything the states do, the word "protection" must simply
drop out, so that the text would read "equal laws" rather than "the equal
protection of the laws."
14. Section 1 of the Act first stated that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, were citizens of the United States. It then provided that in every
State and Territory all citizens, without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude, should have
the same rights as white citizens
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property ... and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other.
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
15. See, e.g., infra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
16. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
17. Id. at 369.
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2. The Mystery of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
If the Equal Protection Clause is ill adapted to the function it is has long
been called on to perform, we must look to the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
which seems promising at first. Like the Act, and unlike the Equal Protection
Clause, it deals with the rights of citizens. Better yet, it refers to the "privileges
or immunities of citizens," which in the 1860's often meant the very private
law rights of contract and so forth that the Act dealt with. But although the Act
and the clause appear to deal with the same subject matter of citizens' rights,
they seem to provide different kinds of protection. Recall the distinction noted
earlier between equality-based and substantive provisions. The Act is an
antidiscrimination requirement that says nothing about the content of state laws.
Thus, it is an equality-based provision. The clause, by contrast, reads like the
First Amendment, which forbids Congress from abridging the freedom of
speech. The content of the freedom of speech is given by the Constitution, not
by Congress. If the Privileges or Immunities Clause is like the First Amend-
ment in this regard, it is not an antidiscrimination provision but a substantive
protection for the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
whatever those rights may be.
If that is what the clause means, our search for the ground of the Act is
in serious trouble. As a substantive provision, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause could mean one of two things. First, the privileges and immunities it
protects might be rights that are not identical to the specific rights contained
in the positive law of the states. In that case, the clause requires that the law
of every state be such as not to invade the related protected right. For example,
it could require that the Maryland law of contract respect some minimum right
to enter into agreements. This limitation would not, however, dictate all of
Maryland's contract law; the parol evidence rule could take any number of
forms.
If the Privileges or Immunities Clause gives this kind of substantive
protection, then it does not constitutionalize or authorize the Civil Rights Act.
Consider a federal constitutional provision stating that everyone shall have a
substantive right to own property. This gives everyone the same minimum
rights. But it is not equivalent to saying that everyone shall have the same right
to own property. As long as there is any form of property ownership that is
outside the minimum-say, the right to own in tenancy by the entireties-the
states will remain free to create that form or not, and to permit only certain
13911992]
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persons to enjoy it.18 Absolute protection for the minimum has no effect on,
and therefore does not mandate equality with respect to, anything outside of
the minimum.
The second possibility, if the clause is substantive, is that the privileges and
immunities of citizens are not minimum rights, but a complete specification of
the law in certain areas. This reading would constitutionalize the Civil Rights
Act in a sense, because the law it created would be the same for all races. Such
a reading, however, would achieve this constitutionalization by dictating most
of state law. There is but one Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to all the
states and cannot be changed without amending the Constitution. As a result,
it would be impossible for the states or Congress to change, say, the rule
against perpetuities; moreover, questions would inevitably arise concerning
exactly what form of that rule-among the various forms in use among the
states-had been constitutionalized.
3. The Riddle Restored
Herein lies the riddle. The Equal Protection Clause seems to have the
necessary focus on equality, but its subject matter is limited to the protection
of the laws, and it extends beyond citizens to all persons. The Privileges or
Immunities Clause has the right subject matter and the right coverage, because
it is about citizens' rights, but it appears to be a substantive limitation, not a
ban on discrimination. Neither seems to require equality with respect to the
rights of citizenship set out in the Civil Rights Act. How, then, did the Four-
teenth Amendment constitutionalize the Act?
The standard response to these textual criticisms is to attribute the difficul-
ties to inept draftsmanship, in particular the sloppiness of Representative John
Bingham of Ohio, the principal author of the second sentence of Section 1.19
This suggests that we simply must live with a gap between the words of the
Amendment and the legal rules it enacts. We need not. I offer a reading of
Section 1 that is textually sound and that constitutionalizes the Civil Rights Act
without writing a uniform national private law into the Constitution. This
reading revolves around an unfamiliar way of understanding the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, under which it ensures that all the citizens of every state
18. To take another example, imagine a substantive constitutional provision stating that everyone shall
have a right to the protection of personal security. That would not be the same as the Civil Rights Act's
rule that citizens of all races shall have the same protection of personal security. A state could comply with
the substantive requirement if it made and enforced criminal laws against assault, battery, murder, and so
forth. Having done so, it could then give additional tort protection only to some racial group. Such a law
would comply with the substantive rule but would violate the Civil Rights Act.
19. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 215-20 (1977) (stating that fact that
Privileges or Immunities Clause applies to citizens while other clauses apply to all persons is inexplicable
and probably reflects poor drafting).
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shall be entitled to the privileges and immunities of state citizenship, thereby
mandating equality of rights.
B. Other Interpreters
While such an understanding is unfamiliar, it has significant advantages
over current suggested readings of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Inter-
preters of the clause fall roughly into two groups: David Currie and everyone
else. Only Currie, to my knowledge, maintains that the clause is primarily an
antidiscrimination provision.20 Under his reading, the actual content of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States is given by positive
law, state and national, rather than by the Fourteenth Amendment. What is
crucial is not the content of those rights but the understanding that guaranteeing
all citizens their state law rights would constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act.
This Article provides an explanation of how the text of the clause can mean
what Currie and I say it means, and of how that meaning is rooted in the
thought and usage of the Reconstruction Republicans. I also present passages
from the legislative history of the Reconstruction era in which the equality-
based reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was employed, and I give
a more extended account of the application of the clause in its antidiscrimina-
tion mode.
Other contemporary students of the Privileges or Immunities Clause assume
that it is a substantive provision like the First Amendment, and that the trick
is to understand the phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States" as we might try to understand the freedom of speech.2' Possible mean-
ings generally fall into three classes. Best known are the rights contained in the
first eight amendments to the Constitution, stripped of the labels that identify
them as pertaining only to the federal government.22 Next, some commentators
maintain that privileges and immunities include constitutionally protected
versions of natural rights in a Lockean sense, preeminently rights of private
20. CURRIE, supra note t, at 342-51. Earl Maltz suggests that the notion of "limited absolute equality"
was central to Republican thought, EARL M. MALTz, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869, at 4 (1990), and that it may be reflected in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, id. at 92
(Bingham's proposal, the ancestor of the clause, reflected limited absolute equality). Maltz's discussion of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, however, appears to assume that it is entirely substantive; if I
understand him correctly, he means to say that the clause provides equal rights in the same way the First
Amendment provides everyone with the same protection for freedom of speech. Id. at 106-20.
21. Possible readings, all based on the assumption that the clause is entirely substantive, are surveyed
in Tinothy S. Bishop, Comment, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Intent, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 142 (1984).
22. The First Amendment has such a label on its face, as does the provision in the Seventh Amendment
that prevents any court of the United States from reexamining jury factfinding other than according to the
rules of the common law. The Supreme Court held that the other amendments implicitly are limited to the
federal government in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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property and liberty of contract.23 Finally, some have suggested that the phrase
requires us to construct a general notion of national citizenship and its rights
based on the structure of the Constitution and the relationship that it establishes
between government and the individual.
These possibilities can be mixed and matched. Justice Hugo Black main-
tained that the clause applies the first eight amendments to the states and does
nothing else.' William Winslow Crosskey took the same view.Y A more
recent exponent of Crosskey's thesis, Michael Kent Curtis, suggests that the
privileges and immunities referred to by the clause include the rights of the Bill
of Rights, other personal rights contained in the Constitution such as the writ
of habeas corpus, and other fundamental rights.2 The best known critic of
Justice Black's view, Charles Fairman, denied total incorporation but evidently
thought that, to the extent that the clause has an intelligible meaning at all, it
protects those Bill of Rights liberties that qualify as fundamental. 27
Others emphasize natural rights of property and liberty. Bernard Siegan
maintains that the clause embodies a doctrine of natural rights familiar to us
from the old-style substantive due process s embodied in Lochner v. New
York.29 Bruce Ackerman evidently endorses a Lockean reading of the clause's
original meaning.30 John Hart Ely develops a national citizenship theory most
23. Here and elsewhere, when I refer to Lockean rights I mean the kinds of rights widely discussed
by those who participated in the 19th-century development of the liberal tradition of which Locke was a
source and symbol. I do not mean to imply anything about the actual thought of John Locke.
24. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, ., dissenting).
25. 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1089-95 (1953).
26. MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (1986).
27. Fairman first presented his anti-incorporation argument in Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
Although he agreed that the clause, if it means anything, protects some freedoms contained in the Bill of
Rights, Fairman's final position seems to have been one of skepticism. In his account of the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Fairman presented Reverdy Johnson's incomprehension concerning the Privileges
or Immunities Clause and concluded that "[c]oming from him, that amounted to a certificate that, for
purposes of litigation, the privileges and immunities clause did not have a definite meaning." FAIRMAN,
supra note 9, at 1297.
28. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPEmE COURT'S CONSTITUTION 46-71 (1987). Siegan also suggests
that the clause protects some, but not all, of the rights listed in the first eight amendments. See, e.g., id.
at 117.
29. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30. Ackerman intimates a natural rights approach to privileges and immunities in Bruce Ackerman,
Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE L.J 1419, 1428-30 (1990) (book review) [hereinafter Ackerman,
Grand Inquisition]. Following his principle of constitutional synthesis, Ackerman elsewhere suggests that
the 14th Amendment's original meaning arose from a synthesis with the principles of the Constitution of
1787 and that its meaning today must reflect the founding, the libertarian and egalitarian impulse of
Reconstruction, and the rejection of common law categories of property and contract (and hence, presum-
ably, Lockean rights) in the constitutional revolution of the 1930's. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 521-36 (1989) [hereinafter Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics]. If I understand Ackerman correctly, he regards the Privileges or Immunities Clause as wholly
substantive and believes that the Equal Protection Clause is the only equality requirement of Section 1.
Philip Kurland has also suggested that an updated "fundamental rights" reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause could be used "to define and protect the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens
[Vol. 101: 13851394
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extensively: he argues that the privileges and immunities of citizens include
"representation-reinforcing" rights that are necessary to ensure a pluralistic
political system and to protect political minorities from breakdowns in plural-
istic politics.31
Other theories of the clause argue that we can find its full meaning by
relating it to other parts of the Fourteenth Amendment. Raoul Berger maintains
that the Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses, taken together,
forbid race discrimination with respect to the rights listed in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and no others. According to Berger, the content of the constitution-
al rule comes from the concept of privileges or immunities, while its antidis-
crimination character comes from the requirement of equal protection.32 Robert
Kaczorowski suggests that Section 1 of the Amendment achieves its full
meaning in connection with the enforcement power contained in Section 5, and
that together they give Congress power to define and protect rights of national
citizenship.33
All the substantive readings, however, contain important flaws. First, by
focusing on the rights of national citizenship, they ignore the state citizenship
guaranteed by the first sentence of Section 1 and therefore provide at most an
incomplete account of the citizenship rights protected by the clause. Next, they
make it impossible for the Privileges or Immunities Clause to ground the Civil
Rights Act. Precisely because they require that the states respect whatever
substance the concept of "privileges or immunities" has, they cannot produce
the purely equality-based character of the Act, which permits the states to have
any private law they like, as long as it is the same for all citizens. The readings
that find their content in natural rights or some general notion of citizenship
make the clause quite difficult to interpret: it is much harder to read the law
of nature than of, say, Georgia. Incorporation is subject to the traditional
objection that the phrase "privileges or immunities" seems a rather indirect way
of saying something very simple. Finally, all of these readings, by requiring
in a highly organized service state." Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour
Come Round At Last?," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 420; see also Normand G. Benoit, The Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Can There Be Life After Death?, 11 SUFFoLK U. L. REV.
61 (1976) (modernized Privileges or Immunities Clause doctrine should balance government interest and
weight of asserted right).
31. Ely grounds his theory on the claim that
the most plausible interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is, as it must be, the one
suggested by its language-that it was a delegation to future constitutional decision makers to
protect certain rights that the document neither lists, at least not exhaustively, nor even in any
specific way gives directions for finding.
ELY, supra note 7, at 28. Charles Black's profoundly influential essay on the structural approach to
constitutional interpretation also sketches a concept of national citizenship. CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR.,
STRUCTURE AND REATIONSHIM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39-51 (1969).
32. BERGER, supra note 19, at 18-19.
33. Robert I. Kaczorowski,Revolutionary Conytitutionalism in theEra ofthe Civil War andReconstruc-
tion, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 913-17 (1986). Kaczorowski does not suggest that Section 1 has no self-
executing effect in the absence of federal legislation. Id. at 915.
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that the Equal Protection Clause be broad enough to encompass the Civil Rights
Act, put weight on that clause that it does not easily bear.
The problematic nature of the clause, and of most of the theories of it that
have been put forward, has led some commentators simply to throw up their
hands. Fairman intimated such sentiments, but the most prominent prophet of
despair is Judge Robert Bork, whose view probably represents the conventional
wisdom. He observes that no consensus has ever developed on even the rough
outlines of the provision's meaning and suggests that because it is unintelligible
we should therefore treat it as we would a provision that was obscured by an
ink blot.34 While I agree that Judge Bork's conclusion follows from his prem-
ise, the purpose of this Article is to render that premise obsolete.
C. Method
The historical discussion that follows will be guided by the riddle posed
here: How does the Fourteenth Amendment place the antidiscrimination rule
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the Constitution? My answer is that it does
so through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. First, the privileges and
immunities of state citizenship include the legal rights referred to by the Civil
Rights Act. Second, a restriction of a citizen's rights, on a basis that is incom-
patible with the Reconstruction idea of equality, constitutes an abridgment of
rights. The clause therefore ensures that when a state's law defines these rights,
it does so in keeping with that idea of equality.35 I accompany this reading of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause with an unfamiliar reading of the Equal
Protection Clause, which interprets it as requiring equality only with respect
to the protection of the laws, a subset of the functions of government. That
subset consists of the remedial aspects of law that protect primary rights. Not
only is that subset smaller than all the activities of government, it is smaller
than the privileges and immunities of citizens.
34. BORIC, supra note 5, at 166; see also Wallace Mendelson, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amend-
ment-Abuse by Contraction vs. Abuse by Expansion, 6 HASTJNOs CoNsT. L.Q. 437, 451 (1979) (stating
that Privileges or Immunities Clause is inspiring, but provides no judicially manageable standards). This
conventional wisdom is reinforced by the fact that the most thorough and thoughtful recent study of the
14th Amendment declines to reach a firm conclusion about the original meaning of any part of Section 1.
NELSON, supra note t.
35. This relatively limited approach might be criticized for trivializing the 14th Amendment by treating
it as a mere "superstatute," a change in the constitutional rules, rather than a "transformative amendment"
that changes the Constitution's interpretive principles. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note
30, at 521-25. Ackerman's claim that the 14th Amendment is not just a change in the rules, however, seems
to rest on the prior conclusion that it is highly vague and general. If I am correct that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has a clearer meaning than orthodoxy supposes, then Ackerman's approach is less
plausible. I do not intend to trivialize the 14th Amendment. There is nothing necessarily trivial about a
change in the constitutional rules, even if that change is expressed clearly--the 17th Amendment remains
important although everyone knows what it means (direct election of senators). Besides, the 14th Amend-
ment, as I understand it, works a deep change in American federalism even if it does not turn federalism
on its head.
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For each of these interpretations, my claims are twofold. First, I assert that
the interpretation that I urge is one that someone in 1866 could have meant by
the language of the two clauses. The most important part of the Article con-
cerns this claim with respect to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In order
to make the claim, I have recovered and reassembled the conceptual and
terminological building blocks of the equality-based reading. Those building
blocks consist of the idea of the privileges and immunities of state citizen-
ship-the everyday rights covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1866-and the
idea that a state abridges a state law right when it denies that right to a class
of citizens, but not when it alters the content of that right equally for all. If we
understand the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause this way, then it
forbids Black Codes but does not forbid changes in, for example, the law of
real property.
Second, I claim that, in fact, some Republicans adopted the equality-based
view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause during Reconstruction. I do not
mean to suggest that it was the only reading put forth or accepted. Indeed, I
hesitate to attribute to most participants in the framing and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment any precise notion of the meaning of Section 1, other
than that it was designed to forbid Black Codes and constitutionalize the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Similarly, with respect to the Equal Protection Clause, I
note that in the nineteenth century, the phrase "the protection of the laws" was
used to refer to the rules, institutions, and activities of government that secured
rights against invasion. Again, there is evidence that this understanding was
common, although probably not universal, among Republicans.
Beyond that, I avoid saying much about broader questions concerning
Reconstruction. In particular, this Article asserts nothing (or almost nothing)
about the relative strength of conservative, moderate, and radical Republicans
during the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
such questions of political history are common fare, I do not feel competent
to address them. Fortunately, it is not necessary to do so in order to recover
the equality-based reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
II. ANOTHER BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 1
This part of the Article describes the events leading to the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the legal doctrines that the Amendment's drafters
employed. The next part shows how the Privileges or Immunities Clause can
be understood as an antidiscrimination provision that grounds the Civil Rights
Act and discusses what the clause seems to have meant to its Republican
supporters.
1992] 1397
The Yale Law Journal
A. The Comity Clause
The concept of privileges and immunities was not new in 1866. Article IV,
Section 2 of the original United States Constitution begins: "The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States. 36 This clause forbids the states from giving unfavorable treat-
ment to visiting out-of-state Americans with respect to the body of rights that
constitutes the privileges and immunities of state citizenship.37 From this
reading comes the provision's usual name, the Comity Clause.
Two features of the clause as usually understood deserve attention. First,
its protections extend only to citizens of American states who are temporarily
in other states, but who have retained citizenship in their home state. It has no
effect, either substantive or equality-based, on the treatment a state gives its
own citizens." Second, the Comity Clause does not impose a complete ban
on unfavorable treatment of visiting Americans. Rather, it applies only to the
privileges and immunities of citizens, whatever those privileges and immunities
may be.
The limitation to privileges and immunities came up in the most famous
Comity Clause case of all, one that was often quoted in 1866: Corfield v.
Coryell.39 Plaintiff Corfield, apparently a citizen of Delaware, owned a fishing
boat called the Hiram, which was leased and then subleased to a fisherman,
who took her to rake oysters in a part of Delaware Bay claimed by New
Jersey.4° During the fishing expedition, the Hiram was seized by an armed
New Jersey vessel, taken up the Maurice River to Leesburg, New Jersey, and
sold as prize.41
Corfield brought a federal diversity action for trespass against Coryell, who
had acted as prize master. Coryell claimed that his action was justified under
a New Jersey statute that prohibited any person not an "actual inhabitant and
36. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The two clauses about privileges and immunities use different
conjunctions for reasons of logic. The Article IV provision is an affirmative mandate and therefore gives
"privileges and immunities." The second sentence of the 14th Amendment is a prohibition. In order to forbid
abridgments of both privileges and immunities, it uses the connective "or," thereby distributing the negation.
If it said "and," a strong argument could be made that a law was forbidden only if it abridged both a
privilege and an immunity.
37. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180-81 (1868).
38. The Comity Clause assumes that there is a law of state citizenship without saying what that law
is, just as other provisions of the Constitution assume that there is a law of national citizenship without
saying what it is. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (President must be natural born citizen). This
silence, and the importance of the issue for a variety of questions concerning slavery, made citizenship one
of the most hotly contested legal questions in the decades preceding the Civil War. See, e.g., Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see also 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382 (1862) (free person of color
born in the United States is citizen of the United States and eligible to be master of vessel engaged in
coasting trade).
39. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.ED. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
40. Id. at 547.
41. At the prize hearing, the Hiram was defended by an associate of the subIessee, the sublessee "Keene
having escaped under an apprehension of being sued by a person living at Leesburg, to whom he was
indebted." Id.
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resident" of New Jersey from raking for oysters in New Jersey waters from a
boat not wholly owned by a New Jersey citizen.42 Corfield replied that the
New Jersey statute was invalid under the Commerce Clause and the Comity
Clause, that the jurisdiction of the New Jersey prize court was ousted by the
federal admiralty jurisdiction, and that the relevant water was not within the
territory of New Jersey.43
Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting on circuit, held for the defendant. He
rejected Corfield's Commerce Clause argument, holding that the statute was
not a regulation of commerce but an allocation of property rights,' and said
that federal admiralty jurisdiction did not oust that of the New Jersey court.45
Justice Washington began his discussion of Corfield's Article IV claim with
a now-famous description of the privileges and immunities of citizens.
46
Corfield, however, involved not some well-known fundamental right, but
oysters, and Justice Washington found that citizens enjoyed commonly owned
42. Id. at 547-48.
43. Id. at 550.
44. Id. at 550-51.
45. Id. at 552-53.
46. The discussion begins:
The next question is, whether this act infringes that section of the constitution which declares
that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states?" The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.
What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to
enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject neverthe-
less to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes
of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions
than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular
privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of
privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated
and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. These, and
many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and
the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other state, was manifestly
calculated (to use the expression of the preamble of the corresponding provision of the old
articles of confederation) "the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different states of the Union."
Id. at 551-52.
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oysters as property, not privileges or immunities.47 Thus, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause did not provide any basis for Corfield's claim.4s
In the first half of the nineteenth century, various understandings of the
Comity Clause and the concept of privileges and immunities were put for-
ward.4 9 The interstate comity reading was very prominent and appears to have
47. It goes on to say:
But we cannot accede to the proposition which was insisted on by the counsel, that, under this
provision of the constitution, the citizens of the several states are permitted to participate in all
the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other particular state, merely upon the
ground that they are enjoyed by these citizens; much less, that in regulating the use of the
common property of the citizens of such state, the legislature is bound to extend to the citizens
of all the other states the same advantages as are secured to their own citizens. A several fishery,
either as the right to it respects running fish, or such as are stationary, such as oysters, clams,
and the like, is as much the property of the individual to whom it belongs, as dry land, or land
covered by water, and it is equally protected by the laws of the state against the aggressions of
others, whether citizens or strangers. Where those private rights do not exist to the exclusion
of the common right, that of fishing belongs to all the citizens or subjects of the state. It is the
property of all; to be enjoyed by them in subordination to the laws which regulate its use. They
may be considered as tenants in common to this property; and they are so exclusively entitled
to the use of it, that it cannot be enjoyed without the tacit consent, or the express permission
of the sovereign who has the power to regulate its use.
Id. at 552.
48. The constitutional discussion was actually unnecessary. Corfield's action was in trespass; Justice
Washington held that it should have been brought in case, because Corfield was not in actual or constructive
possession of the Hiram when she was captured. Id. at 549, 555. (The forms of action are truly fundamental;
I am indebted to Gary Lawson for this point.)
The question whether the Comity Clause is limited to comity has been disputed by modem commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Charles J. Antieu, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1967) (clause gives substantive protection).
There is also controversy as to which of these views Justice Washington adopted. See, e.g., SIEGAN, supra
note 28, at 48-49 (Justice Washington thought the Comity Clause protected citizens against their own states).
I think Justice Washington meant to embrace the comity reading. First, the point of the invocation of
"fundamental" rights is the distinction between such rights and oysters. Moreover, Justice Washington seems
to have been talking about kinds of rights when he said that they fall under general categories. Finally, his
explanation that the citizens of each state were to enjoy these privileges in every other state, combined with
his appeal to the interstate harmony purpose of the provision, reinforces the antidiscrimination reading.
Whatever he may have implied in Corfield, Justice Washington very likely subscribed at least to the comity
reading of the clause. In Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 F Cas. 902 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 2240), he explained
that the Constitution allocated each American a state of citizenship for purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction, even though it also in effect made every citizen a citizen of every state:
With respect to the immunities which the rights of citizenship can confer, the citizen of one state
is to be considered as a citizen of each, and every other state in the union. But the privilege of
suing in the tribunals of the nation, cannot possibly depend upon the fact of general citizenship,
because if it did, the jurisdiction of those tribunals would extend to every case where citizens
were parties ....
Id. at 903. According to the comity reading of the clause, the privileges and immunities of citizens are their
rights under state law. This concept of privileges and immunities fits into the interstate equality reading of
Article IV because it gives visiting Americans the rights of natives without intruding into the states' power
to shape their law. It is also perfectly adapted for an intrastate equality rule, under which every citizen has
the same rights, whatever the state determines they shall be. See infra notes 147-49, 312-18 and accompany-
ing text.
49. Some Abolitionists sought to devise attacks on slavery based on the clause, more or less knowingly
departing from its orthodox meaning in doing so. See JACOBUs TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 94-115
(rev. ed. 1965).
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been the mainstream interpretation.50 Under it, the clause requires states to
give out-of-state Americans at least the same privileges and immunities that
their own citizens enjoy. The interstate comity reading assumes that privileges
and immunities constitute a substantial part of the content of a state's law,
especially its basic law of private civil capacity, such as the right to make
contracts and to own property.
B. The Thirty-ninth Congress
The Thirty-eighth Congress adjourned on March 3, 1865. The following
month General Lee surrendered, Lincoln was assassinated, and Andrew Johnson
became President. Under Johnson's "Presidential Reconstruction," most of the
former Confederate states formed new governments, ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment, and elected Senators and Representatives to the Thirty-ninth
Congress, which convened on December 4, 1865. The two Houses refused to
seat the Southern Senators and Representatives and created a Joint Committee
on Reconstruction in order to formulate their own approach to the postwar crisis
of the Union. The nation was given a new fundamental legal rule, and Congress
a new power, when on December 18th the Secretary of State proclaimed that
the Thirteenth Amendment, with its ban on slavery and congressional enforce-
ment provision, had been ratified.51
To understand the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, we must focus
on three aspects of the work of the Thirty-ninth Congress: the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which was introduced in January and passed over the President's veto
in April; a proposed constitutional amendment relating to civil rights that was
reported by the Joint Committee in February but never voted on in either
50. According to Story:
It is obvious, that, if the citizens of each state were to be deemed aliens to each other, they could
not take, or hold real estate, or other privileges, except as other aliens. The intention of this
clause was to confer on them, if one may say so, a general citizenship; and to communicate all
the privileges and immunities, which the citizens of the same state would be entitled to under
the like circumstances.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 674 (Durham, Carolina
Academic Press 1987) (1883). Chancellor Kent noted that "if [citizens] remove from one state to another,
they are entitled to the privileges that persons of the same description are entitled to in the state to which
removal is made, and to none other." 2 JAEs KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 35 (New York,
William Kent, 7th ed. 1851). The interstate comity view was adopted by two state supreme court cases that
were frequently cited in discussions of the clause. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797); Abbot
v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89 (1887). Antislavery theorist John Codman Hurd apparently recognized that
the orthodox view was one of comity, although he seems to have thought that the clause gave all citizens
the rights set out in a "pre-existing common law of the colonies." 2 JOHN C. HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM
AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 352-53 (Boston, Little, Brown 1858).
51. The Amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, §§ 1-2.
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House; and the Fourteenth Amendment itself.52 The theme linking these three
was equality or, as we might put it today, antidiscrimination.
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
As the Thirty-ninth Congress organized itself, the provisionally reconstruct-
ed Southern States were passing the Black Codes, which limited the rights of
blacks and freed slaves. Largely in response to these developments, on January
5, 1866, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, introduced the Civil Rights Bill. The bill was designed to secure
equality between blacks and whites in the enjoyment of certain rights basic to
ordinary life. Section 1 formed the heart of the bill. In its original form, this
section mandated equality with respect to both civil rights in general and as
specifically listed.53
Senator Trumbull specifically stated that he designed the bill to override
discriminatory state laws like the Black Codes. He explained:
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled
in the insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the freedmen,
and in nearly all the States they have discriminated against them. They
deny them certain rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still
impose upon them the very restrictions which were imposed upon them
in consequence of the existence of slavery, and before it was abolished.
The purpose of the bill under consideration is to destroy all these
discriminations, and to carry into effect the constitutional amend-
ment.
52. See generally HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OFTHE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); JOSEPH
B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956) [hereinafter JAMES, FRAMING]; JOSEPH
B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1984) [hereinafter JAMES, RATIFICATION].
James' books are especially useful because they describe the 14th Amendment primarily as a political issue
and make it possible to understand how the political storms would distract from a detailed legal consider-
ation of the proposal.
53. Section 1 as first introduced provided:
[A]Il persons of African descent born in the United States are hereby declared to be citizens of
the United States, and there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the
inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or previous
condition of slavery; but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
54. Id. Representative James Wilson of Iowa, who introduced the Civil Rights Bill in the House as
Chairman of its Judiciary Committee, gave the same account of its basic purpose: "It will be observed that
the entire structure of this bill rests on the discrimination relative to civil rights and immunities made by
the States on 'account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery."' Id. at 1118.
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He maintained that the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to pass
the bill because legal race discrimination constituted a badge of servitude and
thus violated the Thirteenth Amendment. More broadly, he stated that the
freedom that the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to protect necessarily
included equal enjoyment of the basic legal capacities of contract and property
and the basic protections of government.
55
The claim that Congress had such power provoked heated controversy. The
Civil Rights Bill, whatever its primary object may have been, was not limited
to protecting freed slaves and was not even limited to the states in which
slavery had formerly existed.55 According to its opponents, the new national
rule of equal civil rights was nothing but an attempt by Congress to rewrite the
states' domestic laws of property, contract, personal security, and so forth. 57
State law, they argued, created citizens' rights; if Congress could legislate upon
all matters of state law, it could pass national laws on all those subjects, thereby
overthrowing the principle of enumerated powers on which American federal-
ism rested."
Advocates of the Civil Rights Bill responded that it was limited to racial
equality and did not represent federal interference with the substance of state
law. The states would remain free to create whatever rights they pleased, as
long as they gave them to all citizens.59 Their argument relied on the realiza-
55. On the first point, Trumbull described the various slavery era restrictions on the rights of blacks
in the South and said that "[w]hen the constitutional amendment was adopted and slavery abolished, all
these statutes became null and void, because they were all passed in aid of slavery, for the purpose of
maintaining and supporting it." Id. at 474. After describing the new Black Codes, he went on to argue that
"any statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to
other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of servitude which, by
the Constitution, is prohibited." Id. Similarly, Senator Jacob Howard, Republican of Michigan, explained
that the Civil Rights Bill provided that with respect to civil rights, "there is to be hereafter no distinction
between the white race and the black race. It is to secure to these men whom we have made free the
ordinary rights of a freeman and nothing else." Id. at 504. The equation of nonslavery with equality reflected
Abolitionist notions. See TENBRoEK, supra note 49, at 159-73.
56. A precursor to the Civil Rights Bill, introduced by Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts on
December 13, 1865, was limited to the insurrectionary states. See CONG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39
(1865). Wilson's proposal would have nullified all "laws, statutes, acts, ordinances, rules, and regulations"
in those states that provided for "inequality of civil rights and immunities" on the basis of race, color,
descent, or previous condition of slavery. Id. Toward the end of the debate on Senator Wilson's proposal,
Trumbull explained that he would propose similar legislation as soon as the 13th Amendment was ratified.
Id. at 43.
57. See, e.g., id. at 1121 (remarks of Rep. Rogers of New Jersey) ("Has Congress the power to enter
the domain of a State, and destroy its police regulations with regard to the punishment inflicted upon
negroes?').
58. Columbus Delano, a Repliblican Representative from Ohio, said that the bill declared "in effect
that Congress has authority to go into the States and manage and legislate with regard to all the personal
rights of the citizen--rights of life, liberty, and property. You render this Government no longer a Govern-
ment of limited powers .... " Id. at 158 app.
59. The classic answer to Delano was delivered the next day by Samuel Shellabarger, Republican of
Ohio. He explained that there was a crucial difference between mandating equality of civil rights and
dictating their content:
Now, Mr. Speaker, if this section did in fact assume to confer or define or regulate these civil
rights, which are named by the words contract, sue, testify, inherit, &c., then it would, as seems
to me, be an assumption of the reserved rights of the States and the people. But, sir, except so
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tion that congressional power to require equality did not necessarily have to
rest on a claim of plenary federal power to make private law. A power limited
to requiring equality would be enough to authorize the bill.60
One Republican who shared the doubts about the adequacy of Congress'
constitutional power was Representative John Bingham of Ohio, a member of
the Joint Committee and the principal drafter of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.61 Bingham, a firm abolitionist, favored the policy of the Civil
Rights Bill but thought that Congress lacked the power to enact it.6" These
doubts may have been shared by President Johnson, who said that he vetoed
the bill on the grounds that it exceeded Congress' power.3
These constitutional arguments did not sway the Republican majority. Over
the President's veto, they made the bill the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Section
1 provided:
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens
of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory
far as it confers citizenship, it neither confers nor defines nor regulates any right whatever. Its
whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that whatever of these enumerated
rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike without
distinctions based on race or former condition in slavery.
Id. at 1293.
60. Robert Kaczorowski reads the congressional debates differently, arguing that the Republicans did
indeed claim the power to determine the content of citizens' rights through federal legislation, and that they
intended the Civil Rights Bill to do so. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil
RightsAct of 1866: A Legislative History in Light ofRunyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565,569-73 (1989).
In his view, the bill combined substantive protection for absolute federal rights with a requirement that state
laws regulating such rights not discriminate on the basis of race. Id. at 572-73. Such a reading, however,
makes it difficult to account for statements such as those of Senator Trumbull, who said, "if the State of
Kentucky makes no discrimination in civil rights between its citizens, this bill has no operation whatsoever
in the State of Kentucky." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866). Unless the states' power to
regulate national rights completely swallows up any other protection those rights may have, it is hard to
reconcile Trumbull's statement with absolute national rights. See also supra note 59 (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger that Civil Rights Bill does not seek to confer, define, or regulate rights, but only to mandate
equality).
61. Representative Bingham presents the most exasperating problem faced by anyone who tries to take
seriously the words of the second sentence of Section 1 because he seems to have written them without
being a man who took words seriously himself. One pair of commentators concluded that Bingham, though
able, had "a strong egocentricity and a touch of the windbag. As a legal thinker he was not in the same
class with the top notch minds of his time, such as Reverdy Johnson, Lyman Trumbull, Matt Carpenter,
or George Edmunds in the Senate, or George Hoar in the House." John F. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The
Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUMI. L. REV. 131, 164-65 n.169 (1950).
Bingham's speeches were highly rhetorical, and his thoughts are hard to follow; he was undoubtedly a
gasbag. Whether he was also a gashead is a more difficult and controversial question. My view is that either
Bingham's analytical powers were mediocre or he was too lazy to use them.
62. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1291-92 (1866).
63. Id. at 1679-80 (veto message). Most prominently, President Johnson claimed that Section 1 dealt
with areas solely within the power of the states. "Hitherto every subject embraced in the enumeration of
rights contained in this bill has been considered as exclusively belonging to the States." Id. at 1680.
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in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.64
2. The Joint Committee's First Proposed Amendment
The concerns regarding congressional power led Bingham to suggest, and
the Joint Committee to report, a constitutional amendment designed to give
Congress the power to adopt civil rights legislation. Bingham's draft, submitted
on February 13, 1866, while the Civil Rights Bill was under consideration,
would have amended the Constitution to provide:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and proper-
ty.65
The amendment was debated in the House and postponed.66
Bingham did not explain precisely what the amendment would accomplish,
nor did he explicate the text so as to make clear why it would do whatever it
did.67 We can, however, divine two things about his understanding of the
64. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. The Act as finally adopted differed from Senator
Trumbull's initial proposal in two important respects. It protected only citizens, not inhabitants, and it did
not open with a general ban on discrimination in civil rights or immunities. The first change probably
responded to the concern that otherwise the bill would extend all the rights of citizens to aliens, and in
particular that it would permit aliens to hold real property on the same terms as citizens. See CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (Sen. Johnson). The second responded to concerns over the general phrase
"civil rights and immunities," particularly the fear that it would be found to include the right to
vote-something the Republicans hesitated to do. When he discussed the phrase's deletion shortly before
the House voted on the bill, Representative James Wilson of Iowa, chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, explained that he did not think the change made a difference, but that it was done to accommo-
date those who feared that "it might be held by the courts that the right of suffirage was included" in the
general phrase. Id. at 1366-67. The rest of the Act consists of enforcement provisions that are extremely
important for a complete understanding of the Act itself, but do not affect most questions regarding § 1.
65. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
66. The amendment was introduced in the Senate, id. at 806, and discussed by Senator Stewart, id.
at 1082, but never formally debated.
67. Bingham said: "I do not propose at present to detain the House with any very extended remarks
in support of [the proposed amendment]. I ask, however, the attention of the House to the fact that the
amendment proposed stands in the very words of the Constitution of the United States as it came to us from
the hands of its illustrious framers." Id. at 1034. Bingham was referring to his use of the words "privileges
and immunities of citizens," which come from the Comity Clause, and "life, liberty, or property," which
come from the Fifth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, Representative Higby of California reiterated Bingham's
point about the sources of the amendment's words. Id. at 1054. Representative Hale, commenting on Higby's
speech, said: "The ingenuity of the argument was admirable. I never heard it paralleled except in the case
of the gentleman who undertook to justify suicide from the Scripture by quoting two texts: 'Judas went and
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proposal with as much confidence as is possible where Bingham is concerned.
First, however many purposes the amendment may have had, equality was its
animating principle. Bingham began his concluding speech by approvingly
quoting President Johnson's statement that 'the American system rests on the
assertion of the equal right of every man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. ',68 That speech's finale, too, was a paean to equality.69 More
specifically, although Bingham's proposal (like Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment) never mentioned race, the elimination of race discrimination was
very much on his mind. In an exchange with Representative Robert Hale,
Republican of New York, Bingham explained that his proposal was not limited
to the late Confederate States; rather, it would give Congress power to eliminate
race discrimination throughout the country.70
Second, it is likely that Bingham thought that both clauses of his proposal
gave Congress power to forbid discrimination. He regularly ran together the
two constitutional provisions from which his proposal derived, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. He praised "these great canons of the supreme law, securing to
all the citizens in every State all the privileges and immunities of citizens, and
to all people all the sacred rights of persons."71 Indeed, he included them
together when he referred to the "bill of rights. 72 Bingham said that his equal
hanged himself;' 'Go thou and do likewise."' Id. at 1063.
68. Id. at 1088-89.
69. He said the Due Process Clause referred to "law in its highest sense, that law which is the
perfection of human reason, and which is impartial, equal, exact justice." Id. at 1094. In the 1859 debate
on Oregon's admission to the Union, he called equality "the rock on which that Constitution rests-its sure
foundation and defense." CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859).
70. In response to Hale's claim that the amendment would operate only in the seceding states, Bingham
said that it would apply to other states "that have in their constitutions and laws to-day provisions in direct
violation of every principle of our Constitution." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1866). When
Bingham said that, Representative Rogers interjected, asking "I suppose the gentlemen refers to the State
of Indiana?" Id. Bingham replied, "I do not know; it may be so. It applies unquestionably to the State of
Oregon." Id. Bingham was referring to race discrimination. Rogers mentioned Indiana because the previous
day he had pointed out that the amendment would nullify Indiana's ban on immigration and property
ownership by blacks. Id. at 134 app. Bingham in 1859 had opposed the admission of Oregon, whose
proposed constitution forbade immigration by blacks. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982-85 (1859).
In his second speech on the proposed amendment Bingham again alluded to that debate, saying that the
Constitution had been disregarded in Oregon and the insurrectionary states. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1090 (1866). His objections to Oregon's admission in 1859 were based on Article IV. CONG. GLOBE,
35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982-85 (1859).
71. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).
72. Bingham explained that even opponents of a congressional enforcement power "admit the force
of the provisions in the bill of rights that the citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States, and that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... "Id. at 1089; see also id. at 1034
(explaining that earlier draft, based upon Article IV and the Due Process Clause, was necessary because
those "great provisions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested
for its execution and enforcement hitherto on the fidelity of the States"). Fairman thought that Bingham
included the Privileges and Immunities Clause within his "bill of rights." See Fairman, supra note 27, at
5, 26, as did tenBroek, TENBROBK, supra note 49, at 212-15. Crosskey thought this interpretation to be
merely silly: "Now, who ever heard of a 'bill of rights' consisting of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the original document, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?" William Crosskey, Charles
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protection language was about forbidding discrimination, and probably about
that alone.73 He never distinguished the other clause by saying that it had
nothing to do with discrimination.
Bingham also made reference to equal rights in discussing the privileges
and immunities language of his amendment. In his second and concluding
speech on the proposal, Bingham asked: "What does the word immunity in your
Constitution mean? Exemption from unequal burdens. Ah! say gentlemen who
oppose this amendment, we are not opposed to equal rights; we are not opposed
to the bill of rights that all shall be protected alike in life, liberty, and property
... ."7' A few moments later, in response to Representative Hale's objections
of the previous day, Bingham said: "The gentleman did not utter a word against
the equal right of all citizens of the United States in every State to all privileges
and immunities of citizens . . . ."75 Apparently, Bingham thought that his
proposal would enable Congress to mandate equal privileges and immunities
of citizenship in the states.76
Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CIH. L. REV.
1, 27 (1954). In my view, the answer to Crosskey's question is John Bingham.
73. Representative Hale objected to the equal protection provision, fearing that it would give Congress
general power to protect life, liberty, and property. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1866).
Pressed by Hale, Bingham denied that it went beyond a congressional power to require equality in
protection:
Mr. HALE: My question was whether this provision, if adopted, confers upon Congress general
powers of legislation in regard to the protection of life, liberty, and personal property.
Mr. BINGHAM: It certainly does this: it confers upon Congress power to see to it that the
protection given by the laws of the States shall be equal in respect to life and liberty and
property to all persons.
Mr. HALE: Then will the gentleman point me to that clause or part of this resolution which
contains the doctrine he here announces?
Mr. BINGHAM: The words "equal protection" contain it, and nothing else.
Id. at 1094.
74. Id. at 1089.
75. Id.
76. As this implies, Bingham probably thought that Article IV already mandated equality in the rights
of state citizenship, and he probably was not alone. Toward the end of the debate on the 14th Amendment,
Senator Luke Poland of Vermont said that the Privileges or Immunities Clause reiterated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, without saying exactly what he thought the latter meant. Id. at 2961. After quoting
Article IV, Poland explained that
radical differencefs] in the social systems of the several States ... led to a practical repudiation
of the existing provision on this subject, and it was disregarded in many of the States. State
legislation was allowed to override it, and as no express power was by the Constitution granted
to Congress to enforce it, it became really a dead letter.
Id. The reference to different social systems seems to mean slavery. If native-born blacks were citizens,
a constitutional provision giving all citizens equal privileges and immunities certainly would have eliminated
slavery. In his speech introducing the Civil Rights Bill in the House, Representative Wilson said that it rested
on the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 1117-18. It is not clear whether he thought that Article IV
provided substantive or antidiscrimination protection, but the bill was an antidiscrimination measure.
Oddly enough, Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott seems to have thought that Article IV assumes equal
rights among citizens. In order to prove that blacks could not be citizens of any state, Taney argued that
if they were, the Privileges and Immunities Clause would entitle them to thefull rights of citizens whenever
they went to another state. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1857). Justice Curtis,
in dissent, relied on the more orthodox view of the Comity Clause, under which the states remained free
to classify their citizens and could impose the same classifications on visiting Americans. Id. at 582-85.
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The House's reaction to Bingham's proposal confirms that it was under-
stood as requiring equal rights among citizens. When debate concluded, Roscoe
Conkling of New York, a member of the Joint Committee, moved that the
amendment be postponed.77 In support of Conkling's motion, Republican Giles
Hotchkiss of New York explained that Bingham's proposal was not properly
designed to achieve its goal, which was "to provide that no State shall discrimi-
nate between its citizens and give one class of citizens greater rights than it
confers upon another."78 Hotchkiss wished to revise the language because
Bingham's draft, which gave a new power to Congress but did not impose a
self-executing limitation on the states, could not be regarded as "permanently
securing those rights."79
Hotchkiss explained to Bingham:
[I]f the gentleman's object is, as I have no doubt it is, to provide
against a discrimination to the injury or exclusion of any class of
citizens in any State from the privileges which other classes enjoy, the
right should be incorporated into the Constitution. It should be a
constitutional right that cannot be wrested from any class of citizens,
or from the citizens of any State by mere legislation. 0
The Joint Committee decided that it would have to try again.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment
That second try became the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment was
an omnibus proposal that dealt simultaneously with four of the leading prob-
lems of Reconstruction: the status of the Civil Rights Bill, apportionment of
representatives, suffrage, and eligibility of former rebels for state and federal
office.81 Section 1 of the Amendment addressed the first of those questions.
77. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
78. Id. Bingham's equal protection provision was not about citizens' rights.
79. Id. Hotchkiss also shared Hale's concern that by giving Congress power to secure equal protection
of life, liberty, and property the Bingham amendment would "authorize Congress to establish uniform laws
throughout the United States upon the subject named, the protection of life, liberty, and property." Id. When
Bingham protested, Hotchkiss replied that constitutional provisions should be "so plain it will be unnecessary
for courts to give construction to them' Id. (Hotchkiss' subversive advice was not followed).
80. Id. Hotchkiss asked: "Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution that no State shall
discriminate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as part of the organic law of
the land, subject only to be defeated by another constitutional amendment." Id.
81. Under the original Constitution, slaves were counted at three-fifths for purposes of apportioning
representatives and direct taxes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
Emancipation entitled the ex-slave states to substantially increased representation in the House and the
Electoral College. The Republican nightmare was that former rebels would magnify their political power
by including ex-slaves in the basis of apportionment while disenfranchising them. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 357-58 (1866) (chart prepared by Rep. Conkling showing representation under various
suffrage plans). The Amendment also deals with national and rebel debt, but those issues were not of much
practical consequence.
1408 [Vol. 101: 1385
Privileges or Immunities
What is now the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment emerged as the result of a rather disorienting series of votes in the Joint
Committee.82 Apparently the committee had some trouble choosing between
a straightforward ban on race discrimination (proposed by Pennsylvania Repub-
lican Thaddeus Stevens) and the more delphic language (proposed by Bingham)
that eventually was incorporated in the Amendment. 3 While we do not know
the exact rationale for the committee's decision, it seems fairly clear that they
understood both provisions as incorporating the Civil Rights Act into the
Constitution.84
The second sentence of Section 1 was approved and ratified as it emerged
from the Joint Committee. The congressional discussions of Section 1 show
that the provision was designed to require equal civil rights, but no one ex-
plained precisely how the language would yield that result. Thaddeus Stevens,
chairman for the House of the Joint Committee, introduced the proposal in that
chamber. He said that Section 1 would put the Civil Rights Act into the
Constitution, but did not explain how, and in particular which part of, the
language did the job. 6
The introductory speech in the Senate was delivered by Jacob Howard of
Michigan, who was filling in for the ill William Fessenden of Maine, chairman
82. The journal of the Joint Committee records its votes, but not the debates and informal discussion.
JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMrITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, THMIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, S.
Doc. No. 711, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. (1915) [hereinafter JOINT COMMTEE JOURNAL]. Accordingly, we are
left to reconstruct the legal and political concerns that led to a series of decisions that, on the surface, are
difficult to follow. Earl Maltz presents a persuasive account of those concerns, and their reflection in the
committee's voting process. MALTZ, supra note 20, at 79-92.
83. See JOINT COsiTfTEE JOURNAL, supra note 82, at 28-44. Stevens' draft provided that "[n]o
discrimination shall be made by any State, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id. at 28. The committee first adopted Stevens' language,
id. at 29, then added Bingham's provision, id. at 35, then deleted Bingham's, id. at 36, and finally replaced
Stevens' language with Bingham's, id. at 39, 44.
84. Earl Maltz points out that while Bingham's proposal was being accepted, rejected, and accepted
again, the committee was moving away from mandating black suffrage and toward the compromise contained
in § 2 of the 14th Amendment, which reduces a state's representation to the extent that it limits the suffrage
of adult males. Maltz suggests that the move from Stevens' individual rights provision, which explicitly
mentions race discrimination, to Bingham's formulation, which does not, reflects the Republicans' conclusion
that their position in the upcoming 1866 election would be strengthened if they could present their platform
as guaranteeing Southern allegiance, rather than solely as providing rights for blacks. MATIZ, supra note
20, at 91-92.
85. The only addition to § 1 was what is now the first sentence which, among other things, overrides
Dred Scott. Without that provision the argument still could have been made, and backed with Supreme Court
precedent, that freed slaves were not citizens and hence not protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause
and that the citizenship clause of the Civil Rights Act was ultra vires.
86. Stevens said that the Amendment
allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates
upon one man shall operate equally upon all. Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime
shall punish the black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree. Whatever law
protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection to the black man. Whatever means of
redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify
in court shall allow the man of color to do the same.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). Stevens then moved on to § 2, which he considered "the
most important" part. Id.
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of the Joint Committee for the Senate. Howard provided by far the most
detailed discussion of Section 1, saying that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, insofar as he understood it, protected a wide variety of rights, including
those listed in Corfield and the first eight amendments to the federal Constitu-
tion. He said that the Equal Protection Clause would abolish all caste legisla-
tion,87 and stressed that Section 1 would not deal with suffrage. 88 It remained
to be seen exactly what would be made of the Amendment.
III. CITIZENS' RIGHTS
A. Equality and Discrimination
Orthodox equal protection jurisprudence assumes that the Fourteenth
Amendment contains some general principle of equality or antidiscrimination
that incorporates the Civil Rights Act of 1866 without mentioning race, color,
or previous condition of servitude. That general principle is assumed to be built
into the word "equal" in the Equal Protection Clause. Orthodox thinking
presents the clause as the means by which the Amendment contains the Act,
even though the Amendment's text resembles neither the Act nor a more
conventional antidiscrimination provision, such as the Fifteenth Amendment. 89
There are two leading candidates for the general principle of equality. One
treats the Equal Protection Clause as if it were a badly drafted marker for a list
of antidiscrinination rules.90 The other suggests that the clause stands for the
principle that "arbitrary" or "invidious" decisionmaking is forbidden.91
87. Id. at 2765-66. It is not clear whether Howard meant that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would
give the rights he listed substantive or antidiscrimination protection. His 1866 speech suggests substantive
protection but does not clearly distinguish it from equality. In 1869, when the Senate was discussing a
proposal to eliminate race discrimination in voting through legislation pursuant to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Howard indicated that the clause was directed against the Black Codes. He said that
[tihe immediate object of [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] was to prohibit for the future
all hostile legislation on the part of the recently rebel States in reference to the colored citizens
of the United States who had become emancipated .... It was to secure them against any
infingement or violation of their rights by those southern Legislatures.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869). This suggests that he may have thought the Privileges
or Immunities Clause to have mandated equality: the Black Codes were most often denounced for their
discriminatory character, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 struck at them by mandating equality.
88. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
89. The 15th Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. Although the Amendment does not give obvious answers to
all questions that arise under it, the basic questions are answered by the text, which identifies the issue on
which it operates and states the grounds on which discrimination is forbidden.
90. This is essentially the approach urged by then-Justice Rehnquist in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He wrote that we could, with confidence, identify only race
and national origin as prohibited factors. Id. at 777-80.
91. This principle is reached by comparing a law that we are fairly certain the clause forbids-for
example, one that makes it legal to murder ex-slaves-with one that we are fairly certain the clause
permits-for example, the law against homicide itself. There is obviously a reason for discriminating against
murderers, whereas we are tempted to call the discrimination against ex-slaves arbitrary, which is to say
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Standard equal protection jurisprudence, faced with the inescapably general
text of the clause, appeals to a notion of general equality or impartiality in
lawmaking. On this score it is historically sound. The Republicans who domi-
nated the Thirty-ninth Congress did indeed conceive of such a notion, one that
would preserve state control over the content of law while demanding that the
laws apply to all citizens equally. Most of them seem to have thought that the
principle of racial neutrality was derived from this more general principle that
all citizens should have the same rights.
We can begin to see this by examining the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
Act banned discrimination by saying that citizens were to have the same
rights. 92 The original draft of the Act is even more striking. It began with an
explicit ban on race discrimination,93 and then moved seamlessly to mandate
that "the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude .... shall have the same right
[to make contracts and so forth]"' ' -not the same rights as white citizens,
which would limit the equal rights principle to racial neutrality, but simply the
same rights. While that latter mandate follows an ordinary ban on race discrimi-
nation and seems to be one because it mentions race, syntactically it is not: the
modifying clause "of every race and color" does not limit the general statement
that all citizens shall have the same rights.95
Such an emphasis on general equality should not be surprising, because the
Republicans were fond of speaking in such terms. Senator Trumbull made the
general principle of equal rights, not racial neutrality per se, the basis of the
Civil Rights Act itself. Trumbull said of the Black Codes, "[A]ny statute which
is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are
secured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is,
in fact, a badge of servitude which by the Constitution is prohibited."96
that the only reason we can think of for having it is hostility to ex-slaves, something that has nothing to
do with murder. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,451 (1985) (Stevens,
L, concurring) (suggesting that the clause requires that legal classifications have a "rational basis").
92. It provided that all citizens "of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude... shall have the same right [to make contracts and so forth] as is enjoyed
by white citizens ... ." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added).
93. "[Tjhere shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State
or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery... ." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
94. Id.
95. Similarly, a proposed constitutional amendment introduced by Thaddeus Stevens in December 1865
moved easily from general equality to a specific antidiscrimination rule: "All national and state laws shall
be equally applicable to every citizen, and no discrimination shall be made on account of race and color"
Id. at 10.
96. Id. at 474. In a sarcastic response to Garrett Davis, a Democrat from Kentucky and probably the
most bitter opponent of the Republican program in the Senate, Trumbull said of the Civil Rights Act:
It is a bill providing that all people shall have equal rights. Is not that abominable? Is that not
iniquitous? ... It declares that all persons in the United States shall be entitled to the same civil
rights, the right to the fruit of their own labor, the right to make contracts, the right to buy and
sell, and enjoy liberty and happiness; and that is abominable and iniquitous and unconstitutionall
Id. at 599.
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Trumbull derived his ban on race discrimination from the more general princi-
ple of the equality of citizens.97
The rhetoric of general equality was also common in the debates on the
Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Henry Raymond, Republican of New
York, explained that Section 1 "secures an equality of rights among all the
citizens of the United States." 98 When he introduced the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in the Senate, Senator Howard said that Section 1 "establishes equality
before the law," and that "[wlithout this principle of equal justice to all men
and equal protection under the shield of the law, there is no republican govern-
ment."99
This doctrine of general equality meant, as Thaddeus Stevens put it, that
"the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all." 1°° It
said nothing, however, about the content of that law. This point was important
because opponents claimed that the Civil Rights Bill intruded into the reserved
powers of the states concerning the rights of property, contract, and so
forth.10 1 In response, Republicans contended that the states still would be able
to give their citizens whatever rights they liked, as long as everyone got
them.1r2 This meant that equality provisions maintained the basic structure of
American federalism.1 3 Although a national principle of equality would im-
97. This general principle was also raised by other Republicans during the debate over the Civil Rights
Act. Senator Henry Lane, Republican of Indiana, defended the Act on the grounds that the freedmen "are
free by the constitutional amendment lately enacted, and entitled to all the privileges and immunities of other
free citizens of the United States.' Id. at 602. Representative William Windom, Republican of Minnesota,
praised the Civil Rights Act because it rested on the true republican principle of "the absolute equality of
rights of the whole people, high and low, rich and poor, white and black." Id. at 1159.
98. Id. at 2502. Raymond explained that he had favored the policy of the Civil Rights Bill because
he "was in favor of securing an equality of rights to all citizens of the United States," but voted to sustain
the President's veto, because he doubted Congress' power to pass it. Raymond "very cheerfully" supported
the 14th Amendment because it would resolve those doubts. Id.
99. Id. at 2766.
100. Id. at 2459.
101. See, e.g., id. at 478 (Sen. Saulsbury); id. at 158 app. (Rep. Delano).
102. Trumbull said:
The bill neither confers nor abridges the rights of any one, but simply declares that in civil rights
there shall be an equality among all classes of citizens, and that all alike shall be subject to the
same punishment Each State, so that it does not abridge the great fundamental rights belonging,
under the Constitution, to all citizens, may grant or withhold such civil rights as it pleases; all
that is required is that, in this respect, its laws shall ba impartial.
Id. at 1760. Likewise, Representative William Lawrence, Republican of Ohio, made the distinction between
substance and equality, stressing that the Civil Rights Bill did "not confer any civil right, but so far as there
is any power in the states to limit, enlarge, or declare civil rights, all these are left to the States." Id. at 1832.
Rather, the bill required that "whatever of certain civil rights may be enjoyed by any shall be shared by
all citizens." Id.
103. As Willam Nelson notes, the "interpretation of section one [of the Fourteenth Amendment] as
a guarantee of equal rather than absolute rights solved the Republican dilemma of wanting to give Congress
power to protect rights without giving it power to destroy state legislative freedom." NELSON, supra note
t, at 117.
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pose a significant new limit on the states, it was still a far cry from actual
centralization. 1' 4
The Republican concept of general equality thus distinguished between the
content of citizens' fights and the decision as to who would enjoy those rights.
This distinction has its sharpest and most important application with respect
to laws that explicitly modify the rights of one group of people. As Senator
Howard explained, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to put an
end to such laws, to "abolisho all class legislation in the States and [do] away
with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable
to another." 105 The concern with "class" or "caste" legislation, laws that say
which citizens shall have which rights, seemed quite natural during early
Reconstruction because it was exemplified in the immediate target of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: the Black
Codes.
The Black Codes generally modified the rights of freed slaves in a straight-
forward way and thus directly violated the principle of general equality. Laws
that contained special limitations on freedmen's capacities as witnesses in court
were common. 116 A Mississippi law that especially infuriated the Republicans
directly distinguished the content of rights according to which class would
exercise them. It granted blacks the property rights enjoyed by white persons
but forbade them from renting or leasing lands or tenements "except in incorpo-
rated towns or cities in which places the corporate authorities shall control the
same."107 The Black Codes were archetypes of unequal legislation.
104. The debates also reflect the observation that specific antidiscrimination provisions leave the states
in control of the content of civil rights. Republican Samuel Shelabarger of Ohio defended the Civil Rights
Bill on this theory:
Now, Mr. Speaker, if this section [Section 1] did in fact assume to confer or define or regulate
these civil rights, which are named by the words contract, sue, testify, inherit, &c., then it would,
as seems to me, be an assumption of the reserved rights of the States and the people. But, sir,
except so far as it confers citizenship, it neither confers nor defines nor regulates any right
whatever. Its whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that whatever of these
enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens
alike without distinctions based on race or former condition in slavery.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866).
105. Id. at 2766.
106. The Alabama Code of 1867 provided that "[fireedmen, free negroes and mulattoes are competent
to testify only in open court, and only in cases in which freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes are parties,
either plaintiff or defendant, and in civil and criminal cases, for injuries in the persons or property of
freedmen, free negroes or mulattoes" ALA. CODE § 2680 (1867); see also Act of Dec. 15, 1865, tit. 31,
§ 3, 1865 Ga. Laws 239; Act of Feb. 28, 1866, ch. 24, 1866 Va. Acts 89-90.
107. Act of Nov. 25, 1865, § 1, 1865 Miss. Laws 82. Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts
denounced this law as a violation ofthe principle of"equality of civilrights and immunities." CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., Ist Sess. 111 (1865).
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B. The Text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
To see how the language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause implements
the principle of general equality with respect to the rights of citizens, we must
understand more clearly the vocabulary of Reconstruction.
1. The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
a. State or National Rights?
The Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States. The Supreme Court's reading of the clause rests
on these last words. That reading was announced, and the clause effectively
banished from the Constitution, in the Slaughter-House Cases.'0 8 In 1869,
the Louisiana legislature created the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and
Slaughter-House Company, authorized the company to erect a slaughterhouse
that would be open to all butchers at set fees, and forbade anyone from slaugh-
tering animals anywhere else in a three-parish area around New Orleans."' 9
The butchers who were not part of the monopoly company complained that the
law abridged their privileges or immunities of citizenship by forbidding them
to practice their calling in their own establishments."0
Justice Miller, writing for the Court, maintained that under the Constitution
"there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State," which
bring with them different privileges and immunities of citizenship."' The
butchers' argument failed, he said, because it assumed that "the citizenship is
the same, and the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the clause are the
same," even though "[t]he language is, 'No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States"'--that is, the distinctive rights of national citizenship. Since no one
suggested that it was a right of specifically national citizenship to be a butcher,
Justice Miller felt that the Court was "excused from defining the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States which no State can abridge.""
3
108. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
109. Id. at 59-60.
110. Id. at 66. They also claimed that the monopoly violated the 13th Amendment, the Due Process
Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
111. Id. at 74.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 78-79. In order to repel the suggestion "that no such privileges and immunities are to be
found if those we have been considering are excluded," id. at 79, Justice Miller gave some examples. It
is a right of national citizenship to come to the seat of the national government in order to transact business
with that government and to use the navigable waters of the United States. Likewise it is a national right




If that conclusion was right, then the clause cannot protect state positive law
rights of property, contract, and so forth.
Justice Miller was wrong. His interpretation depends on italics that, like
many other things concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, appear in the United
States Reports but not in the Constitution. Those italics are doubly misleading.
First, by saying that the clause relates to the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States, they silently introduce the assumption that the clause
protects a class of rights-the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, rather than a group of people-the citizens of the United States, whose
privileges and immunities may not be abridged. Without this move, Justice
Miller's position is very shaky. If the Constitution says that a state may not
abridge the privileges or immunities of a particular group of citizens, then the
state may not abridge any of that group's privileges or immunities, no matter
which citizenship those rights are associated with.
Second, although Section 1 recognizes that there are separate citizenships
of the states and the United States, the Amendment does not divide those
citizenships, but staples them together. Every citizen of the United States who
resides in a state is a citizen of that state and therefore has the privileges and
immunities of state citizenship by operation of the Constitution. This makes the
possession of the rights of state citizenship into a right of national citizenship.
Justice Miller acknowledged this when he said that national citizenship rights
include the acquisition of state citizenship and the rights thereof through
residence.114 It is thus virtually impossible to avoid the conclusion that, as
Senator George Boutwell put it, "[als a citizen of the United States, the first
right of the citizen of the State is that he shall enjoy all the privileges and
immunities of a citizen of the State."' 15
Furthermore, the majority's reading makes the substance of the clause
redundant. As Justice Field explained in his Slaughter-House dissent, before
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted no one would have thought that a state
could abridge the national privileges or immunities that Justice Miller discussed.
The Supremacy Clause already protected federal rights."6 While a constitu-
tional amendment may amount to a truism, we generally prefer to avoid such
a construction.
114. "One of these privileges [of national citizenship] is conferred by the very article under consider-
ation. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the
Union by a bonafide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State." Id. at 80.
115. 2 CoNG. REc. 4116 (1874) (debate on Civil Rights Act of 1875).
116. Justice Field said that if the clause refers only
to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specifically designated in the
Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain
and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and
the people on its passage. With privileges and immunities thus designated or implied no State
could ever have interfered by its laws ....
83 U.S. at 96 (Field, I., dissenting). It is more plausible to argue that the real point of this part of § 1 is
to be found in § 5, which empowers Congress to enforce the provisions of the Amendment. Even on this
view, however, the clause is strangely drafted, because its purpose is hidden elsewhere.
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The natural interpretation of the text is that the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States include the privileges and immunities of both
of the citizenships that the Constitution confers. But what are the privileges and
immunities of state citizenship, and what can it possibly mean to say that a state
may not abridge a right defined by its own laws?
b. State Privileges or Immunities as Positive Law Civil Rights
The privileges and immunities of state citizenship are rights like, and
probably consist mainly of, those listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Those
are private law rights of property ownership, contractual capacity, and personal
security, and access to governmental mechanisms that protect those primary
rights. The saliency of state private law rights appears first of all from a
comparison of the Act with the leading authority on the substance of privileges
and immunities, Corfield v. Coryell.n7 The Civil Rights Act guaranteed racial
equality with respect to the basic rights of the common law. According to
Corfield, the Comity Clause guarantees interstate equality with respect to the
privileges and immunities of citizens. These privileges and immunities closely
foreshadow the common law rights protected by the 1866 Act."8 Someone
who started with Corfield could easily end up drafting the Civil Rights Act.
The debates on the Act and the Amendment reflect this near equivalence,
sometimes suggesting that the words "rights," "privileges," and "immunities"
were almost interchangeable. The original draft of the Civil Rights Act forbade
discrimination as to "civil rights or immunities."11 9 When he introduced the
bill, Senator Trumbull complained that the Black Codes "depriv[ed] persons
of African descent of privileges which are essential to freemen."1 20 A few
moments later, in order to enumerate the fundamental civil rights that accompa-
nied free citizenship, he turned to the Comity Clause and specifically to Justice
Washington's list of privileges and immunities in Corfeld.
21
Similar usage was common. Representative Henry Raymond of New York
supported the Fourteenth Amendment in part because he favored giving freed-
men "the rights, privileges, and immunities of other citizens of the United
States, whatever those rights may be."' Senator Lane of Indiana claimed
117. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
118. Justice Washington, who heard the case while riding circuit, said that the privileges and immunities
of citizens may be
comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety ... [including the right] to claim the benefit of the writ of
habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take,
hold and dispose of property, either real or personal ....
Id. at 551-52.
119. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 474-75 (quoting Corfield).
122. Id. at 2512.
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that the Civil Rights Act was proper because, after emancipation, freedmen
were "free by the constitutional amendment lately enacted, and entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of other free citizens of the United States."
'1
Speaking in opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment, Democratic Representa-
tive Andrew Jackson Rogers of New Jersey complained that "all the rights we
have under the laws of the country are embraced under the definition of
privileges and immunities."'"
Despite Representative Rogers' hyperbole, nineteenth-century usage con-
cerning political participation confirms the close connection between privileges
and immunities and civil rights: neither was thought to extend to political rights,
such as voting or serving on juries.' 5 Political rights were commonly distin-
guished from civil rights, and only a subset of the citizens had the right to
participate politically.126 Justice Washington's suggestion that the right to vote
was a privilege of citizenship under the Comity Clause appears to have been
the minority view.127 Most Republicans agreed that neither civil rights nor
privileges and immunities included political rights, 128 and legal usage general-
ly appears to have reflected this approach.1 29
123. Id. at 602.
124. Id. at 2538. Although some Republicans would have argued that Rogers' assertion was too
sweeping, none would have denied that the privileges and immunities of citizens included a great many
of their basic, everyday legal rights.
125. It is difficult to be sure whether the concepts of civil rights and of privileges and immunities of
citizenship, which overlapped substantially, were simply synonymous. The problem arises in part because
"privileges and immunities of citizenship," unlike "civil rights," was already a legal term in 1866, due to
the Comity Clause. Civil rights, by contrast, appeared in more general political discourse.
126. The dominant view appears to have been the one assumed by Senator Stephen Douglas in 1850,
when he explained that free blacks in Illinois were "protected in the enjoyment of all their civil rights" but
were "not permitted to serve on juries, or in the militia, or to vote at elections; or to exercise any other
political rights." CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1664 (1850).
127. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). Contra Campbell v.
Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797) (franchise and holding office not among privileges and
immunities under Article IV); Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92 (1827) (visiting Americans become
naturalized in new state and acquire right to vote and hold office after satisfying residence requirement).
128. The provision in the Civil Rights Bill forbidding discrimination in "civil rights and immunities"
was removed in the House in order to allay fears that it would be construed to include the franchise. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1366 (1866). House Judiciary Committee Chairman Wilson explained that
this had been done in an abundance of caution. Id. Most Republicans seem to have agreed with Representa-
tive Thayer, who said, "[Tihe words themselves are 'civil rights and immunities,' not political privileges;
and nobody can successfully contend that a bill guarantying simply civil rights and immunities is a bill under
which you could extend the right of suffrage, which is a political privilege and not a civil right" Id. at 1151.
In 1869, Senator Howard denied that the Privileges or Immunities Clause included voting, on the grounds
that the same language in the Comity Clause did not. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869).
129. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), a companion to Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880), the Court upheld an indictment of a Virginia state judge who was accused of violating § 4 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which forbade states from discriminating on the basis of race injury selection.
The Court held that race discrimination in jury selection violated the equal protection rights of black
defendants. Justice Field dissented, arguing that jury service was a political, not a civil, right, and therefore
was not secured by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 100 U.S. at 365-66. He noted that American citizens
visiting other American states were not entitled to serve on juries under the Comity Clause. Id. at 366. Field
then rejected the majority's conclusion that race discrimination in jury selection denied equal protection
to a defendant who was a member of the excluded class, arguing that such a conclusion would imply that
female and alien defendants would be entitled to have women and aliens on their juries. Id. at 367.
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The privileges and immunities of state citizenship thus consisted of the
rights protected under the traditional reading of the Comity Clause. These rights
are not minimum Lockean freedoms but rather a full specification of state law
on basic subjects. Senator Trumbull relied on the standard theory of the Comity
Clause, and the positive law notion of privileges and immunities that accompa-
nies it, in explaining the Civil Rights Bill. He said that the bill would apply
the Comity Clause rule of interstate equality within the states, noting that
Article IV gave the same rights to visiting Americans from out of state that
were given to local citizens.1 30 He then cited an Indiana case for the proposi-
tion that the Comity Clause "gives to every person who is a citizen of one of
the States the same rights to hold property, the same personal rights, that the
citizen of that State has. '3
After the obligatory quotation from Corfield, Senator Trumbull maintained
that the principle of the Comity Clause should be applied within states: "Now,
sir, if that be so, this being the construction as settled by judicial decisions to
be put upon the clause of the Constitution to which I have adverted, how much
more are the native-born citizens of the State itself entitled to these rights!"'1 2
Those were said to be rights defined by the state's own laws.
33
Senator Trumbull's thinking was fairly clear. Representative Bingham's was
far from that, but he seems to have agreed that the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, as protected by the Comity Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment, included rights defined by state law 34 Bingham, in
130. Trumbull said:
There have been several decisions of courts upon this clause of the Constitution. It was decided
by the general court of the State of Maryland (Chase and Duval, justices) that this section [the
Comity Clause] meant that the citizens of all the States should have the peculiar advantage of
acquiring and holding real as well as personal property, and that such property should be
protected and secured by the laws of the State in the same manner as the property of the citizens
of the State is protected.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 475.
133. It is noteworthy that at times Senator Trumbull spoke as though he believed in absolute natural
rights, although he clearly was advocating an equality measure. He said that the Comity Clause secured
"[s]uch fundamental rights as belong to every free person." Id. at 474. Despite that statement, the rights
Senator Trumbull was referring to were precisely those rights protected by the specific law of some state.
The Maryland and Indiana cases he cited held that the out-of-state American was to receive the same rights
as the in-state citizen. A few days later, Trumbull recognized that point in response to criticism from Garrett
Davis: Trumbull said that the cases he cited "relate entirely to the rights which a citizen in one State has
on going into another State, and not to the rights of the citizens belonging to the State. I never denied that."
Id. at 600. The Civil Rights Bill, which Trumbull was advocating, was an equality provision that gave blacks
the same rights as whites, rather than some set of minimum rights.
134. Bingham's understanding of Article IV, and of the content of privileges and immunities, is difficult
to unravel because he sometimes spoke as if the Privileges and Immunities Clause protected rights of
national citizenship as opposed to rights of state citizenship. Bingham made this point as part of his theory
that Article IV contained an "ellipsis"--the omission of "of the United States" in its reference to privileges
and immunities of citizens. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1867) (admission of Nebraska);
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (need for amendment to secure equal protection); CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639 (1862) (suffrage in the District of Columbia); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong.,
2d Sess. 984 (1859) (admission of Oregon). The only right Bingham ever explicitly identified as one of
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1859, said that the proposed constitution of Oregon violated Article IV because
it discriminated against blacks with respect to the most important common law
rights. These rights later would appear in the Civil Rights Act of 1866."35
During the 1867 debate on Nebraska's admission to the Union, Bingham spoke
of Article IV as if it required equality in state law matters.136 This understand-
ing of the content of privileges and immunities matches Bingham's indications
that both clauses of his original proposal were equality requirements. 137
This is not to suggest that everyone who participated in framing and
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment thought that the privileges or immunities
of citizens consisted of rights defined by state positive law. Some thought that
the phrase referred to Lockean natural rights defined without reference to the
law of any state.1 38 But the positive law, antidiscrimination reading of the
concept was very common, and, against the background of the orthodox reading
of the Comity Clause, it was probably the dominant view. 39 We are therefore
distinctively state citizenship, in 1859 or later, was the franchise. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639
(1862); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong. 2d Sess. 985 (1859).
135. The proposed constitution provided: .'No free negro or mulatto, not residing in this State at the
time of the adoption of this constitution, shall ever come, reside, or be, within this State, or hold any real
estate, or make any contract, or maintain any suit therein .... - CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984
(1859). Equality of rights was the leading theme of Bingham's attack on the provision. Id. at 985.
136. The proposed Nebraska Constitution limited the franchise to white citizens. The House was
considering a bill admitting Nebraska on the condition that it never deny the franchise on the basis of race
or color. Bingham explained that he planned to vote for the bill even though he thought the condition to
be beyond Congress' power and hence a nullity. Those who maintained that the condition on Nebraska's
admission would be legally effectual pointed to conditions imposed on the admission of MissourL See Res.
of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 645. Bingham's response was that the Missouri conditions were merely cumulative
of the Constitution and hence of no independent effect:
It is urged also that States have been admitted upon the condition that non-resident citizens of
the United States should be subject to no other or higher rate of tax than resident citizens or be
denied the immunities or privileges of citizens therein. But this is simply a carrying out of that
provision of the Constitution which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of citizens" [of the United States] (supplying the ellipsis) "in the
several States."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.450 (1867) (brackets in original).
137. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note f, at 24-27 (some antebellum theorists believed that citizens' rights
inherent in a free republic included natural rights); TENBROEK, supra note 49, at 95-100 (abolitionists often
identified rights of citizens with natural rights). It would be folly, however, to take every reference to natural
rights as rejecting the notion that the rights of citizens are to be found in the positive law. On the contrary,
it would have been natural in the 19th century to say that the privileges and immunities of American citizens
were their natural rights, even though those privileges and immunities were found in the positive law,
because it was generally assumed that federal and state law were built around natural rights. See infra note
140 (Sen. Sherman, suggesting that privileges and immunities of citizens are common law rights). To say
this would not imply that the privileges and immunities of American citizens were their natural rights by
definition; rather, it would be true because of the content of American law. It is thus quite possible that
people frequently referred to positive law rights as natural rights. This may seem odd, but if you believe
in a natural right to contract, then you believe that a state's positive law of contract protects that natural
right. Indeed, if you believe in natural rights without believing that they are necessarily reflected in positive
law, you may be more likely to refer to positive law rights of contract as the natural right to contract,
because it is in the positive law that the natural right becomes meaningful.
139. Kent and Story adopted the orthodox view of the Comity Clause. See supra note 50. Cooley
endorsed the antidiscrimination reading of Article IV in his treatise, the first edition of which was published
in 1868. THOMAS COOLEY, CONsTrTUONAL LIMrTATIONs 15-16 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868).
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justified in reading the Fourteenth Amendment as including positive law rights
of state citizenship within the scope of the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens. 140
2. Abridgment
The principal textual argument favoring a substantive reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is that it would be senseless to prohibit a state
from abridging a right that is defined under state law; power over a right's
content implies the power to change the right at will. This reading gains support
from the language of the First Amendment: if Congress can specify the content
of the freedom of speech, Congress surely must have the power to abridge it.
A closer examination of the Constitution, however, reveals a reference to
the abridgment of a right whose substance is under the states' control. Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment reduces the representation in Congress of any
state if the right to vote of its male citizens older than 21 is "denied... or in
any way abridged. ' 141 The right to vote is clearly associated with organized
government. Where there is no government there is no voting. 42 Moreover,
Justice Curtis assumed that the Comity Clause governed the state law rights of state citizenship in his dissent
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 583-84 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting), as he had when
writing for the full Court a year earlier in Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1856) (distinguishing
between property rights attached by Louisiana to contract based on place of contracting and rights attached
to citizenship). The Court reiterated this interpretation in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 wall.) 168 (1869),
explaining that, for example, the clause gives out-of-state Americans "the same freedom possessed by the
citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property." Id. at 180. A few years after the 14th
Amendment was adopted, a leading Republican lawyer and Senator from Wisconsin, Matthew Carpenter,
explained that the Comity Clause dealt only with state law rights and permitted states to discriminate among
citizens. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1871).
140. Early in the 39th Congress, Republican Senator John Sherman of Ohio employed the orthodox
understanding of the rights the Comity Clause protects: "This clause gives to the citizen of Massachusetts,
whatever may be his color, the right of a citizen of South Carolina, to come and go precisely like any other
citizen." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (1865). Republicans also relied on the standard Comity
Clause concept of privileges and immunities during the 1859 debate over the admission of Oregon. The
proposed Oregon Constitution forbade the immigration of free blacks. Representative Henry Dawes,
Republican of Massachusetts, thought that the provision was unconstitutional under the Comity Clause. He
explained that Massachusetts had many black citizens, and that under Article IV they had "all the rights
and privileges and immunities in the State of Oregon that every citizen of that State has." CONG. GLOBE,
35th Cong., 2d Sess. 975 (1859). (Although Dawes and Sherman regarded the Comity Clause as referring
to the specific privileges and immunities of state citizenship, they adopted the unorthodox view under which
the privileges and immunities of state citizenship consisted of a body of rights defined without respect to
personal characteristics such as race, so that a black citizen of Massachusetts visiting South Carolina would
have the rights of a white South Carolinian. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (Chief Justice
Taneny's argument in Dred Scott).)
141. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2. The right to vote would be abridged but not denied if, for example,
freed slaves' votes were counted at one-half, or if they were allowed to vote only for certain offices. See,
e.g., CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2767 (1866) (Sen. Howard) (state would abridge right to vote if
it permitted a person to vote for the state legislature but not Congress).
142. According to Representative Wilson, suffrage "is not a natural right, for where natural rights alone
obtain there is no right of suffrage." Id. at 173.
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the right to vote is largely a subject of state, not federal, law.143 A state de-
fines the right of its electors to vote when it decides on the terms of its officers,
and when it decides which ones shall be elected by popular vote. If all legisla-
tion that affected voting rights abridged the right to vote, then no state would
have any representation in the House. All political systems have laws that
define and thus in some sense limit voting rights.
The wording of the Fourteenth Amendment thus presupposes that one can
speak meaningfully of abridging a right defined by a state's positive law, and
therefore that one can tell the difference between a change in the content of the
right and an abridgment. Moreover, the historical context of Section 2 provides
the classic instance of abridgment: restriction based on race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. The concept of abridgment reflects the Republican
notion of equality, which distinguishes between laws that set out the content
of rights and laws that take rights away from a class of individuals. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 spoke to the latter. A state that established the same rights
for all races was not affected by the Act.
Usage in 1866 supports the claim that "abridgment" was understood in this
way. Legislators described the Black Codes as abridging or limiting rights, even
though Republicans repeatedly asserted, and the Civil Rights Act assumed, that
the states had control over the content of those rights. Senator Timothy Howe,
Republican of Wisconsin, advocated the Fourteenth Amendment in a denuncia-
tion of the Black Codes by complaining that they abridged the privileges and
immunities of classes of citizens."1 4 Similarly, Senator Trumbull complained
that the Black Codes "deny [the freedmen] certain rights."' 45 Senator Howard
denounced the codes, asking, "Is a freeman to be deprived of the right of
acquiring property, of the right of having a family, a wife, children, home?,
146
Representative Wilson argued that the Civil Rights Act would combat state
deprivations of rights: "And should a State enact laws and attempt to enforce
them which shall deprive the citizens of the United States of those [rights of
life, liberty, and property], may we not intervene to protect them in spite of the
143. This is unquestionably true with respect to state offices, whatever the extent of Congress' power
over federal elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (Congress may regulate times, places, and manner of
electing Senators and Representatives).
144. Howe was appalled that the insurrectionary states presented themselves for representation in
Congress and at the same time abridged their citizens' rights through race-based discrimination. After
quoting § 1, he asked:
Does any one on this floor desire to reserve to any State the right to abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens? ... Is it done in any of the States represented here? I cannot deny it
for all of them; but for many of them I do happen to know that no such abridgment of privileges
or immunities is tolerated. Is it necessary, however, to incorporate such an amendment into your
Constitution? Do you find in any of these communities seeking to participate in the legislation
of the United States an appetite so diseased as seeks to abridge these privileges and these
immunities, which seeks to deny to all classes of its citizens the protection of equal laws? Yes,
ML President, I am sorry to say, we do find just such an appetite ....
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 219 app. (1866).
145. Id. at 474.
146. Id. at 504.
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laws of the State?"'147 The Republicans thought that to abridge or restrict
rights was different from changing their content. The latter was ordinary
lawmaking; the former was caste legislation.
3. Forbidding Abridgments of Privileges or Immunities
The previous discussion provides us with a clearer insight into the language
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The privileges and immunities of state
citizenship include those rights of state positive law that come within the
category of privileges or immunities-preeminently the rights of personal
security, contractual capacity, and property, along with access to the mecha-
nisms of government that protect them. A state abridges such rights when it
withdraws them from certain citizens, but not when it alters their content
equally for all.
The following two formulations would therefore equivalently express the
principle of general equality with respect to privileges and immunities of state
citizenship: (1) every state shall give the same privileges and immunities to all
its citizens; (2) no state shall abridge the privileges or immunities of any of its
citizens. Both forbid Black Codes and imply Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.148 Neither strips a state of its power over the content of its citizens'
rights. The Privileges or Immunities Clause thus reads as it does: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States.' 49
147. Id. at 157 app. Concerning the Black Codes, Representative Shellabarger rhetorically asked
whether the national government could "prevent one race of free citizens from being by State laws deprived
as a race of all the civil rights for the securement of which his Government was created, and which are the
only considerations the Government renders him for the Federal allegiance which he renders?" Id. at 1293.
The opponents, too, used this way of speaking about racially discriminatory laws. Representative Rogers,
denouncing the 14th Amendment, was equally at ease in characterizing discriminatory legislation as a denial
of rights: "If a Negro is refused the right to be a juror, that will take away from him his privileges and
immunities as a citizen of the United States .... "Id. at 2538.
148. For example, the Florida Black Code of 1865 had a special contract rule for "colored" farm
laborers:
[I]f he shall refuse or neglect to perform the stipulations of his contract by willful disobedience
of orders, wanton impudence, or disrespect to his employer or his authorized agent, failure or
refusal to perform the work assigned to him, idleness, or abandonment of the premises or the
employment of the party with whom the contract was made, he or she shall be liable, upon the
complaint of his employer, or his agent, made under oath... to be arrested and tried before
the criminal court of the county, and upon conviction shall be subject to all the pains and
penalties prescribed for the punishment of vagrancy ....
1865 Fla. Laws ch. 1. The statute abridged the common law right to contract, a basic privilege of citizens.
The same can be said of Mississippi's provision "[that every civil officer shall, and every person may arrest
and carry back to his or her legal employer any freedman, free negro or mulatto, who shall have quit the
service of his or her employer before the expiration of his or her term of service without good cause." 1865
Miss. Laws 84.
149. For the same reasons, Bingham's earlier draft, which authorized Congress to make all laws
necessary and proper "to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several States," CONO. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1034 (1866), would have conferred a congressional
power to require equal citizens' rights. If a state denied someone the common law privileges of a citizen
by unequal legislation, then overriding the legislation would secure those privileges. Under Bingham's
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This seems to have been the understanding of the clause held by Represen-
tative Thomas Eliot, a Republican from Massachusetts, who paraphrased what
is now the second sentence of Section 1 during the debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment:
I support the first section because the doctrine it declares is right, and
if, under the Constitution as it now stands, Congress has not the power
to prohibit State legislation discriminating against classes of citizens
or depriving any persons of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or denying to any persons with the State the equal
protection of the laws, then, in my judgment, such power should be
distinctly conferred." 0
Note that Eliot rephrased the Privileges and Immunities clause, but evidently
thought the other two clauses could speak for themselves.
A clear explanation was given by then-Senator Boutwell a few years after
the Amendment passed."' To determine a citizen's rights under the clause,
he said, we
see what the rights and privileges and immunities of citizens of the
State generally are under the laws and constitution of the State....
The Government of the United States can take the humblest citizen in
the State of Ohio who by the constitution or the laws of that State may
be deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity that is conceded to the
citizens of that State generally, and lift him to the dignity of equality
as a citizen of that State .... 152
Similarly, Representative Shellabarger said that the clause
[r]equires that the laws on their face shall not "abridge" the privileges
or immunities of citizens. It secures equality toward all citizens on the
face of the law. It provides that those rights shall not be "abridged;"
in other words, that one man shall not have more rights upon the face
of the laws than another man. By that provision equality of legislation,
so far as it affects the rights of citizenship, is secured.153
amendment, Congress would have had the power to secure state law rights by forbidding caste legislation.
150. Id. at 2511.
151. Boutwell was a determined radical from Massachusetts. He served as a Representative in the 39th,
40th, and 41st Congresses, as Grant's first Secretary of the Treasury, and then as a Senator. During the 39th
Congress he served on the Joint Committee.
152. 3 CONG. REc. 1793 (1875).
153. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 71 app. (1871) (debate on the Ku Klux Act). Shellabarger's
remarks suggest that he may have thought that the citizenship clause of § 1 conferred substantive rights
of national citizenship. He cited Corfield as listing the rights of national citizenship that Congress could
protect against other private persons. This point was relevant because he was advocating provisions of the
Ku Klux Act that punished purely private conduct. Id. at 69-70 app. He also stressed equality, however,
and never suggested that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was anything other than an equality require-
ment.
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Some Republicans adopted the equality-based reading with respect to rights
of state citizenship. If this conclusion seems odd, it is probably because we no
longer distinguish so easily between a state's power over the content of its
citizens' rights and its power to determine which citizens shall have those
rights. This change in perspective probably reflects an increase in legislative
activity. In 1866, the privileges and immunities of citizenship were determined
mainly by the common law and were fairly static. It was therefore easy to
recognize a distinction between a change in the substantive law and an abridg-
ment such as a Black Code. We are now used to legislation that rearranges
people's private law relationships, and it seems strange to say that a change in
the law of contract that restricts someone's rights does not abridge privileges
or immunities.' 54
This reading offers a solution to the riddle of the text. The Privileges or
Immunities Clause can be understood to mandate the rule of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.
4. Other Rights of United States Citizens
The Civil Rights Act does not exhaust the meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States include rights as defined by the positive law of their states; to abridge
such rights is to take them away through unequal legislation. But citizens of
the United States are citizens both of states and of the nation. Justice Miller
was therefore correct in saying that the clause forbids the abridgment of rights
created or protected by national law.
I will put aside the important question of whether this protection is com-
pletely redundant. It is certainly redundant with respect to those rights of
national citizenship that were protected against the states before the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, such as the right created by the Contracts Clause.1
55
A more difficult question is whether there are privileges or immunities of
United States citizenship that the states did not have to respect before the
Amendment came into force but that became protected as a result of the
Amendment. If such rights exist, then the clause has independent substantive
154. As legislative changes in the underlying rules of property and contract multiplied in the later 19th
century, the background, quasi-constitutional nature of the common law regime became problematic. One
response was to constitutionalize the common law by forbidding legislation that interfered with vested
property rights. Because all property was implicitly subject to the police power, courts began to inquire into
whether legislation that interfered with property rights was an exercise of the police power, even though
the Constitution never refers to the police power. This way of thinking was built into substantive due process
doctrine. See generally BENJANUI R. TWISS, LAWYERs AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME
TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942).
155. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 10. Even with respect to such rights, the 14th Amendment as a whole is not
redundant because § 5 gives Congress an explicit power to enforce national rights, a power that it had not
previously possessed.
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effect, because those rights of national citizenship would no longer be subject
to control by the states. As explained below, the most important issue turning
on this question involves the application of the first eight Amendments to the
states.
56
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1875
One of the reasons that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is so
notoriously frustrating is that there is no contemporaneous written explanation
that carefully goes through the text-especially the Privileges or Immunities
Clause-clarifying its meaning and purposes. The history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, however, contains substantial evidence to support my proposed
reconstruction. 5 7 The Act banned race discrimination by common carriers,
inns, and places of public amusement, and forbade race discrimination in jury
selection by the states. The debates on the Act are a rich source of information
about how the Fourteenth Amendment was understood at the time of its
adoption, and they show that the equality theory of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause was prominent among Republicans.
In examining those debates, it is necessary to understand that the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 resembles the Civil Rights Act of 1866 far more than it
resembles the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even though it applied mainly to
private persons, and even though the Supreme Court is usually understood to
have said that such an application was impermissible. 5 ' The crucial point,
which is easy to miss, is that the private persons covered by the 1875 Act were
those already under a duty to serve the public without discrimination. In
principle, a common carrier was not permitted to turn away anyone who was
well behaved and prepared to pay the proper fee.'59
The 1875 Act was designed to deal with two problems. First, although the
reconstructed Southern States had eliminated their Black Codes, many had not
made it clear that the legal requirement of equal access to common carriers and
other facilities would translate into actual integration, as opposed to what we
now know as separate-but-equal accommodations. Second, many Republicans
believed that the states were not enforcing the common law rule of nondiscrimi-
nation, but were instead permitting common carriers to violate it at the expense
156. In order to avoid making unreasonable demands on the reader's patience, I shall not treat this
fascinating question in any detail beyond my discussion of incorporation in Part V.C.5, infra.
157. Act of Man 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335; see 7 FAMIMAN, supra note 9, at 156-84 (1987).
158. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
159. The theory was set out by Senator Daniel Pratt, Republican of Indiana:
No one reading the Constitution can deny that every colored man is a citizen, and as such, so
far as legislation may go, entitled to equal rights and privileges with white people. Can it be
doubted that for a denial of any of the privileges or accommodations enumerated in the bill he
could maintain a suit at common law against the inn-keeper, the public carrier, or proprietor or
lessee of the theatre who withheld them?
2 CONG. REC. 4081 (1874).
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of blacks. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 forbade any discrimination and gave
victims a federal cause of action for damages.16 Two leading constitutional
questions thus became intertwined in the 1875 Act: one, which we can readily
understand today, was whether separate-but-equal facilities were consistent with
equal rights; the other was whether Congress possessed the power to act
directly on private persons pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Our focus here, however, is not on those questions, but on the Republican
theory that Congress' power to enact the 1875 Act derived from the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. This thesis was put forth most clearly by Senator Mat-
thew Hale Carpenter, Republican of Wisconsin, who after the departure of
Reverdy Johnson was probably the preeminent lawyer in the Senate.16' On
February 1, 1872, Carpenter offered his own version of civil rights legislation.
His proposal, which differed somewhat from the then-pending bill of Charles
Sumner of Massachusetts, applied to inns, places of public amusement, common
carriers, tax-supported cemeteries, benevolent institutions, and public schools.
It did not apply to jury selection.
62
Carpenter thought that his bill rested on the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, and that the clause mandated equality without affecting the substance
of rights. He began by contrasting the Privileges or Immunities Clause with the
Comity Clause, which subjected a visiting American to all the abridgments of
privileges or immunities imposed by a state on its own similarly situated
citizens. 163 The Fourteenth Amendment, however, changed things:
If no State can make or enforce a law-and law in this connection
includes State constitutions, common law, statutes, and usages in such
State-to abridge the rights of any citizen it must follow that the
privileges and immunities of all citizens must be the same. If my
privileges are not equal to those of the Senator from Maine, then mine
are abridged. This no State can do. 164
160. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9-10 (describing the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
161. Carpenter, for instance, represented the government in Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,
511 (1869), and filed a brief for the monopoly butchers in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1873).
162. Carpenter's substitute language would have imposed a fine on any public inn, licensed place of
public amusement, common carrier, or on any publicly supported cemetery, benevolent institution, or school
that made "any distinction as to admission or privileges therein against any citizen of the United States
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 760 (1872).
He explained the differences:
It will be seen that I have included everything in this substitute which is embraced and intended
to be provided for in the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts, with the single
exception of churches, which I think Congress has no power to regulate, and that I have changed
the provision in regard to cemeteries, so as not to interfere with those which are merely
incorporated, but only as to those which are supported at the public expense or by endowment
for public use.
Id.
163. Id. at 762.
164. Id.
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Carpenter thought that the Privileges or Immunities Clause banned race discrim-
ination.165 Senator Carpenter did not mean that race discrimination was pro-
hibited as a side effect of giving everyone the same substantive rights. For if
the privileges to which he referred were minimum absolute rights, rather than
the particular legal rights established by some state, his inference would have
been incorrect because it would have been possible for the rights of the Senator
from Maine to have been enhanced beyond the minimum.
Carpenter's position on this issue was not left to inference. In defense of
the provision that mandated equal access to common schools, he argued that
he could never accept "that the children of one class of citizens shall not have
the benefit of a common school supported at the public expense by general
taxation."' 66 Senator Allen Thurman, a Democrat from Ohio, interrupted to
argue that this assumed Congress possessed the power to regulate public
schools. Thurman evidently believed that the choice between integration and
separate-but-equal facilities was a policy question left to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, along with other substantive decisions concerning
education.
167
Carpenter took pains to disavow any substantive federal power over civil
rights. He claimed only that equality required integration, ruling out the possi-
bility that he believed the Privileges or Immunities Clause produced equality
as a side effect of absolute rights.168 Carpenter's theory was one of equality
and equality alone, not substance.1 69 He Would not have suggested that using
165. Just after the quoted passage, Carpenter returned to the § 5 issue and argued that "if the State
does not, by its legislation, put all citizens upon a common footing, Congress may do so." Id. Congress
may thus demand equality.
166. Id. at 763. The common schools provision does not appear in the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
167. Thurman said: "[It is not a question at all whether colored children shall not have the benefit
of common schools; but it is a question whether all power of regulation in the States is taken away from
the States..... Id.
168. Carpenter said:
I want to know of the Senator from Ohio whether under this Constitution we cannot provide
that no State shall exclude a colored man from the enjoyment of any right in a court of justice;
for instance, to bring suit there or appear as a witness? Does that take away from the States the
power to regulate their courts? Not at all; but it does say that in the one particular covered by
the Constitution of the United States you shall dance conformity. Your power to regulate your
own affairs, your schools, to say how many you shall have, how they shall be supported, and
all that, is a power of your own; we cannot interfere with it; but if you have a school, and
support it by taxation on all citizens, then you shall not discriminate between the children of
different citizens. That does not take away all power to control them.
Id.
169. This is the same theory Carpenter employed in his brief on behalf of Myra Bradwell, who claimed
that Illinois could not deny her admission to the bar because of her sex: "If no State may 'make or enforce
any law' to abridge the privileges of a citizen, it must follow that the privileges of all citizens are the same."
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 6-7, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (No. 67). Carpenter
began his attack on sex discrimination by explaining that limiting bar admission to white citizens would
violate the Constitution because "[s]uch an act would abridge the rights of all colored citizens, by denying
them admission into one of the avocations which this court has declared is alike open to every one." Id.
at 10. Carpenter could see no difference between race and sex discrimination:
If the legislature may, under pretence of fixing qualifications, declare that no female citizen shall
be permitted to practice law, they may as well declare that no colored citizen shall practice law
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common schools (or public cemeteries) was a privilege or immunity in the
substantive sense. If public schools were an absolute right then the states would
be obliged to provide them. The decision whether to have public schools,
however, was regarded as a question of policy for the states. The only issue
was whether, given public schools, race discrimination would be allowed.
During the debate on integrated schools, opponents often maintained that if
integration were imposed, the Southern States would abandon public education.
I have found no instance in which anyone replied that public education was a
right the states could not take away.170 Thus, proponents of civil rights legis-
lation could not have premised their proposals entirely on a substantive view
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Other Republicans agreed that the proposed civil rights legislation rested
on the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Senator John Sherman appeared to
share this view. 171 Representative Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts, chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee, almost certainly did as well. In December
1873, he introduced civil rights legislation essentially identical to
Carpenter's.1 2 Butler said that the Constitution forbade discrimination with
respect to ordinary civil rights, such as those of riding on a railroad or attending
a common school:
[T]he result of the late war has been that every person born on the soil,
or duly naturalized, is a citizen of the United States, entitled to all the
.... [Tihe only provision in the Constitution of the United States which secures to colored male
citizens the privilege of admission to the bar, or the pursuit of the other ordinary avocations of
life, is the provision that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of a citizen."
Id. (emphasis added).
170. For example, Senator Henry Cooper, a Democrat from Tennessee, explained that in the South
there had long been resistance to public schools supported by taxation. Cooper claimed that Tennessee would
cease authorizing local governments to establish public schools if integration were required. 2 CONG. REc.
4155-57 (1874). A typical response to this argument (although not to Cooper specifically) was that of
Senator Timothy Howe of Wisconsin. "I hear that threat, and I admit I am afraid .... I do not know but
the schools will fall if we do not stay our course; but when peril threatens of any kind I can meet it but
in one way. Let justice be done though the common schools and the very heavens fall." Id. at 4151.
Senator Stewart opposed mandatory mixed schools in part because of the danger that it would cause
the common schools in the South to shut down. In explaining this position, he noted that he had proposed
a constitutional amendment requiring every state "to have an efficient system of common schools." Id. at
4167. "But while it is left to the States to have systems of free schools or not, and while the several States
are wavering in the balance whether they will have those schools or not, I say it is endangering in many
of the States the education of the present generation I fear." Id.
171. Sherman explained that the rights of American citizens were not limited to those granted by the
federal Constitution, but embraced all the rights protected by the common law. After quoting the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, Sherman asked: "What are those privileges or immunities? Are they only those
defined in the Constitution, the rights secured by the amendments? Not at all. The great fountain head, the
great reservoir of the rights of an American citizen is in the common law ..." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
2d Sess. 843 (1872). Sherman must have had in mind antidiscrimination protection for those rights, unless
he thought that the clause constitutionalized some version of the common law. His willingness to include
public schools also makes it difficult to believe that he thought the clause gave substantive protection to
state law rights.
172. 2 CONG. REC. 318 (1873).
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rights, privileges, and immunities of a citizen. All legislation, therefore,
that seeks to deprive a well-behaved citizen of the United States of any
privilege or immunity to be enjoyed, and which he is entitled to enjoy
in common with other citizens, is against constitutional enactment. 
3
Butler understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause as an antidiscrimination
provision concerning common law rights.
Congress debated forerunners of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 through much
of the early 1870's. On April 14, 1873, the Supreme Court decided an impor-
tant case under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Slaughter-House
Cases.74 The reaction to that opinion by supporters and opponents of civil
rights legislation is important evidence that people generally thought that this
legislation rested on the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The legislators'
thinking changed, however, when the Slaughter-House Court held that the
clause protected only the rights of distinctively national citizenship, not ordinary
common law rights.
Senator Sumner immediately submitted his civil rights bill when the Forty-
third Congress convened on December 1, 1873.175 The next day, he asked
the Senate to take up the measure.176 Orris Ferry, a Republican from Connect-
icut, who opposed the bill, moved that it be referred to committee. 177 Ferry
argued that the Slaughter-House Court had held "in principle that the bill which
the Senator has presented is a violation of the Constitution of the United
States.' 78 Sumner's motion failed.
When the House of Representatives turned to civil rights legislation the
same month, opponents took up Slaughter-House as a chorus. Representative
James Beck, a Kentucky Democrat, brought a copy and quoted the passage that
distinguished between rights of state and national citizenship. 179 Because the
rights to be protected by the proposed legislation were rights of state citizen-
ship, Beck said, Congress could not reach them: the "whole spirit and bearing"
of Slaughter-House was "against the constitutionality of the law now pro-
posed."18 When debate resumed in January, Virginia Democrat John Harris
173. Id. at 340. Butler was talking about equality, not absolute entitlement. Although this would have
been obvious from the inclusion of cemeteries and public schools, he made it explicit: "No State has a right
to pass any law which inhibits the full enjoyment of all the rights she gives to her citizens by discriminating
against any class of them provided they offend no law." Id.
174. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
175. 2 CONG. REc. 2 (1873).
176. Id. at 10.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 11. Ferry said that the bill should be referred "because the constitutional question which
was prominent in the former debate on this bill has been submitted to the consideration of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and their decision promulgated since the Senate last met" Id. at 10.
179. Id. at 342.
180. Id. Beck believed that the rights of national citizenship included the protections of the first ten
amendments. Id. at 342-43.
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spoke first in opposition, declaring that the Court's decision made the bill
unconstitutional. 1
In response to Slaughter-House, some of the bill's proponents accepted the
invitation to rely on the Equal Protection Clause-the argument that would
seem obvious to us. Representative Robert Elliott, a Republican from South
Carolina, argued that race-based denials of privileges or immunities of state
citizenship violated equal protection." 2 Republican Representative William
Lawrence of Ohio also turned to the Equal Protection Clause, but realized that
this approach required some work with the language: "When it is said 'no State
shall deny to any person the equal protection' of those laws, the word 'protec-
tion' must not be understood in any restricted sense, but must include every
benefit to be derived from laws."'183 Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen of New
Jersey, another convert to equal protection, had a hard time shaking the notion
that the bill was about the privileges and immunities of citizens. He argued that
the privileges and immunities of distinctively national citizenship included the
equal protection of the laws, which in turn amounted to general racial equali-
ty. 
184
181. Id. at 376. Opposition speakers continued to cite and quote Slaughter-House throughout the debate.
See, e.g., id. at 411 (Rep. Blount); id. at 415 (Rep. Bright); id. at 419 (Rep. Hemdon). Actually the case
was useful for the bill's opponents only on a theory that was too subtle for most of them. Justice Miller
recognized that the Reconstruction Amendments were designed to eliminate race discrimination. The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873). To that extent, his opinion was consistent with
the 1875 Act. The opinion casts doubt on the Act when it says that the regulation of civil rights remains
with the states, implying that Congress may not act directly on private persons as the 1875 Act sought to
do. Id. at 82. One Democrat who did understand was Alexander Stephens, then a Representative from
Georgia. Stephens conceded that the Constitution, apparently through the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
banned race discrimination. He said that the 14th Amendment was designed to make freed slaves citizens
and to prohibit the States from denying them "the same privileges, immunities, and civil rights which were
secured to the citizens of the several States, respectively, and of the United States, by the Constitution as
it stood before citizenship to the colored race was declared by this amendment." 2 CONG. REc. 379-80
(1874). He denied, however, that it went beyond equality and gave Congress power over private law:
Neither of these amendments [14th and 15th] confer, bestow, or even declare any rights at ali
to citizens of the United States, or to any class whatever. Upon the colored race they neither
confer, bestow, or declare civil rights of any character-not even the right of franchise. They
only forbid the States from discriminating in their laws against the colored race in the bestow-
ment of such rights as they may severally deem best to bestow upon their own citizens.
Id. at 380. For Stephens, this meant that Congress could not grant a direct remedy for a private invasion
of a state law right, but could act only on the states themselves.
182. Id. at 407-10.
183. Id. at 412. Lawrence went on to explain that the Civil War amendments were designed to uproot
state race discrimination. Id. at 412-14. Representative Josiah Walis, a Republican from Florida, also argued
that after Slaughter-House, the bill could still rest on the Equal Protection Clause, whatever the status of
privileges and immunities. Id. at 416-17. He then dismissed Slaughter-House, observing that the nation's
"onward march to a broader, higher, and brighter civilization" would not be halted by it any more than by
that earlier case about citizenship, Dred Scott. Id. at 417.
184. Id. at 3453-54. Frelinghuysen seemed unsure whether he wanted to assert that the Equal Protection
Clause was involved. At first, he seemed to be arguing that nondiscrimination was a free standing right of
national citizenship. He then invoked the Equal Protection Clause. Id. Frelinghuysen conceded the force
of Slaughter-House: "[A]s citizens of the United States we are all bound to respect that decision and not
erect slaughter-houses in that district." Id. at 3453. Frelinghuysen's initial suggestion resembles the argument
put forward by Justice Harlan in dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, where he maintained that the grant of
state citizenship contained in the first sentence of § 1 created a national right to "exemption from race
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Other Republicans, living in the long shadow of Dred Scott, were prepared
to defy the Court more directly. The boldest was George Boutwell of Massa-
chusetts, then a Senator. His answer to Slaughter-House was that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause mandated equality as to the rights of state citizenship,
and that for all he cared the Supreme Court could go to hell. Boutwell "dis-
miss[ed] that case as a legislator. ' 1s5 He thought the Constitution protected
rights of state citizenship.186 For Boutwell, to say that the privileges and
immunities of state citizenship were rights of American citizens was to say that
the states must give all their citizens equal civil rights.'87
The most thoughtful response came from Senator Timothy Howe, a Repub-
lican from Wisconsin. The purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments, he
explained, was to put an end to every state's power "to deprive any one or any
number of its citizens of the commonest rights of the commonest man.'
88
Howe said that Justice Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House undertook "to assert
a principle of constitutional law which I do not believe will ever be accepted
by the profession or the people of the United States."'189 But Howe was main-
ly interested in severing the judgment concerning the Louisiana slaughterhouse
discrimination in respect of any civil right belonging to citizens of the white race in the same State." 109
U.S. 3, 48 (1883). His theory may be returning to vogue. See, e.g., Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations
on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469, 524-28 (1989).
185. 3 CONG. REC. 1792 (1875). Boutwell said that the decision was "the law of the case, but it is not
law beyond the case," and "not law for the Senate when the Senate is engaged in considering a question
which is a different question from that on which the court passed." Id. Perhaps Boutwell was not quite
telling the Court to go to hell, but he was certainly denying that the opinions given in support of its
judgments were the supreme law of the land.
186. In 1874, Boutwell said that Justice Miller's doctrine was a "great mistake":
As a citizen of the United States, the first right of the citizen of the State is that he shall enjoy
all the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the State; and therefore as citizens of the United
States, no State can make a distinction between the citizens of the State over which it has
jurisdiction.
2 CONG. REC. 4116 (1874). The following year he said that "[tihe chief privilege, the great right established
by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution is that citizens of the United States are citizens of the State
wherein they reside." 3 CoNG. REc. 1793 (1875).
187. In 1874, Boutwell asked rhetorically whether the federal government could
secure to the citizen of every State all those privileges and immunities which belong to, or are
enjoyed lawfully by, any other citizen of the same State by virtue of the fact that that citizen
is, first, a citizen of the United States, and secondly, made a citizen of the State by virtue of
the power of the General Government?
2 CONG. REC. 4116 (1874). In 1875 he said that:
while we cannot go into the States and say what the rights of citizens of the State in the State
shall be, whenever there is a law in a State or a provision in its constitution which secures to
citizens generally their rights and discriminates against other citizens, that discrimination is not
only against citizens as citizens of the State, but against those citizens as citizens of the United
States, and in our power under the fourteenth amendment to protect them as citizens of the
United States, we ... secure to our citizens, the citizens of the United States, their rights under
the laws of the States as citizens of the State.
3 CONG. REC. 1793 (1875).
188. 2 CONG. REC. 4147 (1874).
189. Id. at 4148.
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monopoly from the reasoning that had produced it.' 90 He pointed out that
even if the decision succeeded in gutting the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
it still had nothing to do with the pending civil rights bill, because Justice
Miller had agreed that the Equal Protection Clause forbade race discrimina-
tion.' 91 Howe apparently thought the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be
primarily an antidiscrimination provision and hoped that Slaughter-House might
be recast to accept that principle. In the interim, he seemed willing to rely on
the Equal Protection Clause.
Parting company with the challengers of the Slaughter-House decision was
Matthew Carpenter, who decided not to fight the Supreme Court. By 1875 he
thought that the public accommodations and schools provisions were unconstitu-
tional under Slaughter-House, and he persisted in his longstanding objection
to the jury provision. 192 Even though he still supported the bill's aims, Car-
penter would not participate in what he deemed the counterproductive enterprise
of passing a statute that would be invalidated by the courts.' 93 Although he
agreed that Slaughter-House might have been incorrectly decided, he said that
it would nonetheless apply to civil rights legislation. 194 To pass the bill under
those circumstances, he argued, would be a cruel hoax that would disserve the
cause of freedom.
195
To summarize, the theory of the Fourteenth Amendment that I present here
was current in the early 1870's. Many leading Republicans believed that
Congress' power to pass civil rights legislation derived from the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Senator Carpenter, one of the nation's preeminent lawyers,
explained the clause explicitly in terms of equal citizens' rights. The opponents
of the 1875 Act also understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be the
proffered constitutional warrant for the legislation. Thus, when the Court in
Slaughter-House held that the clause had nothing to do with rights of state
citizenship, those opponents put this case at the center of their argument. Before
Slaughter-House was decided, and even for a short while thereafter, Republi-
190. Howe was trying to separate monopolies from race discrimination. He said the monopoly act
"made no discrimination between a white man and a black man. It made, I think, broad discrimination
between the rights of white men-a discrimination which upon my soul I believe the fourteenth amendment
condemns-but not a syllable of discrimination between the two colors." Id. Howe disliked Justice Miller's
distinction between state and national rights, which he said was "not the conclusion of the court" but merely
"a part of the argument simply by which the justice who delivered the opinion of the majority undertook
to defend the judgment of the court." Id. According to Howe,
if it were the judgment of the court and could be found to-day inscribed on its records, I could
not forbear to say, what the American people and I believe the civilized world have already said
of another and a prior decision of that same court, that it is not law and cannot be law.
Id.
191. Id. at 4148-49.
192. 3 CONG. REc. 1861-64 (1875).
193. Id. at 1861.
194. Id. at 1863.
195. Id.
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cans in Congress thought that the Privileges or Immunities Clause mandated
equality with respect to the rights of state citizenship.
IV. EQUALITY, PROTECTION, AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
The foregoing approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been
guided by an attempt to determine how the clause could be the ground for the
Civil Rights Act of 1866."96 The natural response to this approach is to say
that the attempt is unnecessary and any equality-based reading of the clause is
redundant because the Equal Protection Clause provides the necessary ground
and more. According to the orthodox view, the Equal Protection Clause man-
dates equality in all state actions. 197
This venerable position, which may have been taken by some participants
in the framing debates, is often attributed to the Supreme Court's first great
Equal Protection Clause case, Strauder v. West Virginia.198 It is, however,
unpersuasive when examined closely. On the contrary, it is more plausible to
conclude that the Equal Protection Clause requires equality with respect to the
"protection of the laws," a subset of the activities of government and, crucially,
of the privileges and immunities of citizens. In short, the Equal Protection
Clause is mainly about protection, even though it is about equality too.
In this part of the Article, I will first try to shake our traditional understand-
ing of the Equal Protection Clause and then sketch the rudiments of a reading
that is more in keeping with the provision's text and history.
A. Equality In Everything or Equality in Protection
1. The Text
The challenge to orthodoxy begins with the language of the clause1 99 "No
196. I do not mean to suggest that my reading cannot stand on its own. On the contrary, it has the
significant virtue of accounting for the rights of both of the citizenships conferred by the first sentence of
§ 1 and of using the concept of state-citizenship privileges and immunities that appears in the orthodox
reading of the Comity Clause. My reading, however, becomes not merely attractive but imperative if the
Civil Rights Act must rest on the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
197. "A core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (footnote omitted) (resting on
Equal Protection Clause); see also 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 314 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause "governs all governmental actions which
classify individuals for different benefits or burdens under the law").
198. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The Court cited Strauder as authority for its sweeping statement in Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. at 432.
199. Although this view of the clause may seem unfamiliar, many students of the original understanding
agree that the clause is about protection in a limited sense. Jacobus tenBroek, who systematically surveyed
the origins of the 14th Amendment in the abolitionist movement, concluded that the clause was a substantive
mandate for "[p]rotection of men in their fundamental or natural rights," and that"equality was a modifying
condition." TENBROEK, supra note 49, at 237. Earl Maltz argues that the Equal Protection Clause was
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State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." Those words require equality with respect to something, and our
ordinary understanding of the Equal Protection Clause is that they require
equality with respect to everything. This may seem obvious, but it is not. If the
Constitution contained a provision forbidding any state from denying to anyone
the equal right to trial by jury, no one would think that it applied to anything
other than jury trials.2°° But the orthodox view holds that the clause does not
refer to any right in particular, but to all rights. The standard reading, then, rests
on the premise that the "protection of the laws" means the same thing as, for
example, "treatment under the law" or simply "laws."
That last statement makes the point rather strikingly: the word protection
is not doing much work in the standard reading of the text. Nothing is gained
by going from "equal laws" to "the equal protection of the laws." If orthodoxy
is correct, the noun in the Equal Protection Clause is, at best, surplusage. I say
at best, because the word actually obscures the universal sweep of the text that
the standard reading demands. The word protection, if taken in its ordinary
sense, has meanings that make it difficult for the clause to apply to everything
a state does. For one, the protection of the laws can refer to an operation or
activity of the laws, which suggests that the Equal Protection Clause governs
the administration or execution of the laws rather than their content. But if
protection refers only to application and not to substance, the clause is not all
encompassing and could not generate the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The language could, however, be looser-"protection" might signal that
the clause refers to laws that have to do with protecting something. If that is
what is going on, the clause once again cannot require equality in everything,
because by hypothesis it does not govern laws that do not have to do with
protection, whatever protection might be about. The standard reading of the
clause is persuasive only as long as we stress the adjective while ignoring the
noun. It rests on a belief that there is no distinctive "protection of the laws"
separate from "the laws." If that belief is not correct, then, parallel to the right
to jury trial in the example above, the clause must have a nonuniversal content,
limited to the protection of the laws, however that may be understood.
designed to "constitutionalize a principle which would require statutes to provide the mechanism to protect
citizens in the exercise of extrinsically established legal rights." Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal
Protection of the Laws-An Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DMGO L. REV. 499, 537 (1985). Alfred Avins
reached the same conclusion about the limited meaning of protection after a careful review of the use of
the concept in the Reconstruction debates. Alfred Avins, The Equal "Protection" of the Laws: The Original
Understanding, 12 N.Y.L. F 385 (1966); see also CURRIE, supra note t, at 348-50; HERIONE H. MEYER,
THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMiENT 150-51 (1977).
200. We easily could have had such a provision. James Madison's initial draft of the religion clauses
of the First Amendment provided that "[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, nor on any pretext, infringed." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed.,
1834) (June 8, 1789).
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2. Protection By Government
In fact, usage in the nineteenth century and during Reconstruction recog-
nized something called the protection of the laws, which was a central function
of government, but did not include everything that the government did. Specifi-
cally, "protection of the laws" referred to the mechanisms through which the
government secured individuals and their rights against invasion by others.
That the basic function of government was to protect people's rights was
a commonplace.2°1 The Lockean bargain, by which the citizens give the gov-
ernment a promise of obedience-allegiance-and receive security for their
rights in return, was explained by Blackstone, who said that the "original
contract of society" was
that the whole should protect all of it's [sic] parts, and that every part
should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that
the community should guard the rights of each individual member, and
that (in return for this protection) each individual should submit to the
laws of the community; without which submission of all it was impos-
sible that protection could be certainly extended to any.y
In America, this basic purpose of the state made it on to Justice Washington's
Corfield list, which included "[p]rotection by the government" among the
privileges and immunities of citizens.2 3 During the debate on the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, Representative James Wilson of Iowa, chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, invoked the connection between allegiance and protec-
tion.2" Wilson's remarks made clear that the remedies government provides
when citizens' rights are invaded are essential to government's protective
function. 5
201. Earl Maltz discusses this in considerable detail. Maltz, supra note 199, at 507-10.
202. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COmiENTARiES *47-48. I call the bargain Lockean, but could as easily
have said Hobbist. "The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer,
than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.... The end of Obedience is Protection...
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 272 (C.B. McPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968).
203. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
204. "The highest obligation which the Government owes to the citizen in return for the allegiance
exacted of him is to secure him in the protection of his rights." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1295
(1866).
205. Wilson spoke in response to a proposal of Bingham's, who had moved an amendment to a then-
pending motion to recommit the civil rights bill to committee. Bingham's amendment would have instructed
the Judiciary Committee to replace the criminal penalties of the bill with a private cause of action by the
victim of discrimination. id. at 129 1. Wilson responded that Bingham's provision would protect only those
who could afford a lawsuit:
This bill proposes that the humblest citizen shall have full and ample protection at the cost of
the Government, whose duty it is to protect him. The amendment of the gentleman recognizes
the principle involved, but it says that the citizen despoiled of his rights, instead of being
properly protected by the Government, must press his own way through the courts and pay the
bills attendant thereon. This may do for the rich, but to the poor, who need protection, it is
mockery .... Sir, I cannot see the justice of that doctrine and I assert that it is the duty of the
Government of the United States to provide proper protection, and to pay the costs attendant
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The remedial function of government sometimes went by the name of the
protection of the laws. The phrase appears in Blackstone, who characterized
"[t]he remedial part of the law" as "the protection of the law., 20 6 The words
made their way to America at least by 1803, when Chief Justice Marshall
explained that someone possessing a right to his commission had a remedy at
law because "[tlhe very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protec-
tion. ' '2°7 Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney, quoted Blackstone's
definition of the protection of the laws as their remedial operation in an 1843
opinion involving the Contracts Clause."0
3. Reconstruction
a. Protection
The Equal Protection Clause grew out of proposals in the Thirty-ninth
Congress that dealt with this concept of the protection of the laws. On January
20, 1866, the Joint Committee considered a subcommittee proposal for a
constitutional amendment that would give Congress power "to secure.., to
all persons in every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and
property."2 9 A few days later the same subcommittee prepared a draft provid-
ing that Congress would have power "to secure all persons in every State full




The remedial part of the law is so necessary a consequence of the former two [declaratory and
directory], that laws must be very vague and imperfect without it. For in vain would rights be
declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no method of recovering and asserting
those rights, when wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly, when we
speak of the protection of the law.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 202, at *55-56.
207. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
208. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (I How.) 311, 317 (1843). Taney, writing for the Court, held that the
Contracts Clause prevented Illinois from retrospectively limiting the foreclosure rights of judgment creditors
or granting the mortgagor a new right to redeem. He reasoned that the Contracts Clause, which forbids the
states from impairing the obligation of contracts, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, included both the right created
by the contract and those aspects of the remedy interference with which would materially impair the right.
In the process, Taney equated remedy and protection:
We have quoted the entire paragraph [from Blackstone], because it shows, in a few plain words,
and illustrates by a familiar example, the connection of the remedy with the right. It is the part
of the municipal law which protects the right, and the obligation by which it enforces and
maintains it. It is this protection which the clause in the Constitution now in question mainly
intended to secure.
42 U.S. (1 How.) at 317-18.
209. JOINT CoMmITTEE JOURNAL, supra note 82, at 12. The same proposal would have given Congress
power to secure "to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the same political rights and privileges."
Id. Apparently the protection provision was not thought to include political rights.
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the United States, in any State, the same immunities and also equal political
rights and privileges.""21 Similarly, Bingham's February draft, which was the
immediate precursor to the second sentence of Section 1, empowered Congress
"to secure... to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights
of life, liberty, and property."' These drafts dealt with the distinctively
protective function of government; they evidently did not refer to all govern-
ment activities."'
The notion that the Equal Protection Clause governs a right to protection
was expressed clearly in the debates on the Ku Klux Act of 1871.213 The
claim that Congress had power to act directly against private outrages like those
of the Klan usually rested not on the theory that the Equal Protection Clause
forbade discrimination in general, but on a belief that it specifically forbade
discrimination in law enforcement-the protection of the laws. The idea was
that if the states failed in their duty to provide equal protection, then Congress'
enforcement power extended to undertaking the duty itself.214 In discussing
the Ku Klux Act, many Republicans focused on the states' duty to protect life,
liberty, and property.
215
210. Id. at 14-15.
211. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
212. This concern with protection is exhibited by the Civil Rights Act itself, which gave all citizens
"full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." Act of Apr.
9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
213. Act of Apr 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The Ku Klux Act was the third of the four major
Reconstruction civil rights laws. The first was the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Next came the Voting Rights
Act of 1870. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. Its primary purpose was to enforce the 15th
Amendment, although it had other important provisions too. The Ku Klux Act was directed at private
violence against freed slaves and Republicans and at state officials who failed to deal with such violence.
Last was the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. It forbade race discrimi-
nation by common carriers and other private persons who were under a duty to serve the public, and forbade
race discrimination in jury selection.
214. Senator Daniel Pratt, a Republican from Indiana, said to states that objected to federal punishment
of "riots, arsons, robberies, and murders": "You have brought this necessity upon yourselves by refusing
to obey a plain constitutional duty not to withhold from any one the equal protection of your laws." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 506 (1871). This argument has two steps: (1) the Equal Protection Clause
obliges the states equally to protect people's rights against other private persons, and (2) where the state
has failed in its obligation, Congress can enforce that obligation by creating a substitute federal remedy.
One can agree with the first proposition without agreeing with the second. Both, however, reflect the focus
on protection.
215. Republican Representative George Hoar of Massachusetts said that Congress was flooded with
complaints "that large numbers of our fellow-citizens are deprived of the enjoyment of the fundamental
rights of citizens. That their lives are not secure; that their property does not receive the equal protection
of the law; that their homes are not safe .... Id. at 332. Hoar apparently thought that equality in the
content of the laws was required by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, while the Equal Protection Clause
was concerned with legal remedies and administration. He said that if the 14th Amendment was designed
merely to prevent'formal exercise of power by the State in derogation of civil rights, that last clause would
have been unnecessary, because the preceding part had provided that 'no State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.', Id. Similarly,
Representative Samuel Shellabarger said that "[t]he laws must be, first, equal, in not abridging rights; and
second, the States shall equally protect, under equal laws, all persons in them." Id. at 71 app.
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b. Suffrage
All this shows that during Reconstruction the interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause that is today accepted had a competitor which limited the
clause to the protective functions of government. In order to determine which
of these readings would have seemed more natural when the Amendment was
framed, we can examine one of the crucial issues of Reconstruction: equal
suffrage. Suffrage is especially illuminating because, as has long been recog-
nized, the debates on voting rights cast doubt on the claim that the Equal
Protection Clause is universal in scope. Those debates leave us with the nagging
question of how so many Republicans could have asserted that Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment had nothing to do with voting when they had before
them a clause that so obviously applied to all government actions.216 Such
claims would be understandable, however, if those Republicans thought they
had before them two relevant clauses, both of which were limited in subject
matter: one to the privileges and immunities of citizens, the other to the protec-
tion of the laws.
We can begin with the source. John Bingham said, "The amendment does
not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of regulating
suffrage in the several States."217 This confirms that as far as Bingham was
concerned the drafting change from protection of life, liberty, and property to
protection of the laws did not expand the Equal Protection Clause to include
all government actions.18 Jacob Howard was just as emphatic, in 1866 and
later, in asserting that Section 1 had nothing to do with voting. When he
216. The second Justice Harlan assembled the best known compilation of the evidence concerning
voting. He claimed that the 14th Amendment does not affect the right to vote other than through § 2. See
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, I., dissenting). Although Justice Harlan apparently
recognized that the Privileges or Immunities Clause constitutionalizes the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 400
U.S. at 163, his account of the Equal Protection Clause went no further than to cast doubt on its application
to voting. Id. at 164. Perhaps because he was unwilling directly to challenge the presumption that the
Constitution contains a general ban on state race discrimination, he rested his argument mainly on inferences
from § 2 of the Amendment, and did not seek to give a detailed account of the language of § I that would
be consistent with his conclusion. The more limited reading of the Equal Protection Clause represents the
textual grounding of his claim about voting rights that Justice Harlan either did not have, or did not think
he could use.
217. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2542 (1866). Bingham believed that other parts of the
Constitution-specifically, the Article I, § 2 requirement that Representatives be elected by the people, and
the Guarantee Clause-limited the states' power to disenfranchise large numbers of their adult male citizens.
Id. But he evidently did not believe that the 14th Amendment imposed any new limitations. In 1871,
Bingham presented a report of the House Judiciary Committee on a petition urging that Congress secure
the franchise for women under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The report responded that the 14th
Amendment "did not add to the privileges or immunities" contained in Article IV, and that its guarantees
thus did not include voting. H.R. REP. No. 22, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1-3 (1871).
218. It is clear that Bingham thought that § 1 did not affect suffrage. He thus apparently did not
subscribe to the current reading of the Equal Protection Clause. It is more difficult to determine whether
he would have shared my belief that the clause, albeit not universal, is not even broad enough to support
the entire Civil Rights Act of 1866. I think he probably would have done so, because he recognized the
difference between the rights of citizens and aliens, infra note 237, but some doubt remains on that question.
1438 [Vol. 101: 1385
Privileges or Immunities
introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate, he said, "The first section
of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these classes [blacks or
whites] the right of voting."219 A few years later, Howard was shocked by
the suggestion that race discrimination with respect to voting violated Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' If Howard thought that the protection of
the laws included all the laws, his treatment of suffrage is impossible to
explain.Y
Similarly, during the debates on the Civil Rights Act, Senator Henry
Wilson, a Republican from Massachusetts, articulated his view that the govern-
ment's obligation to provide full protection of life, liberty, and property did not
imply equal suffrage. 2 Later in 1866, toward the end of the debate on the
Fourteenth Amendment, Vermont Republican Senator Luke Poland likewise said
that equal protection did not imply equal voting rights a
219. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). Howard was candid that he felt this was a
shortcoming of the amendment required by political reality. Id.
220. "1 feel constrained to say here now that this is the first time it ever occurred to me that the right
to vote was to be derived from the fourteenth article. I think such a construction cannot be maintained."
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869). A moment later Howard explained that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause did not include the franchise because the similar language in Article IV did not do
so. Id. He then went on to explain that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was designed to eliminate the
Black Codes; after quoting the clause, he said:
The immediate object of this was to prohibit for the future all hostile legislation on the part of
the recently rebel States in reference to the colored citizens of the United States .... It was to
secure them against any infringement or violation of their rights by those southern Legislatures.
That is the whole history of it.
Id. It is not clear whether Howard thought the clause accomplished this end through a substantive or an
equality-based rule.
221. Howard's 1866 discussion of the Equal Protection Clause provides support for both views of the
clause's meaning. Howard began by saying that the clause (perhaps along with the Due Process Clause,
which he had just quoted) "abolishes all class legislation in the States." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2766 (1866). Shortly thereafter, he spoke of giving "the black man, I had almost called it, the poor privilege
of the equal protection of the law." Id. The latter statement sounds like it refers to protection as one right
among others.
222. Wilson explained that in his view the 13th Amendment enabled Congress to require equal
protection for the freed slaves but did not empower it to affect the suffrage:
When [the 13th] amendment was added to the Constitution it gave Congress ample power to
make these men free, as free as the non-voting white population of those States, as the women
or children, or such persons as were not allowed the privilege of suffrage. The Massachusetts
bill of rights declares that "each individual in society has a right to be protected by it in the
enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property." Mr Webster says that "the right of being protected
in life, liberty, and estate is due to all, and cannot be justly denied to any, whatever be their age,
property, or residence in the State." This sacred right to be fully protected in life, liberty, and
estate is due to the freedmen, and I believe Congress is clothed with ample authority to secure
the emancipated slaves in their civil rights and immunities. But I did not understand then, and
I do not believe now, that it gives Congress the power to clothe these men with suffrage or to
confer office upon them.
Id. at 1255.
223. Shortly after quoting the last two clauses of § 1, Poland said:
All the people, or all the members of a State or community, are equally entitled to protection;
they are all subject to its laws; they must all share its burdens, and they are all interested in its
legislation and government. Notwithstanding this no State or community professing to be
republican allows all its people to vote.
Id. at 2962. Although he did not believe that the Equal Protection Clause applied to all state activities,
apparently because he thought of protection as a specific right, Senator Poland probably would not have
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One especially instructive passage in the Reconstruction debates appears
during the preparation of the Fifteenth Amendment In 1869, Representative
George Boutwell, arch-radical, member of the Joint Committee, and exponent
of an equality reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, introduced in the
House both a constitutional amendment that was a forerunner of the Fifteenth
Amendment and a bill to accomplish the same end by ordinary legislation. In
support of the bill he relied on several sources of congressional authority,
including the Privileges or Immunities Clause but not the Equal Protection
Clause.? Boutwell, who was not shy about asserting federal power, seems
to have thought it plausible that voting was a privilege of citizens but not that
it was part of the protection of the laws? 5 Both his approach to voting legis-
lation and the repeated statements by other Republicans that Section 1 had
nothing to do with voting, are consistent with the view that the Equal Protection
Clause is limited to the protection of the laws. They are not consistent with the
current view.
c. The Broader Reading
This suggests that the more limited interpretation was not only present but
widespread among Republicans. It is more difficult to determine when the now-
accepted view, according to which the clause secures equality with respect to
shared my belief that the clause was not even broad enough to encompass the entire Civil Rights Act of
1866. He strongly implied that in his view the 1866 Act rested on the Equal Protection Clause, and possibly
the Due Process Clause. Id. at 2961.
224. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 555-61 (1869). Boutwell appealed to Congress' power to
determine the manner of electing representatives under Article I, § 4, id. at 556-57, and to the Guarantee
Clause, id. at 557-58, as well as the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which he discussed at length, id. at
558-59. Boutwell's bill was entitled, "A bill to secure equal privileges and immunities to citizens of the
United States, and to enforce the provisions of article fourteen of the amendments to the Constitution." Id.
at 561. As demonstrated below, one reason he did not mention the Equal Protection Clause was probably
to avoid the response that aliens would then have the right to vote guaranteed by the Constitution. Boutwell
was not alone in this tendency. In 1868, Thaddeus Stevens argued that Congress could require equal suffrage
under the 14th Amendment. Although he never identified a specific clause as the source of this power, he
spoke repeatedly of the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens, but never of the protection of the laws.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1966-68 (1868).
225. Justice Harlan's historical analysis in Oregon v. Mitchell drew a response from Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall. 400 U.S. 112, 250-78 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). All of their
historical evidence that specifically relates a clause of the 14th Amendment to suffrage concerned the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. For example, they argued that Bingham's first proposed amendment might
have covered suffrage, even though it did not mention voting, because it was a successor to an earlier draft
that did cover political rights. Id. at 258-60. The equal protection provision of Bingham's proposal, however,
was limited to life, liberty, and property, id. at 259; only the privileges and immunities language even
arguably could have included suffrage. Similarly, the Justices presented evidence that they said suggested
that Bingham, id. at 264-66, Howard, id. at 263-66, and Democrat Andrew Jackson Rogers, id. at 267,
thought that the privileges of citizens included the franchise. William Van Alstyne's response to Justice
Harlan's earlier opinions also suggests that the Equal Protection Clause applies to suffrage without either
presenting any historical source saying precisely that or considering the possibility that the clause, rather
than being universal, is limited to the protection of the laws. Vrliam Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth
Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
33.
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all state activities, made its first appearance. As a comparison of Howard's
reference to abolishing all class legislation with his emphatic pronouncements
about voting demonstrate, discussions of the clause that seem to confirm our
understanding may in fact not do so. Statements in the congressional debates
that come to grips with this issue and come down in favor of a broad reading
appear late in Reconstruction. 6
Those statements seem to find it necessary to wrestle with the text. For
example, during the drafting of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
Senator Carpenter proposed legislation that forbade discrimination by common
carriers but, unlike Sumner's draft, did not deal with jury service. Carpenter's
view was that jury service was a political right, not a civil right, and therefore
was not a privilege or immunity of citizens.227 In response, Senator Oliver
Morton of Indiana sought to rely on the Equal Protection Clause. In order to
do so, he found himself explaining that equal protection was not limited to
protection as ordinarily understood, but that it should be understood more
broadly to include the equal "benefit" of the laws.'
On balance, and especially in light of the evidence concerning suffrage, it
seems likely that the dominant view, at least in 1866, was that the protection
of the laws was not the same thing as "the laws."
226. Avins asserted that the now-orthodox reading did not appear at all until the 1870's:
It was not until the Republican majority was, under political pressure, forced to find a way of
justifying the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, that, for the first time, the theory
was developed and expounded that the word "protection" in the Equal Protection Clause meant
"benefit," and that this clause conferred anything more than the same remedies for pre-existing
rights.
Avins, supra note 199, at 424 (citations omitted).
227. Alluding to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Carpenter said: 'The right to testify in court is
undoubtedly one of those inherent privileges that belong to a citizen which the State cannot impair, but that
is different from the political right to serve as a juror or judge; at least it seems so to me." CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 821 (1872). He distinguished privileges or immunities from political rights again the
next day. Id. at 843.
228. Morton asked:
[W]hat is meant by "the equal protection of the laws" which a State shall not deprive any person
of? To what does the word "protection" refer? Does it mean that the State shall not deprive a
man of the equal protection of the law for his person? Will any one contend that it shall have
a construction so narrow as that? Will it be contended that it means that a State shall not deprive
a person of the equal protection of the laws for his property, that it shall be confined to that?
I submit that when it declares that no State shall deprive any person of the equal protection of
the laws, it means substantially that no person shall be deprived by a State of the equal benefit
of all the laws; that the word "protection," as there used, means not simply the protection of
the person from violence, the protection of his property from destruction, but it is substantially
in the sense of the equal benefit of the law ....
Id. at 846-47. In 1875 he was still struggling with the word protection, quoting the clause and asking: "Does
that simply mean that each man shall be equally protected or have an equal right to be protected from an
assault and battery, from assassination? Is it confined to that? Not at all." 3 CONG. REC. S1793 (1875). The
same problem confronted those Republicans who, after Slaughter-House, sought to rest the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 on the Equal Protection Clause. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
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d. Citizens and Aliens
The contention that the Equal Protection Clause refers only to the protection
of the laws raises the question whether the protection of the laws includes
everything in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In fact, discussion and congressional
action during Reconstruction support not only the claim that the clause is
limited to protection, but the thesis that while the privileges and immunities of
citizens are broad enough to encompass the 1866 Act, the protection of the laws
is not. This evidence revolves around the nineteenth-century approach to the
respective rights of citizens and aliens.
A striking feature of the second sentence of Section 1 is that the first clause
refers to citizens while the latter two refer to persons. It was clear in the
nineteenth century that citizens had rights that aliens, who were persons but not
citizens, did not.Y2 9 Most importantly, aliens generally were not permitted to
own real property except as specifically provided by state law.230 Indeed, the
classic way of explaining the operation of the Comity Clause was to say that
it would relieve visiting Americans of the disabilities of aliens and thus allow
them to own real estate.23' This commonplace about the rights of citizens and
aliens arose during the debates on the Civil Rights Act. The word "inhabitants,"
which had appeared in the original draft of Section 1, was changed to "citizens"
in order to avoid any implication that it would enable aliens to own real
property2
32
To say that aliens were not citizens, and in particular that they could not
hold real estate, was not to say that aliens were to be treated as outlaws. On
the contrary, civilized countries extended to aliens the protection of the laws.
Blackstone noted that the King of England protected aliens while they were
within the realm, although he protected his natural-born subjects everywhere
and at all times. 3  Like other ideas of Blackstone's, this one crossed the
229. Republican Representative Horatio Burchard of Illinois said during the debates on the Ku Klux
Act: "The privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States are those particular advantages or
exemptions secured or granted to them, but not extended to all persons, and from which aliens may lawfully
be debarred." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 313-14 app. (1871).
230. Chancellor Kent discussed the disabilities of aliens with respect to real property in some detail
in his Commentaries. 2 KENT, supra note 50, at 15-38. The doctrine comes from the common law. 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 202, at *360-61.
231. This was Story's account of the Comity Clause's purpose: "It is obvious, that, if the citizens of
each state were to be deemed aliens to each other, they could not take, or hold, real estate or other
privileges, except as other aliens." STORY, supra note 50, at 674. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts explained that the states of the Union remained foreign to one another for certain purposes, even though
under the Comity Clause out-of-staters "shall not be deemed aliens, but may take and hold real estate."
Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92 (1828).
232. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (Sen. Johnson).
233.
As therefore the prince is always under a constant tie to protect his natural-born subjects, at all
times and in all countries, for this reason their allegiance due to him is equally universal and
permanent. But, on the other hand, as the prince affords his protection to an alien, only during
his residence in this realm, the allegiance of an alien is confined (in point of time) to the duration
of such his residence, and (in point of locality) to the dominions of the British empire.
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Atlantic. In a speech against the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Edgar Cowan,
a moderate Republican from Pennsylvania, objected to Section l's grant of
citizenship, because of the rights that might come with citizenship. He knew
on the one hand that strangers did have the right to protection:
If a traveler comes here from Ethiopia, from Australia, or from Great
Britain, he is entitled, to a certain extent, to the protection of the laws.
You cannot murder him with impunity. It is murder to kill him, the
same as it is to kill another man. You cannot commit an assault on
him, I apprehend. He has a right to the protection of the laws .... 234
On the other hand, it was equally clear to Senator Cowan that aliens were not
full citizens and that their rights to hold real property were limited:
I have supposed that every human being within [the courts'] jurisdic-
tion was in one sense of the word a citizen, that is, a person entitled
to protection; but in so far as the right to hold property, particularly
the right to acquire title to real estate, was concerned, that was a
subject entirely within the control of the States. It has been so consid-
ered in the State of Pennsylvania; and aliens and others who acknowl-
edge no allegiance, either to the State or to the General Government,
may be limited and circumscribed in that particular.
235
Senator Cowan went on to argue that it was unwise to take away from the
states the power to determine who should enjoy the rights of citizens."5 John
Bingham, too, distinguished between the right to protection, to which citizen
and stranger alike were entitled, and the exclusive rights of citizens."
Senator Cowan put the point neatly, but the most striking evidence that
many Republicans believed that the limited rights of aliens included the protec-
I BLACKSTONE, supra note 202, at *358.
234. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866).
235. Id.
236. Senator Cowan had a novel objection to the 14th Amendment. Pennsylvania had been invaded,
he complained, by Gypsies, and he did not want Congress to interfere with Pennsylvania's measures to
protect itself from this invasion. Id. at 2891. Senator John Conness of California responded:
The only invasion of Pennsylvania within my recollection was an invasion very much worse
and more disastrous to the State, and more to be feared, and more feared, than that of Gypsies.
It was an invasion of rebels, which this amendment, ifl understand it aright, is intended to guard
against and to prevent the recurrence of. On that occasion I am not aware, I do not remember
that the State of Pennsylvania claimed the exclusive right of expelling the invaders, but on the
contrary my recollection is that Pennsylvania called loudly for the assistance of her sister States
to aid in the expulsion of these invaders-did not claim it as a State right to exclude them, did
not think it was a violation of the sovereign rights of the State when the citizens of New York
and New Jersey went to the field in Pennsylvania and expelled those invaders.
Id. at 2892. Cowan did not reply.
237. In support of his first proposed amendment, supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text, Bingham
said that all citizens should have the privileges and immunities of citizens, and then asked, "Is it not essential
to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens or strangers,
within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and
property?" Id. at 1090.
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tion of the laws but not the right to own real estate has been in the Revised
Statutes for more than one hundred years. Tracing the descent of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 into contemporary law reveals not one but two successor
statutes: Revised Statutes Sections 1977 and 1978, codified as 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 1982. The Civil Rights Act, as we know so well, prescribed equality
among citizens with respect to a list of rights.s
The first of the two statutory descendants, R.S. § 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other. (emphasis added)
The other, R.S. § 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, says:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
(emphasis added)
As far as the federal statutes are concerned, a state is free to forbid aliens, or
indeed aliens of a particular race, from acquiring real property in the state.
This distinction, perhaps shocking to us, reflects the understanding that the
acquisition of real property is a privilege of citizens not within the protection
of the laws.239 Section 1981, which protects all persons but does not equalize
rights concerning property, began as a proposal by Senator William Stewart of
Nevada in December 1869. It was designed to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause for the benefit of alien immigrants, mainly Asians in California.240
Like Section 1981, Stewart's draft applied to all persons but did not include
238. Citizens were equal in the rights "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and... [to] all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property," and were liable to "like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
239. The history of these statutes is set out lucidly in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 195-205
(1976) (White, J., dissenting). Although Justice White emphasized that § 1981 rests on the Equal Protection
Clause, he did not mention the inference that § 1981 is narrower than the Civil Rights Act of 1866 because
the Equal Protection Clause, which applies to everyone, is narrower than the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, which applies only to citizens. Justice White's point was that § 1981 derives from the 14th
Amendment, not the 13th Amendment.
240. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1869) (resolution requesting Judiciary Committee to
investigate whether legislation was needed to enforce treaty obligations and Equal Protection Clause); id.
at 323 (S. 365 introduced); Charles I. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth
Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL L. REV. 529, 564-68 (1984).
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property rights. It eventually became Section 16 of the Voting Rights Act of
1870." Section 18 of the Voting Rights Act readopted the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which protected only citizens but included property rights2 2 The
revisers codified Section 16 and the twice-adopted 1866 Act by preparing two
provisions: R.S. § 1977, which protects all persons with respect to the rights
listed in Senator Stewart's section, and R.S. § 1978, which protects only
citizens with respect to the property rights contained in the 1866 Act but not
in Senator Stewart's list.
Stewart's decision to exclude property rights from his statute that would
protect all persons was not an accident. When the Senate took up consideration
of Stewart's bill, Kansas Republican Samuel Pomeroy initiated the following
colloquy:
MR. POMEROY. I have not examined this bill, and I desire to ask the
Senator from Nevada a question. I understand him to say that this bill
gave the same civil rights to all persons in the United States which are
enjoyed by citizens of the United States. Is that it?
MR. STEWART. No; it gives all the protection of the laws. If the
Senator will examine this bill in connection with the original civil
rights bill, he will see that it has no reference to inheriting or holding
real estate.
MR. POMEROY. That is what I was coming to.
MR. STEWART. The civil rights bill had several other things applying
to citizens of the United States. This simply extends to foreigners, not
citizens, the protection of our laws where the States deny them the
equal civil rights enumerated in the first section [of S. 365].
MR. POMEROY. They have the same civil rights in that regard. Does
the property of a foreigner dying here descend under our laws? Most
of the States appoint a public administrator who administers upon the
estates of foreigners differently from what he does on the estates of
citizens. Does this interfere with that?
MR. STEWART. I think not.
MR. POMEROY. Foreigners are not allowed to petition the Senate.
If the bill passes, will the petitions of foreigners be received here?
MR. STEWART... It has nothing to do with property or descent.
We left that part of the law out; but it gives protection to life and
241. Act of May 31, 1870, cl. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.
242. Id. § 18.
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property here. The civil rights bill, then, will give the courts jurisdic-
tion to enforce.
MR. POMEROY. I am undoubtedly in favor of the object of the bill.
I wanted to see how far the Senator was willing to go. So far as the
bill goes I think it is right; I only question the propriety of not going
further myself.' "
Ever since 1870 the federal statutes have reflected Senator Stewart's under-
standing that citizens have rights that foreigners do not, but that all alike are
entitled to the equal protection of the laws.24
The significance of this point cannot be overemphasized. If the Voting
Rights Act of 1870 was a proper measure to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause, then the clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of alienage with
respect to the protection of the laws. If the protection of the laws includes the
right to own real property, then the Equal Protection Clause would have
extended this right to aliens, thereby overthrowing a well-established aspect of
American law that the Republicans knew about and accepted. Section 16 of the
1870 Act, however, was drafted on the contrary premise, that the protection of
the laws does not include ownership of real property.
It is tempting to respond that the Equal Protection Clause protects aliens
from race discrimination but not from discrimination based on the fact that they
are aliens. Senator Stewart's text, however, does not bear such a reading. The
1866 Act bans race discrimination by saying that all citizens shall have the
same rights as white citizens. That means that a state cannot deny a citizen a
listed right because that citizen is not white. Senator Stewart's provision says
that all persons shall have the same rights as white citizens. Therefore a white
243. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870).
244. See Alfred Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, and the Right to
Buy Property, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 274, 304 (1967). Avins explained that Stewart's omission of the right
to own real property
accords fully with the prevailing jurisprudence under article four, section two [the Comity
Clause], that citizens had the right to own real property but aliens did not; while the omission
of the right to own personal property is probably explained by the fact that it was not a matter
of "protection of the laws," as then understood.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Avins understood that the Civil Rights Act rested in part on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, but may have thought that the Act was to that extent substantive. Alfred Avins,
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. . ON LEGIS. 1, 6
n.21 (1968).
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alien is entitled to the fights of a white citizen. That is simply a ban on alien-
age-based discrimination.
24s
In short, the federal antidiscrimination statutes as they emerged from
Reconstruction reflect the understanding that the Equal Protection Clause does
not prohibit discrimination with respect to all the rights listed in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment and historical usage
of "protection of the laws" support this reading. If the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is not an equality provision, then the drafters of Section 1 failed in their
primary purpose.2
B. Protection
At this point it may appear that the Fourteenth Amendment is like a rug
with a bump in it. My attempt to resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause
has displaced the confusion to the Equal Protection Clause, which no longer
means what we thought it meant and now means who-knows-what. In the
preceding section, I sought to cast doubt on the conventional understanding of
the text of the Equal Protection Clause. In this section I will begin to recon-
struct an interpretation of the clause based on the premise that the protection
of the laws is a subset of government activities having to do with protecting
people and their rights. This discussion sketches the core of the clause's
meaning under that more limited interpretation.
The Equal Protection Clause's text suggests three conceptual issues:
equality, denial, and the protection of the laws. I have already discussed the
Reconstruction notion of equality, which is largely familiar from orthodox equal
protection jurisprudence.247 There is no reason to think that the concept of
equality would be any different under the Equal Protection Clause, except that
the states may make no distinction between citizens and aliens with respect to
the protection of the laws.
245. Confirmation of this point appears in § 17 of the 1870 Act, which provided criminal enforcement
for § 16. Section 17, the descendent of which is 18 U.S.C. § 242, provided for the punishment of anyone
who, under color of law, discriminated against any person with respect to any of the rights in § 16 "on
account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color or race." Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114,
§ 17, 16 Stat. 144. Similarly, during debate on a naturalization bill, Republican Representative Aaron Sargent
of California said that the Chinese "and any one else, no matter what his color, is entitled to the equal
protection of our laws in life, liberty, and security," but not everyone should be made a citizen. CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4275 (1870).
246. A conclusion along these lines is scarcely unique. See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 20, at 97 ("In
the 1860s, however, the different statuses [of citizens and aliens] were rather plainly viewed as implying
a limitation on the rights guaranteed by the equal protection and due process clauses."). If it nevertheless
seems odd, that may be because most of the leading academic literature on the Equal Protection Clause,
including attempts to divine its original meaning, simply assumes that the clause requires equality in all
state conduct without considering any other possibility. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
247. See supra notes 89-107 and accompanying text.
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The only new question relating to equality is whether the clause is exclu-
sively an equality requirement or whether it confers a substantive entitlement
to the protection of the laws, with the proviso that protection must be equal.
Although this is not easy, the best reading is that the clause requires only that
whatever protection is given be given to everyone.m Classes modified by
"equal" do not usually mark out a nonempty subset of the class. For example,
if a school were required to give every student a hot lunch, it would have to
give every student a lunch that was hot. But if it were required to give every
student the same lunch, it probably could give them all nothing. The latter
requirement may allow the students to be given something, but this is not the
necessary result.
The idea of denial has an easily identifiable core: a purposeful decision by
a state not to provide protection for a reason that violates the requirement of
equality. The classic case occurs when the Ku Klux Klan lynches blacks and
the government does nothing because government policy favors the Klan. If
the clause governs the content of laws as well as their execution, then any law
that unequally provides or withdraws protection also violates the clause.
Difficult questions certainly would arise. For example, it might be hard to
decide how deliberate a failure to protect must be in order to qualify as a
denial.249
The concept of the protection of the laws presents two important questions.
The first is whether protection refers only to the administration of the laws, or
also to their content. Administration is plainly covered. If a state refuses to
enforce its criminal battery laws when ex-slaves are attacked, it has violated
the Equal Protection Clause. It is likely that the clause also governs the content
of protective laws. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 gave blacks the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property.250
This is critical for equal protection, for one way of depriving someone of the
benefit of a law would be to pass another law that took that benefit away.
Thaddeus Stevens said that the amendment required that whatever law protected
the white should protect the black equally, a point that goes to the substance
of the laws.-51 Similarly, Bingham's initial draft was understood to affect the
content of laws when it spoke of equal protection.- 
2
248. By contrast, tenBroek thought that the clause was not limited to equality because "the basic notion
of this phrase is protection; equality is the condition." TENBRoEK, supra note 49, at 222.
249. Some recent cases would make interesting material for an elaboration of this point See, e.g.,
DeShaney v. Winebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Due Process Clause does
not impose affirmative duties on states); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (criminal defendant's
equal protection rights violated by overall pattern of state behavior only if "the decisionnmakers in his case
acted with discriminatory purpose").
250. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27.
251. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
252. Representative Hale thought so, and although Stevens argued that the proposal authorized Congress
to equalize state protective laws but not to pass its own, he did not suggest that the equality requirement
applied only to the execution and not the substance of the laws. Id. at 1063-66.
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The second question is: what portion of a state's legal system makes up
the protection of the laws? 3 More specifically, it is difficult to be sure
whether those who spoke of the right of protection and the protection of the
laws meant to refer solely to legal remedies, or also to some parts of the
substantive law of rights. Remedial laws clearly are part of protection.2 It
is harder to say whether anything else is included. The best view may be that
the rights to life and liberty-essentially, the right of personal security against
violence-are in effect substantively protected, because they are so basic as to
be inseparable from their protective shell: it is difficult to find the right to
personal security anywhere in the law other than in remedial regimes such as
assault and battery255 All those criminal law provisions of which a defendant
might avail himself are thus within the protection of the laws because they
secure natural liberty against the state. The protection of the laws with respect
to property, however, probably includes only remedial laws, leaving the content
of property rights outside the Equal Protection Clause. 6
Substantive laws creating wholly positive or conventional rights-such as
the right to vote, which does not exist in the state of nature-would not be
protective. The clause would apply, however, to laws that protect conventional
rights. For example, a state could not make it a crime to assault white voters
without making it a crime to assault black voters, and it could not have a
practice of prosecuting only assaults on white voters. This is a clear example
253. We confront here the problem that the 14th Amendment puts into positive law certain concepts
that had been used in political rhetoric but that had not been dealt with as legal doctrines. Thus, the many
recorded discussions of equal protection and protection by government do not directly answer our questions.
Largely for these reasons, Nelson generally rejects the notion that the 14th Amendment itself can be anything
other than the starting point for the development of legal doctrines. NELSON, supra note t, at 6-9. This
approach is not mine. I assume that the questions posed by legal texts have answers, though I am not so
naive as to suggest that it is easy to find them.
254. Blackstone and Chief Justice Marshall, for example, said that protection consisted of the remedial
part of the law. Supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
255. The right to liberty classically consisted of freedom from physical restraint: "This personal liberty
consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing one's situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever
place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law."
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 202, at *130. Thus it too would be protected by laws against violence.
256. Bingham appears to have made this distinction between substance and protection with respect
to property. When his proposal to give Congress power to require equal protection of life, liberty, and
property was challenged on the grounds that it would establish national control over private law, specifically
the law of property, he replied:
Although this word property has been in your bill of rights from the year 1789 until this
hour, who ever heard it intimated that anybody could have property protected in any State until
he owned or acquired property there according to its local law or according to the law of some
other State which he may have carried thither? I undertake to say no one.
As to real estate, every one knows that its acquisition and transmission under every
interpretation ever given to the word property, as used in the Constitution of the country, are
dependent exclusively upon the local law of the States, save under a direct grant of the United
States. But suppose any person has acquired property not contrary to the laws of the State, but
in accordance with its laws, are they not to be equally protected in the enjoyment of it. or are
they to be denied all protection?
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866). Bingham erred in his dating of the Bill of Rights,
assuming that he was referring to the Fifth Amendment.
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of the difference between substance and protection, because under my reading
neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Privileges or Immunities Clause
requires any state to allow anyone to vote.
The Equal Protection Clause thus, at the very least, forbids a state from
deliberately refusing to enforce its protective laws for reasons that offend the
rule of equality. It probably also imposes the equality requirement on the
substance of a category of laws that was, in the nineteenth century, of funda-
mental importance. If the latter is true, then the Equal Protection Clause
overlaps the Privileges or Immunities Clause to a significant extent. The overlap
is not complete, however, because there is at least one legal right that is a
privilege or immunity of citizens but is not within the protection of the laws:
ownership of real propertyY 7 This exception may seem inconsequential, but
the right to own real property, important even today, was truly fundamental in
the agrarian Reconstruction era. Lyman Trumbull and his associates would have
thought it a bitter joke had some Democrat suggested that freed slaves be given
equality in all rights but that one.2 8
Moreover, the fact that we have complete confidence only with respect to
the right to own property does not mean that there are not other rights that were
not covered by the Equal Protection Clause. The Republicans distinguished
between the full rights of citizens and the narrower rights of all persons, both
in common usage and in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.259 They
thus highlighted an aspect of the concept of privileges and immunities that
appears in the words themselves but that we rarely consider. Both "privileges"
and "immunities" imply exclusivity, grants to some but, by definition, not
all.Y Thus, the contrast between the rights of citizens and less-favored aliens
257. See id. (aliens entitled to the protection of the laws but not to own real property).
258. Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, arguing in favor of the Freedman's Bureau in an
exchange with Senator Stewart of Nevada, made clear the importance of real property rights:
They have enacted a law in the state of Mississippi that will not allow the black man to lease
lands or to buy lands outside of the cities ....
We must annul this; we must see to it that the man made free by the Constitution of the
United States, sanctioned by the voice of the American people, is a freeman indeed; that he can
go where he pleases, work when and for whom he pleases; that he can sue and be sued; that
he can lease and buy and sell and own property, real and personal .... I am sure the Senator
from Nevada is in favor of that policy of emancipation that carries with it equality of civil rights
and immunities, rather than that other policy that makes the enfranchised bondsman a serf or
peon, the slave of society, its soulless laws and customs.
Id. at 111; see also 1865 Miss. Laws 82.
259. Nelson notes that there is an interpretation of the text that focuses on the distinction between the
right of all persons to protection and the rights of citizens. "Under this interpretation, what ultimately became
section one was designed to give constitutional stature to a basic distinction in mid-nineteenth-century
American law between the rights of aliens and the rights of citizens." NELSON, supra note t, at 52.
260. A privilege is a "right, advantage, or immunity granted to or enjoyed by a person, or a body or
class of persons, beyond the common advantages of others; an exemption in a particular case from certain
burdens or liabilities." 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 522 (2d ed. 1989). An immunity is an "[e]xemp-
tion from a service, obligation, or duty; freedom from liability to taxation, jurisdiction, etc.; privilege granted
to an individual or a corporation conferring exemption from certain taxes, burdens, or duties." 7 OXFORD
ENGLISH DCTIONARY 691 (2d ed. 1989).
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is central to the concept of privileges and immunities. Justice Miller would have
been justified in emphasizing the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States."
The overlap between privileges and immunities and equal protection also
goes a long way toward explaining remarks in the Reconstruction debates
suggesting that the Equal Protection Clause constitutionalizes the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. The most prominent of these is in Thaddeus Stevens' speech
introducing the amendment to the House.2' Several things are noteworthy
about Stevens' explanation. First, he spoke about the second sentence of Section
1 as a unit and did not single out the Equal Protection Clause. Second, he
included protection among the things that would be equal, which is hard to
reconcile with the theory that equal protection underlies the whole list, but
which does accord with the theory that protection is a subset of rights. Finally,
all the examples Stevens gave fell within the overlap of privileges and immuni-
ties and protection.
V. APPLYING THE RECONSTRUCTED PRIVILEGES
OR IMMUNrrmS CLAUSE -
Having suggested that the equality-based reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was available and advanced during Reconstruction, I begin
this part by explaining why that reading, along with the more limited view of
the Equal Protection Clause, is a more satisfying account of the text and history
of Section 1. The rest of this part attempts to understand the scope of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. It focuses on the privileges and immunities
of state citizenship, as the novelty of my interpretation lies in the suggestion
that a ban on abridging them would forbid discrimination while retaining the
states' power over the content of their laws.
A. The Better View
The equal citizenship reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has
several advantages over other readings that do not include an equality-based
approach to state law rights. First, by providing a central role for the rights of
state citizenship, it takes seriously the dual citizenship conferred by the first
sentence of Section 1. The privileges or immunities of state citizenship are an
261. Stevens, after a close paraphrase of the second sentence of § 1, explained that "these provisions"
allow[] Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates
upon one man shall operate equally upon all. Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime
shall punish the black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree. Whatever law
protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection to the black man. Whatever means of
redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to alL Whatever law allows the white man to testify
in court shall allow the man of color to do the same.
CONG. GLOBE , 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
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embarrassment for a wholly substantive reading of the clause, which must either
jettison them or imply that the Constitution dictates the content of state law in
many particulars.
262
Next, this approach reconciles the two constitutional provisions that speak
of privileges and immunities of citizens. The rights of state citizenship protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment are the very rights of state law referred to in the
Comity Clause of Article .263 More generally, this approach to the Four-
teenth Amendment preserves the conceptual structure of privileges or immuni-
ties as a variable that is given its value by the content of the relevant law. In
neither Article IV nor the Fourteenth Amendment does the concept have or
need any independent content of its own. This last observation points up an
additional attraction of the positive law understanding of privileges or immuni-
ties: it banishes most of the baffling uncertainty that has for so long surrounded
those words for students of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the concept is indeed
a variable that refers to the positive law, then the central task is distinguishing
between those aspects of the positive law that constitute citizenship rights and
those that do not. This task is not easy, but it is not as difficult as an inquiry
into natural rights.
This Article has been guided by a question that arises out of historical
context: Can the Privileges or Immunities Clause serve to read the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 into the Constitution? My claim is that it can indeed do so, while
simultaneously preserving the Civil Rights Act's fundamental character as a
nonsubstantive ban on discrimination. As a textual matter, this interpretation
brings together the Act, which refers only to citizens, and the provision of the
Amendment that refers to citizens. The fact that most readings of Article IV
identify privileges and immunities identical to the rights referred to in the Act
also sits well with this approach.
An equality-based reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is not
merely desirable but necessary if, as I claim, the Equal Protection Clause is
properly understood as applying only to the protection of the laws, a body of
rights narrower than the privileges and immunities of citizens and narrower than
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. As explained above, that more limited reading,
well known to students of the original understanding but contrary to the current
orthodoxy, is textually attractive because it gives substance to the subject of
the clause, the word "protection." This reading is historically well grounded
in nineteenth-century ideas about the protective function of government, and
262. For that reason, substantive readings paradoxically have to agree with Justice Miller's conclusion
in the Slaughter-House Cases that the clause is limited to rights of distinctively national citizenship.
263. Because it adopts the approach to state citizenship rights that appears in the orthodox reading of
the Comity Clause, my reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause preserves a simple meaning for dual
citizenship under the Constitution, a meaning consistent with ordinary notions of federalism: the rights of
national citizenship are associated with the prohibitions imposed by the national constitution and the
legislative competence of the national government, while the rights of state citizenship are associated with
the state constitutions and the legislative competence of the state governments.
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was in wide circulation during Reconstruction. Moreover, this reading accounts
for the repeated Republican statements that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had nothing to do with voting, and was the explicit premise for an
important piece of Republican civil rights legislation, the ancestor of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.
Finally, this reading of the Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection
Clauses gives a coherent account of the second sentence of Section 1. To see
this, we need to consider an aspect of the Due Process Clause that has always
been important but that is often glossed over because it is even more basic than
what we normally call "procedural due process." The Due Process Clause
provides that no State may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." It thus applies when the state acts against someone
by taking away life, liberty, or property, and is usually understood to require
that such unfavorable state actions occur only after the government has em-
ployed fair procedures?. 4 But that is not all that the clause means. If, as
seems likely, it derives from the "law of the land" provision of Magna Charta,
the Due Process Clause also refers to the principle of legality itself: the require-
ment that the government act only pursuant to law-the "due process of
law"--and not according to the whim of some official.265
It would make good sense for Section 1 to impose the principle of legality
on the states. The main extralegal ground of government conduct in the white-
dominated South of 1866 was race, followed by anti-Union sentiment. To
require that official action against individuals be pursuant to law would elimi-
nate such extraneous considerations. Moreover, the requirement of legality fits
well with the principle of equality that underlies Section 1 because adverse
government action based on the private feelings of officials is, by definition,
partial and arbitrary. Finally, the procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause
would ensure that Judge Lynch would no longer sit in the state courts. 6
264. See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277
(1856) (stating that Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendmentrequires that federal deprivations of life, liberty,
or property be effected pursuant to procedures consistent with other provisions of the Constitution and with
"those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before
the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political
condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country.").
265. The "law of the land" ("per legem terrae") provision of Magna Charta states: 'No freeman shall
be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or banished, or in any ways destroyed, nor will the king
pass upon him, or commit him to prison, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
COOLEY, supra note 139, at 351 n.1 (Cooley's translation). Its history is discussed in Frank H. Easterbrook,
Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 95-100. If the due process requirement does not
embody the "law of the land" rule, it probably embodies a similar but more limited usage of "due process"
that refers only to the proper service of writs by the courts. Id. at 95-96. It is quite possible that by 1866
the phrase had taken on the "law of the land" meaning. Justice Swayne said in his Slaughter-House dissent
that '[d]ue process of law' is the application of the law as it exists in the fair and regular course of
administrative procedure." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 127 (1873).
266. Abolitionists sometimes claimed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposed
on government an obligation to see that deprivation of life, liberty, or property was undertaken only by the
government, and only as prescribed in law. This would make it into an equal protection provision.
TENBROEK, supra note 49, at 119-22, 237-38. This approach to due process squeezes the two concepts of
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The Due Process Clause prevents state activity that is, literally, lawless.
Its complement is the Equal Protection Clause, which forbids the denial of
protection and therefore prohibits inaction in the face of private lawlessness.
Under these clauses combined, the state may move against an individual only
pursuant to law, and may not sit on its hands while individuals threaten the
rights of any person. Together, they impose regularity and hence equality on
the administration of the laws. On this reading it is easy to see why these two
clauses apply to all persons, not just to citizens. The principle of legality, and
the protection of life, liberty, and property, are the basics of government.
Citizens enjoy additional rights, but everyone is entitled to the minimum of due
process and equal protection.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment thus mandates equal civil rights
for citizens, the regular and impartial rule of law, and universal performance
of the state's basic function. It is about equality through and through.
B. The Doctrine Reconstructed
A doctrine of the reconstructed Privileges or Immunities Clause must have
two components: a method of determining whether a law affects a privilege or
immunity of citizens and a method of determining whether it violates the
principle of equality by abridging a citizen's privileges or immunities. An
abridgment must be contrasted with a change in the content of the law as it
applies to all citizens. A doctrine of abridgment would deal with many of the
problems that confront old-style substantive due process and new-style equal
protection.
1. Privileges or Immunities
The Privileges or Immunities Clause forbids abridgment of the privileges
or immunities of citizens, not of any other kind of rights. Corfield was about
the distinction between privileges and immunities and other rights, like fishing
in oyster beds. We should already have this doctrine because the Comity Clause
has been in the Constitution from the beginning. There have been so few
decisions under the clause, however, that the case law is sketchy at best.2' 6
Nevertheless, the Comity Clause suggests that we can approach the Fourteenth
protection and legal regularity into a single clause. If we read the 14th Amendment in light of this history,
it is natural to say that the protection requirement has been made explicit in the Equal Protection Clause
and the procedural and rule of law aspects of § 1 are localized in the Due Process Clause.
267. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). In recent times, the Court has not attempted
to carry out the Corfield project of determining which categories of rights constitute privileges and
immunities of citizens. Instead, it now interprets the clause in light of its presumed purpose of interstate
harmony and asks whether some particular right is basic to the operation of the Union. See, e.g., Baldwin
v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). As a result, the Court has developed an
interpretation of the concept of privileges and immunities that is adapted to the Comity Clause but that is
not useful for interpreting the same words in the 14th Amendment.
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Amendment by asking whether a right is one as to which a state could discrimi-
nate against out-of-state Americans. As noted before, the core categories of the
privileges and immunities of state citizenship are the private law and public
protection rights covered by Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.28 Tax
laws are also subject to the clause, because any feature that reduces a citizens'
tax is an immunity.26 Similarly, criminal liability and punishment must be
equal because any legal rule that prevents conviction or reduces punishment
is an immunity. Protections against government-constitutional rights as we
use the term today-are immunities. As already noted, privileges or immunities
as understood in 1866 probably did not include political rights. The most
difficult question outside of the historical core involves government benefits.
Justice Washington's conclusion in Corfield was that fishing in a state's
oyster bed is not a privilege or immunity of citizenship because it involves the
division of the state's common property. This raises the question whether
anything that we might now characterize as a government benefit can qualify
as a privilege or immunity. The question is difficult, in part because public
services are a more common and more important function of government now
than when the Comity Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
adopted. In light of that development, and of Corfleld, it is tempting to say that
government benefits are more like oyster beds than they are like the right to
own property. This is unpersuasive, however, because there are many examples
of government services known in the nineteenth century that very probably
would have been classified as privileges or immunities of citizenship. Public
roads, for instance, are an in-kind government benefit, and it is difficult to
imagine that the Comity Clause permits a state to reserve them for its own
citizens.270
While I cannot supply a full application of the concept of privileges and
immunities of citizens to government benefits, one proposal seems promising.
The rhetoric of privileges and immunities of citizens in the nineteenth century
was heavily Lockean. It was based on the theory that individuals have natural
268. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. The classic privileges and immunities covered
by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 are private capacity rights such as property and contract.
269. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). Representative James
Wilson, a Republican of Iowa and chairman of the House Judiciary Committee in the 39th Congress,
explained the concept of an immunity when introducing the Civil Rights Bill, which at that point secured
equal "civil rights and immunities":
What is an immunity? Simply "freedom or exemption from obligation;" an immunity is "a right
of exemption only," as "an exemption from serving in an office, or performing duties which the
law generally requires other citizens to perform."... A colored citizen shall not, because he
is colored, be subjected to obligations, duties, pains, and penalties from which other citizens are
exempted. Whatever exemptions there may be shall apply to all citizens alike .... One class
shall not be required to support alone the burdens which should rest on all classes alike. This
is the spirit and scope of the bill, and it goes not one step beyond.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lst Sess. 1117 (1866).
270. Indeed, the protection of the laws-referred to in Corfleld as "[pirotection by the government,"
6 F. Cas. at 551, and in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as "benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property," Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27-is a government service.
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rights that they bring into society, and that the purpose of government is to
secure those rights by fixing them in definite law and protecting them with the
coercive power of the state.27' A favorite theme of Abolitionists and Republi-
cans was that the individual, who had surrendered the natural right of self-
protection by giving allegiance to the state, was entitled in return to be protect-
ed by the government.272
This way of thinking suggests a principle for deciding whether government
benefits are privileges or immunities. When the government undertakes to
provide something that individuals have a natural right to acquire, and either
monopolizes its provision or forces citizens who obtain the benefit privately
to pay for it a second time by taxing them for its public provision, then the
benefit so provided is a privilege of citizens.273 Protection of person and
property, for example, is a privilege because the government, having monopo-
lized the use of force, must give everyone protection to compensate for that
which they are no longer permitted to provide themselves.
This means that most government benefits with which we are familiar will
be privileges of citizenship because most of them are supported by general
taxation. 274 Those that are financed largely or wholly by user fees may not
271. As Representative James Wilson put it during a debate on suffrage in the District of Columbia,
with the institution of civil governments, "[w]hat were natural rights before, now become civil rights."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1866); see also N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. V ("when men
enter into a state of society, they surrender up some of their natural rights to that society, in order to ensure
the protection of others; and, without such an equivalent, the surrender is void.").
272. Representative Wilson said during the debate on the civil rights bill: "The highest obligation which
the Government owes to the citizen in return for the allegiance exacted of him is to secure him in the
protection of his rights." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sass. 1295 (1866). Representative Shellabarger
similarly asked whether the national government could "prevent one race of free citizens from being by
State laws deprived as a race of all the civil rights for the securement of which his Government was created,
and which are the only considerations the Government renders to him for the Federal allegiance which he
renders?" Id. at 1293.
273. I derive this idea from Judge Williams' suggested mode of adapting the Due Process Clauses to
the modem activist state. Stephen Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits,
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983). Judge Williams suggests that government benefits qualify as property for
purposes of the Due Process Clauses when the government, by financing the benefit through taxes, has
forced the citizens to pay twice for the same good if they seek to obtain it privately. He also suggests that
government licenses should be treated as property when the government has antecedently imposed the
restriction on natural liberty consisting of the license requirement. The analysis is especially instructive
because Judge Williams' approach, like that of most Republicans in 1866, is explicitly Lockean.
274. This approach resonates with Republican expressions of outrage against states that taxed both races
for a service but then provided it only to whites or to blacks on less desirable terms. Debating the 14th
Amendment, Senator Timothy Howe of Wisconsin cited the Florida school system as an example of unequal
legislation. In Florida, both blacks and whites were taxed to support the white schools, but only blacks were
taxed to support the black schools. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lst Sess. 219 app. (1866). Republican Senator
Oliver Morton of Indiana made this point in debating the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
which at that point mandated equal rights to common schools that were supported by taxpayers of both
races:
[W]here schools are maintained and supported by money collected by taxation upon everybody,
there is an equal right to participate in those schools ... if there be a distinction, if the right
to participate in these schools is to be governed by color or any other distinction, I say that is
a fraud upon these who pay the taxes.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3191 (1872). There is some play in the concept of general taxation.
Some difficulties are built into the Constitution's terminology.
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be. With this approach, however, the disposition of property that the state had
not obtained from anyone, such as oyster beds, would not necessarily represent
a privilege of citizens. But if the state used tax revenues to buy an oyster bed,
it could not exclude citizens from fishing there on the basis of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
2. Abridgment and Equality
a. Caste Legislation and Abridgment
The Fourteenth Amendment's concept of abridgment depends on the
distinction between laws that define rights and laws that determine who shall
have them, such as a Black Code. A Black Code was an overlay on preexisting
rights, based not on the normal considerations that determine the content of
those rights, but based instead on an immutable, hereditary characteristic that
had been integral to a vast system of exploitation in the South and a widespread
pattern of disadvantage in the North. In order to understand how the Privileges
or Immunities Clause might operate outside of its historical core, we must
translate this central exemplar into a concept that can be applied to other
situations.
The two central features of a Black Code-that it was an overlay on neutral
laws and that it was based on race and color-generate the organizing princi-
ples of orthodox equal protection thinking. One approach views the Fourteenth
Amendment as implicitly containing a series of absolute antidiscrimination rules
like that in the Fifteenth Amendment. The task of interpretation is then to
determine what the forbidden grounds of discrimination are. The other approach
holds that equality is not concerned with grounds of classification but rather
with reasons for employing those grounds. A law is then forbidden by the
equality rule when it rests on a forbidden criterion, often referred to as ani-
mus.275 The forbidden criterion is characterized as arbitrary or irrational, in
contrast with the criteria that ordinarily underlie legislation.
In practice, the difference between the two approaches is that the animus-
based theory permits the same basis of classification to be permissible under
some circumstances and impermissible under others, depending on the purpose
for which it was used. This means that the state sometimes may employ a
normally forbidden basis of classification, even race. The focus on animus also
means that certain characteristics of persons that are not normally thought of
as marks of caste will nevertheless be forbidden when used for improper
purposes. If individuals who drive foreign cars became the subject of wide-
spread resentment, a law forbidding them from purchasing gasoline, that was
275. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
In Sunstein's terminology, a rule violates the equality requirement when it rests on a naked preference or
a naked desire to harm.
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motivated by a desire to retaliate against them, would be inconsistent with a
ban on animus.
Does the Privileges or Immunities Clause ever permit distinctions based
on race with respect to the rights of citizens? No. Does it recognize the exis-
tence of ad hoc castes, such as owners of foreign cars? Yes. The answers leave
us with a confused concept. On the first issue, the best guidance to the Recon-
struction notion of unequal legislation is offered by the civil rights statutes,
which were the cutting edge of Republican antidiscrimination rules. Although
their teaching is not entirely clear, I think these statutes indicate that discrimina-
tion with respect to race, color, or previous servitude is always unequal legisla-
tion.
This signal first appears in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which states that
all citizens shall have the same rights as white citizens. That is a ban on
discrimination. It could be suggested that the Civil Rights Act permits a state
to give nonwhites rights not enjoyed by whites because whites would then still
have the rights of whites.276 Although this is a plausible reading, its plausibili-
ty partly reflects our modem tendency to think in terms of the rights of poten-
tial plaintiffs in lawsuits, rather than in terms of abstract rules. If a nonwhite
citizen has more rights than a white citizen, then the rule of the Civil Rights
Act has been violated because all citizens do not have the same rights as white
citizens.277 The mature form of the Republican civil rights statute, the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, was a simple prohibition on race discrimination with
respect to public facilities.278 If the 1875 Act is a model ban on unequal legis-
lation, then the Fourteenth Amendment requires caste-blindness with respect
to privileges or immunities of citizens.
276. David Strauss made this point about the Civil Rights Act to me. Although it is true, it may reflect
an accident of drafting. The Civil Rights Bill as originally introduced by Senator Trumbull did not use white
citizens as a baseline; rather, its only reference to race, color, or previous condition of servitude banned
all discrimination on those grounds thus prohibiting race discrimination against whites. See CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). Referring to that version of the legislation, Senator Trumbull explained
that it was a bill "to secure equal rights to all citizens of the country, a bill that protects a white man just
as much as a black man." Id. at 599. Also, the second Freedman's Bureau Act, which applied only in the
rebel states, adopted a rule of nondiscrimination. It provided that a list of rights very similar to the one in
the Civil Rights Act "shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens of such State or district without
respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery." Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173,
176-77.
277. The teaching of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on this subject is equivocal because § 2 of the Act,
which provided criminal enforcement, penalized state actors who deprived inhabitants of rights protected
under § 1, or who imposed greater punishments on an inhabitant than were prescribed for white persons.
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27. This suggests a focus on the rights of individuals, not the
abstract rule of equality. On the other hand, the 1866 Act elsewhere spoke in terms of simple race-blindness.
In § 4, it required the federal courts to appoint sufficient United States Commissioners to afford "reasonable
protection to all persons in their constitutional rights of equality before the law, without distinction of race
or color, or previous condition of slavery ... ." Id. ch. 31, § 4, 14 Stat. 28.
278. The 1875 Act provided that "all persons" were entitled to "full and equal enjoyment"of common
carriers, inns, and places of public amusement, "subject only to the conditions and limitations established
by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of
servitude." Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 336. The Act's jury selection provision similarly
banned discrimination against anyone on the basis of race. Id. ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336-37.
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Turning to the second question, the Reconstruction notion of abridgment
probably also included what we might call ad hoc castes or castes-in-con-
text-criteria that are not commonly employed but that nevertheless represent
a division of the citizenry into classes for reasons unrelated to the content of
fundamental rights. As an unrealistic example, imagine that a state placed limits
on the contractual capacity of people whose names start with certain letters.
That would abridge their right to contract because the alphabet has nothing to
do with the law of contract. This aspect of the doctrine produces far harder
cases than that of alphabet classification.
This result is not entirely satisfying because it leaves us with notions of
equality and abridgment that seem somewhat cobbled together. That problem,
however, is endemic to the concept of general equality, and it was that concept
that the Republicans used. For this reason, I do not mean to suggest that my
notion of unequal legislation solves the problems common to ordinary equal
protection jurisprudence. Both understandings are rooted in the Reconstruction
notion of generalized equality, and both share the difficulties of that frustrating
way of thinking, which rests on an intuition that seems plausible until we begin
to apply it in difficult cases.279
b. Symmetrical Discrimination
One of the most vexing questions during Reconstruction concerned race-
conscious state laws that were nevertheless symmetrical and therefore arguably
equal. Typical examples included antirniscegenation statutes, which prevented
whites from marrying blacks just as they prevented blacks from marrying
whites, and forced separation laws, which kept blacks from mingling with
whites and vice versa. Such laws are equal in the sense that both races are
subject to them.
Despite many Republicans' rebuttals to Democratic denunciations of
interracial marriage, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids restrictions on privileg-
es or immunities that take race into account. It is easiest to begin with the Civil
Rights Act. Under a ban on interracial marriage, the rights of individuals of
different races are not the same under all descriptions, because blacks can marry
blacks and whites cannot, even though all are prevented from marrying mem-
bers of the other race. But if the rights are different under any description, they
are not the same. No rule that requires reference to a citizen's race in order to
know that citizen's rights, therefore, will give citizens of all colors the same
279. Peter Westen argues that the idea of equality has no independent content. He does not say that
antidiscrimination rules are empty, but on the contrary suggests that equality sometimes functions simply
as the label for an antidiscrimination rule. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV.
537, 564-69 (1982) (discussing 14th Amendment as principle of racial nondiscrimination). As both my
discussion here and the problems of standard equal protection analysis demonstrate, there is much to what
Westen says.
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rights. If marriage is a contract then the Civil Rights Act banned antimiscegena-
tion laws.8
This question is easier under the Privileges or Immunities Clause than under
the orthodox reading of the Equal Protection Clause. The latter's reference to
equal protection makes possible the claim that the races are equal because the
restrictions are symmetrical. The former clause, by contrast, forbids abridgments
of privileges or immunities and hence focuses on restrictions on rights.28'
Under a symmetrical discrimination, people's rights are abridged because the
right to marry or to contract is subject to a restriction based on a caste charac-
teristic. A white person's right to marry a black person is abridged. The fact
that a black person's right to marry a white is also abridged makes the statute
more unconstitutional, not less so.
c. Beyond Race, Color, and Previous Condition of Servitude
A difficult question for my theory, as well as ordinary equal protection
analysis, is the existence of castes per se other than those based on race, color,
and previous condition of servitude. Reconstruction saw some consideration,
but no resolution, of the single most difficult of these questions-the caste
status of sex. During the debate on Bingham's first proposed amendment,
Representatives Hale and Stevens touched on sex discrimination but provided
no illumination.282 Justice Field in Slaughter-House thought that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause permitted sex discrimination.283 In Bradwell v. Illi-
nois,24 the case immediately following Slaughter-House, three of the Slaugh-
280. Reverdy Johnson claimed that marriage was a contract and that the civil rights bill would forbid
antimiscegenation laws. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866). Senator Fessenden of Maine
replied that there was no discrimination because a black man "has the same right to make a contract of
marriage with a white woman as a white man has with a black woman." Id. Johnson rejoined that
Fessenden's argument, the standard response, was beside the point He gave as an example his own state's
ban on interracial marriage, under which a black man could not marry a white woman but a white man
could: "There is therefore in Maryland one law in relation to this question for the white man, and another
law for the black man." Id. at 505-06. Johnson's argument was unanswerable, and no one really tried to
answer it. On this issue, the Republicans either deceived themselves or decided that the only thing for it
was a round untruth.
281. I realize that similar reasoning can be employed under the ordinary reading of the Equal Protection
Clause. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The rights created by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual.... Equal Protection of the laws is
not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."). Indeed, I think that such reasoning is
correct, but that the conclusion follows more readily from the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
282. Hale argued that giving Congress power to mandate equality would be an enormous intrusion into
areas normally reserved to the states. He gave as an example distinctions between the property rights of
single and married women, and asked whether Congress could eliminate such distinctions. CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866). Stevens' response was a masterpiece of assertion masquerading as
argument. He said that distinctions based on race were unequal but those between married women and
"femmes sole" [sic] were not, but failed to explain why. Id. Hale pointed out that Stevens had suggested
no way of telling permissible from forbidden bases of classification: 'The line of distinction is, I take it,
quite as broadly marked between negroes and white men as between married and unmarried women." Id.
283. 83 U.S. (16 WalL) 36, 110 (1873).
284. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 130.
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ter-House dissenters explained that they would not hold that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause forbade sex discrimination with respect to admission to the
bar.28
On the other hand, counsel for Mrs. Bradwell was no less than Senator
Matthew Carpenter, a leading member of both the Supreme Court's bar and the
Republican Party. He argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause forbade
discrimination on the basis of sex just as it forbade discrimination based on
race.2 6 Carpenter's argument probably had merit, but this was a very hard
question.
There is at least one characteristic other than race, color, or previous
condition of servitude that does fit comfortably into both our own, and the
Republicans', notion of caste-religion. Creed sometimes found its way onto
lists of characteristics notwithstanding which all men were equal, and it had
a long history as a basis for the creation of second-class citizenship.2 7 The
Constitution already contained the Religious Test Clause of Article VI, and
religious freedom was a standard feature of the state bills of rights, some of
which explicitly banned discrimination based on creed.8
Next, it is likely that political association, like religious belief, would
constitute caste per se. 89 Specific examples in which we can have some
confidence are loyalty to the Union and membership in the Republican Party.
Politics is another ground of classification within the citizenry that has nothing
to do with one's rights and is a common way of dividing people up for favor-
285. Justices Swayne and Field joined in the now-famous opinion in which Justice Bradley explained
that the law of nature and nature's God destined women for domestic pursuits rather than the legal
profession. Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring). The Chief Justice dissented but wrote no opinion. Id.
at 142.
286. See id. at 133-37 (argument of counsel).
287. For example, during the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Senator George Edmunds, a
Republican from Vermont, characterized discrimination based on race, creed, and nationality as violations
of an individual's right "to stand equal with his fellow-citizens." 3 CONG. REc. 1866 (1875); see also CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 app. (1872) (Sen. Thurman commenting on adherence to the 39 Articles
as prerequisite for graduation from Oxford University).
288.
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his
person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the
dictates of his own conscience ....
N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. 5; see also NJ. CONST. of 1844, art. 1, § 4 ("'Nlo person shall be denied
the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on account of his religious principles.").
289. According to Cooley, the limitations on "unequal and partial legislation" built into his law-of-the-
land or substantive due process doctrine implied that "a statute would not be constitutional which would
proscribe a class or a party for opinion's sake." COOLEY, supra note 139, at 390 (footnote omitted).
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able or unfavorable treatment2 9o In addition, political belief and action, like
religion, already had substantial protection under American constitutions.291
The forbidden subjects thus include politics, religion, and possibly sex. This
discussion of candidates for caste status has probably not advanced our under-
standing of that concept very much. These problems are the hard part of the
Fourteenth Amendment and are not likely to go away.
C. Applications
1. Compulsory Segregation
The Supreme Court upheld a railroad car segregation law in Plessy v.
Ferguson.292 Although symmetrical, the law restricted the right to contract
by forbidding a white citizen from buying a ticket on a car that carried blacks.
It also limited the even more fundamental privilege of natural liberty because
the black passenger was not allowed to walk into the white train car. The law
should have been held invalid. 293 The same is true with respect to segregated
public education. Schools financed by general taxation are very probably a
290. For example, in 1860 the Maryland legislature passed a statute transferring responsibility for
policing Baltimore from the municipal authorities to a newly created Board of Police. The Board was
forbidden to employ any "Black Republican or endorser or approver of the Helper Book." 1860 Md. Laws
ch. 7, § 6 (referring to Hinton Rowan Helper's inflammatory antislavery book, IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE
SOUTH: HOW TO MEET IT (1857)). The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore objected to many aspects of
the new legislation, including the disqualification. Mayor & City Council v. State, 15 Md. 376 (1860). The
Supreme Court of Maryland admitted that the disqualification would be invalid "if we were to consider that
class of persons as proscribed on account of their political or religious opinion." Id. at 468. The Court,
however, held itself unable officially to tell what a Black Republican or Helperite was and refused to address
the issue. Id.
291. E.g., N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, § 18 (right to assemble, to consult for common good, to make
views known to representatives, and to petition).
292. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
293. I will have to disappoint the reader who expects me to criticize Plessy for having been decided
under the wrong clause because despite its place in history as an equal protection case, Plessy was not
decided under any particular words of the Constitution at all. It is, if anything, based on substantive due
process. In response to a parade of horribles that included laws "requiring white men's houses to be painted
white, and colored men's black," the Court explained: "The reply to all this is that every exercise of the
police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the
promotion for the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class." Id. at 549-50.
The sentence following Justice Harlan's famous color-blind epigraph puts the correct doctrine well: "In
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law." Id. at 559. Justice Harlan also derided the
majority's substantive due process argument: "But I do not understand that the courts have anything to do
with the policy or expediency of legislation. A statute may be valid, and yet, upon grounds of public policy,
may well be characterized as unreasonable." Id. at 558.
1462 [Vol. 101: 1385
Privileges or Immunities
privilege of citizens.21 If so, to give individuals of different races different
versions of the privilege would constitute an abridgment. 95
2. Jury Selection
In Strauder v. West Virginia,296 the Supreme Court held that a black
defendant could not be convicted by a jury from which all blacks had been
excluded 97 Such a law would not abridge the privileges or immunities of
the potential juror because jury service is a political and not a civil right. The
Court, however, rested its decision on the rights of the defendant. Justice Strong
argued that a criminal defendant received unequal protection when he faced a
jury that had been selected from a pool containing no members of his race.298
Although the issue is not easy, the result probably was right under both the
Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses, which overlap on this
point. The difficult question is whether and when the race of the jury counts
as part of the legal treatment afforded the defendant. I think that it did in
Strauder. Certainly jury-composition rules can constitute immunities. Blacks
could not be tried by juries deliberately drawn from conviction-prone groups.
3. Reverse Preferences
May the states undertake caste-conscious discrimination in favor of those
who traditionally have been the victims of caste legislation?299 Such preferen-
tial treatment is permissible where privileges and immunities are not involved.
One of the most interesting questions on this point concerns public hiring and
contracting. If we regard services provided by general taxation as privileges of
294. See supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text. I agree with the argument given by Senator
Frederick Sawyer, a Republican from South Carolina, during an 1871 debate over segregation in the District
of Columbia schools. Although Sawyer was not addressing the 14th Amendment itself, his reasoning was
based on its concepts:
These schools are maintained by the public funds, common, public funds-funds contributed
by the entire community, funds raised by taxation, paid not by white men alone, but by men
of all colors-and those funds should be administered impartially, giving to no class of men any
privilege over any other class of men.
CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1059 (1871).
295. I do not think that my theory of the 14th Amendment stands or falls with this question. Man is
not the measure of all things, as Socrates replied to the Sophists, and neither is Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). An interpretation of the Constitution is not wrong because it would produce a different
result in Brown.
296. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
297. Id. at 305-12. The decision apparently rested on the Equal Protection Clause.
298. The Court said that the question presented was "whether by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, every citizen of the United States has a right to a trial of an indictment against him by a jury
selected and impaneled without discrimination against his race or color, because of race or color." Id. at
305.
299. This discussion could be much more extensive. I am trying to work out the implications of my
thesis rather than make a substantial contribution to the literature on these subjects. See, e.g., Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
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citizens, we must then ask whether eligibility to be among those who provide
the services also constitutes a privilege. Although answering this question is
not easy, my thought is that the taxpayer's money purchases the service, not
the opportunity for employment. Reverse discrimination with respect to actual
privileges or immunities, however, is impermissible as a caste-based abridg-
ment.
4. Facially Neutral Laws, Proxies, and Shams
Not all the Black Codes were explicitly cast in terms of race.3 °0 If we
make the extremely plausible assumption that their purpose was in fact to
impose control on the freed slaves, these laws present the classic problem of
shams. In this context, shams are laws that do not require that race be consid-
ered in their application, but are adopted as clever substitutes for facially
discriminatory legislation. The simplest sham uses not the forbidden criterion
of classification but some proxy. A standard illustration is the grandfather
clause, used to evade the Fifteenth Amendment, under which an individual
whose grandfather voted was excepted from a literacy requirement. 301 The
literacy requirement would disenfranchise very many blacks and some whites,
while the grandfather exception would rescue illiterate whites and virtually no
such blacks.
Almost all constitutional prohibitions must confront the serious problems
shams present To take a notorious difficulty, antisham doctrines usually require
an inquiry into collective legislative purpose, an enterprise that is extremely
difficult at best.30 It is worth noting, however, that a provision becomes more
susceptible to shams as it becomes more rigidly formalistic, and that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is less formalistic than an explicit ban on
discrimination like the Fifteenth Amendment 303 For example, a sham based
on a proxy that had no more to do with the subject matter than does race would
violate the clause, not because of any doctrine of shams, but because it would
constitute an abridgment on its own terms as a caste-in-context.
300. See, e.g., 1866 Va. Acts 91-93 (vagrancy).
301. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
302. As the grandfather clause cases show, the attempt to eliminate shams can lead courts to derive
a secondary rule concerning legislative purpose from a primary rule that may have been formulated solely
in terms of the content of laws: the 15th Amendment says that the right to vote may not be abridged on
the basis of race, and a grandfather clause law nowhere mentions race. As a reaction to the difficulties
associated with intent tests, judicial attempts to deal with shams also tend to generate effects tests, in which
a law is judged neither by its content nor by its purpose, but by the practical consequences it produces. A
classic instance is the development of Establishment Clause doctrine in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), and its progeny, such as Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983).
303. Although I have given the grandfather clause as an example of a forbidden sham, Maltz maintains
that the 15th Amendment was originally understood to be completely formalistic and hence readily evaded.
MALTZ, supra note 20, at 155-56. It would be interesting to study the relation between the use of hypotheti-
cal examples involving racial shams and the decline of formalism in American legal thought
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5. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
A full treatment of incorporation is beyond the scope of this Article because
I will not be considering privileges and immunities of distinctively national
citizenship in any detail. My discussion of this deep and important question will
be limited to two observations.
The first is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause accomplishes some-
thing very much like incorporation as the Republicans would have understood
it, no matter what we conclude about rights of national citizenship per se. The
privileges and immunities of state citizenship include state constitutional
protections, many of which are similar in subject matter to those contained in
the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution. States may not, therefore,
discriminate with respect to those rights. As things looked in 1866, this would
go a long way toward actually applying the first eight amendments to the states.
State and federal bills of rights overlapped substantially.304 State laws sup-
pressing the speech of blacks or unionists would constitute caste legislation or,
if the state constitution remained facially intact, a denial of equal protec-
tion.305
This point does not answer all questions of incorporation. Suppose a state
repealed its constitutional protection of religious freedom and passed a law
forbidding all religious worship-would that abridge a privilege or immunity
of distinctively national citizenship? 316 My second observation is that, assum-
ing the correctness of Barron v. Baltimore,317 the answer depends on a ques-
tion of labels.0 Constitutional prohibitions have labels that tell which level
304. See NELSON, supra note t, at 118. Nelson's account of incorporation is very similar to mine. Id.
at 117-19.
305. This observation explains how an Abolitionist's outrage at the celebrated Hoar incident, and the
claim that it violated the Comity Clause, would not necessarily imply a need for substantive federal
protection of freedom of speech. In 1844, antislavery leader Samuel Hoar came from Massachusetts to South
Carolina to protest the treatment of free blacks but was expelled by order of the South Carolina legislature.
As Senator Sherman explained during the 39th Congress, the suppression of Hoar's speech violated the
Comity Clause, which "gives to the citizen of Massachusetts, whatever may be his color, the right of a
citizen of South Carolina, to come and go precisely like any other citizen." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 41 (1865). Sherman said that the problem was that Congress lacked the power to enforce the Comity
Clause. Id.
306. This question has felled forests. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947)
(Black, L, dissenting) (Privileges or Immunities Clause applies the first eight amendments to the states);
Fairman, supra note 27, at 5 (Privileges or Immunities Clause does not apply the first eight amendments
to the states); 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 25, at 1089-95 (does incorporate); RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMIENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989) (does not); CURTIS, supra note 26 (does).
307. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
308. Barron held that the Fifth Amendment, like the rest of the fast eight amendments, applies only
to the national government The counterargument is that Amendments I-VIII do not mention which
government they apply to (except for the reference to courts of the Umted States in the Seventh Amend-
ment), and thus might be perfectly general. On this point, no one has come up with a persuasive answer
to John Marshall's argument in Barron. Marshall said that the Constitution tells us that restrictions apply
to the states only if they say so. This is the plan of the original Constitution in Article I, §§ 9, 10. Section
9 speaks in general terms but applies only to the national government because § 10, which substantially
overlaps with it, begins 'No State shall." Id. at 248-49.
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of government they operate against. The First Amendment by its terms applies
to Congress, while the Contracts Clause by its terms applies to the states. If
Barron is right, prohibitions that do not by their terms apply to the states have
implicit labels like the one that is explicit in the First Amendment.
Incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause turns on whether
the definition of a right of distinctively national citizenship includes its label.
If we read it with the label on, the First Amendment creates a right to be free
from congressional abridgments of the freedom of speech. If we read without
the label, the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech. If freedom of
speech is, in and of itself, an immunity of national citizenship, then under the
Fourteenth Amendment no state may abridge it.309 When we take the label
off the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right, or the Article I right to the writ of
habeas corpus, we accomplish incorporation through the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.
The no-labels approach rests on the argument that the Constitution, when
we look at it with a hand over the Privileges or Immunities Clause, contains
"inchoate" rights of national citizenship-privileges and immunities of United
States citizens that are legally real but that the states might nevertheless abridge
in the clause's absence. This position rejects Justice Field's claim in Slaughter-
House that under the Supremacy Clause it is a tautology that no state may
infringe the rights of national citizenship.310
D. The Crescent City Company Reconsidered
Sometimes the Supreme Court makes mistakes. By the Court's telling, the
story of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is one of those tragedies where
everyone dies in the last act. In Slaughter-House, Justice Miller's majority
opinion held that the "privileges or immunities of citizens )f the United States"
did not include rights of state citizenship.31 I have argued above that this is
not the best reading of the text, but that on the contrary those privileges or
immunities include rights of state positive law.
According to what is probably the standard reading of history, the dissent-
ers in Slaughter-House disagreed with both Justice Miller's view and mine. The
best known dissent is Justice Field's, whose opinion was joined by the entire
minority.312 The Slaughter-House dissenters are associated with the claim that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause gives absolute protection to certain natural
309. This is essentially Crosskey's argument. 2 CROSSKEf, supra note 25, at 1089-95. My understand-
ing of this issue has profited enormously from conversations with Akhil Amar. His article on this subject,
which adopts the no-labels approach, is by far the best argument in favor of incorporation under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,
101 YALE L. 1193 (1992).
310. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1873) (Field, 3., dissenting).
311. Id. at 74 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
312. Id. at 83 (Field, I., dissenting).
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rights that qualify as privileges or immunities of American citizens. Under a
free government, privileges and immunities include the whole range of private
capacities protected at common law, including the right to engage in any lawful
calling, subject to such reasonable regulation as is necessary to secure the
liberty of all. The calling of a butcher, subject to appropriate health and sanita-
tion regulations, is wholly lawful. Therefore, when the Louisiana monopoly law
prevented the plaintiffs from following their calling on their own premises it
abridged one of their privileges or immunities.
13
So far the standard reading. In fact, the dissents' discussions of the Privileg-
es or Immunities Clause reflect the principle of equality perhaps even more than
they reflect the concept of absolute rights. Justice Field first appealed to
equality in his brief flirtation with the butchers' Thirteenth Amendment argu-
ment.3 14 When he got to the serious business of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Field retained the equality theme. Discussing Corfield, he said that
among the privileges and immunities of citizens "must be placed the right to
pursue a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than
such as equally affects all persons."3" He then said that what the Comity
Clause
did for the protection of the citizens of one State against hostile and
discriminating legislation of other States, the fourteenth amendment
does for the protection of every citizen of the United States against
hostile and discriminating legislation against him in favor of others,
whether they reside in the same or different States. If under the fourth
article of the Constitution equality of privileges and immunities is
secured between citizens of different States, under the fourteenth
amendment the same equality is secured between citizens of the United
States.316
He was right. 7 Justice Bradley's dissent maintained that any American could
313. Id. at 96-110. "All monopolies in any known trade or manufacture are an invasion of these
privileges, for they encroach upon the liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue happiness ...."
Id. at 101. We know this doctrine as economic substantive due process. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905). The stone that was rejected became the cornerstone for a while.
314. The nonmonopoly butchers maintained that the creation of castes among the citizens by the
creation of a monopoly was an infringement of their freedom. Field quoted Senator Trumbull's argument
that the 13th Amendment mandated equality among the citizens. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 92 (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866)).
315. Id. at 97.
316. Id. at 100-01.
317. Field was offended by monopolies because they were inconsistent with the principle of equality:
This equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and partial enactments, in the lawful
pursuits of life, throughout the whole country, is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the
United States. To them, everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without
other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex, and
condition.
Id. at 109-10; see also Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY LJ. 785 (1982). Although Conant appears to equate
the antimonopoly tradition with substantive rights, opposition to monopolies does not logically imply belief
14671992]
The Yale Law Journal
go to any state and claim citizenship and "an equality of rights with every other
citizen."31s
Everyone knows that the rhetoric of the Reconstruction era mixed referenc-
es to equality and to natural rights.319 It is not, however, well known that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is hospitable to the principle of equality, nor
that it was found to be so by the very Justices who made it famous as a
possible vehicle for the constitutional protection of absolute natural rights. I will
not speculate as to how this aspect of the Slaughter-House dissents has been
lost to us.3"n It did not disappear altogether, though. While it is another com-
monplace that the doctrine of the Slaughter-House dissenters eventually tri-
umphed, it is sometimes forgotten that the entire theory of the Slaughter-House
dissenters reappeared: the classic doctrine of substantive due process had a
strong element of equality.
321
The only question left, then, is whether the dissenters were right about the
application of equality notions to the facts of Slaughter-House. I think they
were. The plaintiffs in Slaughter-House argued that the monopoly was unequal
legislation and Justice Field agreed. They were right that being a butcher is a
privilege of state citizenship. Pursuing an ordinary calling is a civil right, and
the monopoly limited natural liberty. On the other hand, not being a member
of the Crescent City Live-stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company is not
a mark of caste per se. The more difficult question is whether it was an ad hoc
caste on the facts of the case. That depends largely on whether we credit the
argument that a monopoly furthered the interests of all butchers and hence was
related to the subject of slaughtering, or whether we attribute the monopoly to
simple venality.
Constitutional equality provisions are not always easy to apply. Slaughter-
House would be a difficult case today, except that the hard questions would
be hidden by the assumption, built into "rational basis scrutiny," that the states
generally do not act for forbidden purposes. If, as seems likely, the recipients
of the monopoly were chosen for no reason other than their favor with the
in absolute rights because monopolies are defined by their unequal nature.
318. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 113.
319. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note t, at 64-90.
320. The tale was saved and not lost by David Currie. See CtURRIE, supra note t, at 342-51.
321. For example, in striking down a state ban on yellow-dog contracts, Justice Pitney explained that
the 14th Amendment limits the states to pursuing the "general welfare," which does not include simply
"leveling inequalities of fortune" by improving the position of some at the expense of others. Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 18 (1915). To Justice Pitney, redistributive legislation was partial and arbitrary because
transfers from one private person to another served only private interests. This is confirmed by the old
doctrine's "public purpose" requirement with respect to takings and the regulation of property. See, e.g.,
Missouri Pae. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S.
112, 158 (1896). This principle, not the notion that the 14th Amendment incorporates the Takings Clause,
is the original ground of the Supreme Court's conclusion that the states may take private property for public
use only ff they provide just compensation. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1896)
(prohibition on pure transfers between private persons implies prohibition on transfers to the state without
compensation). See generally COOLEY, supra note 139, at 389-97 (discussion of "Unequal and Partial
Legislation").
1468 [Vol. 101: 1385
Privileges or Immunities
legislature, then the Louisiana law did not represent a neutral change in the
rights of its citizens.3 Slaughter-House was probably wrong.
E. Paramount National Citizenship and Federalism
The equality-based reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is not
the only nonstandard account of the Fourteenth Amendment. My account
emphasizes that many Republicans believed the Privileges or Immunities Clause
forbade discrimination with respect to rights conferred upon citizens by state
law. The power to enforce such a rule, however, does not give Congress
authority over the substance of ordinary private law, such as the power to
regulate common carriers within the states. There is, however, a related but
fundamentally different theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, according to
which Congress has precisely that power.
It was sometimes said during Reconstruction that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment made national citizenship paramount, whereas before the Amendment's
adoption it had been subordinate to state citizenship.23r On this view, citizen-
ship brings with it the privileges and immunities of citizens, whatever they may
be. It was also said that the Fourteenth Amendment gave the national govern-
ment the task of protecting the rights of its citizens.3 The rights of citizens
range from contractual capacity to frequenting places of public amusement. If
paramount national citizenship meant that all citizens' rights were now under
congressional control, then Congress could create a right of access to common
carriers just as a state could.
Let there be no mistake about it-this theory of paramount national citizen-
ship would abolish the doctrine of enumerated powers and with it American
federalism. 3' The congressional authority it sanctions is not limited to ensur-
322. Justice Miller denied this in Slaughter-House, arguing that the monopoly was wholesome and not
invidious, even though his approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not require that he address
this issue. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 60-66.
323. The language of paramount national citizenship was utilized in one of the early circuit court cases
under the Voting Rights Act of 1870, where the court said that under the 14th Amendment "e]itizenship
in the United States is defined; it is made independent of citizenship in a state, and citizenship in a state
is a result of citizenship in the United States." United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871)
(No. 15,282). The facts of Hall suggest that Judge Woods, writing for the court, took an expansive view
of Congress' power under § 5, because the case was a prosecution against private persons. See also Howard
J. Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment: 11 Systemization 1835-1837,
1950 Wis. L. REV. 610, 659 (concept of paramount national citizenship originates with Abolitionists in
1830's).
324. Senator Howe suggested this when he said that the 14th Amendment to some extent transferred
control of citizens to the national government. 2 CONG. REC. 4147 (1874). Carpenter said much the same
thing in an exchange with Senator Trumbull during the Ku Klux Act debate. According to Carpenter, the
14th Amendment effected a "tremendous" revolution in our system of government because "[lt gives
Congress affirmative power to protect the rights of the citizen, whereas before no such right was given to
save the citizen from the violation of any of his rights by State Legislatures, and the only remedy was a
judicial one when the case arose." CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 577 (1871).
325. This interpretation is urged by Robert Kaczorowski, who says that the Republicans acted on the
theory that the 13th and 14th Amendments eliminated the limitations on Congress' powers. "The scope of
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ing equality, although it can certainly be used to do that. It goes far beyond
anything granted elsewhere in the Constitution, at least as the Constitution was
understood in the nineteenth century. If Congress could protect the rights of
citizens in this sense, there would be neither need nor role for the states.
326
In rejecting this interpretation, I do not mean to say that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not contain a doctrine of paramount national citizenship. The
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause I present is such a doc-
trine. According to my account, it is vital to distinguish between ensuring the
possession of rights and having power to define them. If I am correct, the Four-
teenth Amendment decrees who shall have the rights of state citizenship and
thereby mandates an equality of rights. That was serious business in 1866, for
it took from the states the power to classify their citizens. It did not, however,
take from them the power to determine the substance of the equal rights of all.
The Fourteenth Amendment, as I understand it, also significantly expands
the power of Congress to ensure citizens of their rights by passing laws such
as the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That too was serious business but still stops
short of a congressional power to define all the rights of citizens. On the
contrary, Congress' ability to grant or define rights continues to be limited to
its enumerated powers. National citizenship thus becomes paramount because
it is granted by the national Constitution and brings with it the full rights of
state citizenship. Congress becomes the final guardian of the citizens' right to
possess their privileges and immunities but retains only limited authority to
define these rights. This distinction between the possession and the content of
rights secures equal citizenship while preserving enumerated national powers
and thus American federalism.327
To choose between these two views, we must begin with the observation
that the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is not hospitable to a
this authority was potentially destructive of American federalism. If Congress chose, it could legislate
criminal and civil codes that displaced those of the states." ROBERT I. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUsTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876,
at 3 (1985).
326. Contrary to Kaczorowski, I do not think this most expansive interpretation actually had many
adherents. Rather, although expansive language was sometimes used, the specific problems being addressed
involved race discrimination. The most difficult questions on this topic concerned private violence against
blacks and supporters of the Union, and it was in this context that Judge Woods wrote his opinion in United
States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). One of the leading theorists of paramount
national citizenship evidently drew back from suggesting total congressional authority over citizens' rights:
"The Constitution had been re-amended in 1866. It had been re-amended, among other reasons, to assure
national powers over persons and propeny in the States in so far as necessary to reach and prevent race
discrimination." Howard J. Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3, 37
(1954).
327. Although I cite Howe and Carpenter as Republicans who referred to national protection of citizens'
rights, I do not think they regarded the 14th Amendment as a grant of general legislative power to Congress.
When debating Senator Trumbull, Carpenter showed that he was thinking about equality: "Now the question
is upon [the 14th] amendment of the Constitution. Are not the privileges and immunities of every citizen
of the United States put on a par in every State of the Union?" CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 576
(1871).
1470 [Vol. 101: 1385
Privileges or Immunities
general congressional power over citizens' rights."as The obstacle to reading
the clause to confer general federal legislative power is that the clause is a rule
for the states. Congress can require state compliance under Section 5, but its
power is defined by the primary rule to which it attaches.
To illustrate this point, consider whether Congress could pass a uniform
national property law pursuant to the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
Section 5. Assume there are no state laws that abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens.329 Rather, Congress has simply decided to take its power over
the rights of citizens as seriously as it takes its commerce power and to legislate
as it deems expedient. Assume that Congress' property law recognizes tenancy
by the entireties, a privilege that is not within the natural right to property.
Congress' tenancy provision does not require that the states comply with
the mandate of the Privileges or Immunities Clause because that mandate does
not include tenancy by the entireties. 3 ' The only sense in which the law
enforces Section 1 is that it makes it legally impossible for a state's property
law to violate the Constitution by rendering the state's law inoperative. In fact,
any congressional preemption of substantive state law would perform this
function. By this way of thinking, Congress could keep the states from violating
Section 1 by abolishing them. This is what happens when we try to avoid the
clause's character as a rule for the states.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause, read with Section 5, does not say that
Congress has substantive authority over the rights of citizens. In order to avoid
this textual difficulty, the argument for broad congressional power is often
328. Kaczorowski suggests that his claims concerning plenary federal power may derive from provisions
of the 14th Amendment other than the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Kaczorowski, supra note 33, at 915.
Although I am primarily concerned with only one provision, I think my argument also applies to the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, because they too are prohibitions on the states. I am also skeptical
of the claim that the first sentence, by imposing a rule concerning the preexisting category of national
citizenship, repealed Article I, § 8 and the 10th Amendment.
329. This stipulation is important. The debates on the Ku Klux Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1875
focused on the question whether Congress could ever act directly on private persons. It is entirely possible
to say that such direct legislation is sometimes authorized while denying that Congress can simply replace
the states. Then-Representative Garfield, during the Ku Klux Act debate, said that Congress could provide
direct protection against private outrages when, but only when, the states had failed to do so. He explained
that the problem of the Klan arose because
by a systematic maladministration of [the laws], or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provi-
sions, a portion of the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state
of facts is clearly made out, I believe the last clause of the first section empowers Congress to
step in and provide for doing justice to those persons who are thus denied equal protection.
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st. Sess. 153 app. (1871); see also Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J 1353, 1359 (1964) (setting out
moderate Republican theory of congressional power where states have defaulted). Jacobus tenBroek too
seems to have adopted Garfield's view or something like it. See TENBROEK, supra note 49, at 202-03, 220-
23.
330. That is true even if the privileges or immunities of citizens include substantive natural rights. Nor,
by hypothesis, is any part of the property law designed to alleviate some other substantive violation of §
1. It is an interesting question whether Congress' enforcement powers authorize deliberately overbroad
measures to prevent violations of the primary rules. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (nation-
wide ban on literacy tests sustained even in states that never used literacy tests for unconstitutional
purposes).
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rested on the drafting history.331 The second sentence of Section 1 derives
from Bingham's earlier February proposal.332 The earlier proposal would have
empowered Congress to secure privileges and immunities as well as equal
protection in life, liberty, and property, although it is doubtful whether it
actually would have given Congress power to enact uniform federal civil and
criminal codes. The argument that the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress
plenary power over civil rights rests on two claims about the drafting process:
first, that Bingham's earlier draft would have given Congress such authority,
and second, that nothing important changed when the February proposal was
rewritten to become Sections 1 and 5 as we have them today.
This claim is not persuasive. First, Representative Hale, the principal
Republican opponent of Bingham's proposed amendment, was afraid that it
would grant Congress general power to protect life, liberty, and property.333
But neither Thaddeus Stevens nor John Bingham said that he wanted to do so.
Rather, both said that the second clause was limited to equality, and neither
asserted that the first clause went farther.3 4
Moreover, Representative Hotchkiss advanced the same objection as
Representative Hale and Senator Stewart. He understood that the purpose of
Bingham's amendment was to end discrimination among citizens.335 Hotchkiss
was in favor of that, but he thought the proposal by its terms would
331. See, e.g, Kaczorowski, supra note 33, at 913-17.
332. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
333. Nine years later, toward the end of the debate on the 1875 Act, Hale asserted that the 14th
Amendment as it finally emerged did the thing to which he had objected: it "did change the constitutional
powers of legislation of Congress ... and introduced a range of legislation by Congress utterly lacking in
the old Constitution." 3 CONG. REC. 979 (1875). He never said, however, exactly what new power the
amendment conferred on Congress, and the context suggests that he thought the new power principally
concerned direct national action where the states had violated § 1. Hale said that § 5 empowered Congress
"in the first instance to remedy the great evil against which the amendment proposes to guard." Id. at 980.
That evil was probably race discrimination, including racially motivated inaction in the face of private
violence. No one would deny Hale's point that the 14th Amendment significantly changed federal-state
relations, but he never suggested that it went beyond equality all the way to giving Congress power to
supplant the states with its own code.
334. In the other chamber, Senator Stewart explained that he opposed Bingham's draft because it would
obviate not only the need for the Civil Rights Bill or any more constitutional amendments, but also "the
necessity of any more State Legislatures or conventions." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1082 (1866).
Stewart said that Bingham's amendment would "work an entire change in our form of government." Id.
Referring to the equal protection provision, he said:
The only way this could be accomplished, would be for Congress to legislate fully upon all sub-
jects affecting life, liberty, and property, and in this way secure uniformity and equal protection
to all persons in the several States. When this was done, there would not be much left for the
State Legislatures, for I apprehend that the great body of the laws of the several States as in fact
of any government relates to the protection of life, liberty, and property. Undoubtedly this had
reference to some other subject. It undoubtedly had reference to protecting the negro or some-
thing of that kind .... I think the committee had in view one object, but by their amendment
would accomplish another.
Id.
335. Id. at 1095.
1472 [Vol. 101: 1385
Privileges or Immunities
authorize Congress to establish uniform laws throughout the United
States upon the subject named, the protection of life, liberty, and
property. I am unwilling that Congress shall have any such power.
Congress already has the power to establish a uniform rule of natural-
ization and uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcy. That is as
far as I am willing that Congress shall go.
336
Hotchkiss wanted to preserve enumerated powers while also protecting equality.
Bingham did not indicate disagreement.337 In the light of Hotchkiss' explicit
repudiation of any intent to grant Congress substantive power, Bingham's
response demonstrates either that he envisioned no such power or that he was
deliberately holding out on the House.
I leave it to those more knowledgeable than I to address the broader
historical question as to whether anyone in 1866 wanted to give the national
government general legislative power. My point is that the text of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause does not give Congress plenary power to define the rights
of citizens and thereby legislate on virtually every subject, and that the drafting
history indicates that this was quite deliberate. Rather, the clause makes national
citizenship paramount as Hotchkiss wanted, by providing "that no State shall
discriminate against any class of its citizens. 338
VI. CONCLUSION
According to John Hart Ely, "the slightest attention to language will
indicate that it is the Equal Protection Clause that follows the command of
equality strategy, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause proceeds by
purporting to extend to everyone a set of entitlements. '39 Ely is precisely
correct. That is what we will think if we pay the slightest attention to language.
The consequences of slight attention are manifest in our non-jurisprudence of
the clause. If we are convinced that the great riddle is the concept of privileges
and immunities of United States citizens we are led in either of two directions.
One of them, taken in Slaughter-House, makes the provision trivial. The other,
pursued in the various substantive theories of the clause, supposes that the
vitally important Fourteenth Amendment employs a concept that is not just
vague at the edges, but that has no discernible core of meaning.
336. Id.
337. In reply to Hotchkiss, Bingham said that the amendment
is not to transfer the laws of one State to another State at all. It is to secure to the citizen of each
State all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States. If
the State laws do not interfere, those immunities follow under the Constitution.
Id. at 1095. That response is no endorsement of plenary federal authority to protect the life, liberty, and
property of all persons. The statement that citizens' rights follow under the Constitution if the states do not
interfere seems to mean once again that Congress will need to use its new enforcement power only if the
states violate the Constitution.
338. Id.
339. ELY, supra note 7, at 24.
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If we pay more attention to language, we realize that it is possible for a
state to abridge a state law right and conclude that the clause secures equality
with respect to such rights. If we pay enough attention to the Equal Protection
Clause to get beyond the word equal, we discover that protection is narrower
than privileges and immunities. We then can conclude that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause does the main work of Section 1 by constitutionalizing the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.
My final suggestion is that we have gotten things backwards. Because it
seems to be either tautological or incomprehensible, the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause is often taken as an instance of the principle, enunciated by the late
Arthur Leff, that it is easy to say nothing with words.' On the contrary, the
words do say something. Indeed, they say exactly what their historical context
would lead us to expect them to mean.
340. See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionabilty and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 485, 559 (1967).
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